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No. 73-898 ~ ~ t/1 n'rr-THREE-JUDGE COURT ~. 
GOSS (Dir, Pupil Personnel, 
Columbus, Ohio Public 
Schools), ET AL. 
v. 
LOPEZ, ET AL. (Columbus 
students) 
~ from USDC SD Ohio 
(E Div) (Peck, Kinneary, 
Rubin) 
Federal Civil 
(42 U •. S. C. 1983 action) 
Timely 
1. Appellees, present and former students in the Columbus, Ohio 
public school system, brought this class action chaFenging the constitu-
tionality of a statutory procedure allowing suspension of public school 
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Appellees sought injunctive, declaratory, and expungement (of school 
records} relief. USDC SD Ohio (E Div} (THREE-JUDGE COURT} (Peck, 
Kinneary, Rubin} granted declaratory relief against the state statute and 
the local regulations promulgated thereunder, and ordered deletion of all 
~ 
reference to suspensions and disciplinary transfers from the Columbus 
public school records of appellees. The judgment and order of USDC makes ---
no mention of injunctive relief. The sole mention of injunctive relief in 
USDC' s opinion is a reference to the nature of the action. J. S., p. 22. 
Appellants, officials and employees of .the Columbus public school 
system and board of education, contend that there is no due process 
guarantee to a hearing in respect to a ten-day suspension from school. 
2. FACTS: In February and March, 1971 racial tension in the 
Columbus, Ohio school system erupted into a number of disturbances. 
During this period a number of students were suspended without a pre- or 
post-suspension h~aring, pursuant to regulations and administrative 
procedures adopted by the Columbus public school system in conformity 
with section 3313. 66 of the Ohio Revised Code: 
The superintendent of schools of a city or exempt 
village, the executive head of a local school 
district, or the principal of a public school may 
suspend a pupil from school for not more than ten 
days. • • • Such superintendent, executive head, 
or principal shall within twenty-four hours after 
the time of •.. suspension notify the parent or 
guardian of the child, and the clerk of the board 
of education in writing of such •.• suspension 
including the reasons therefor. . • . No pupil 
shall be suspended ... from any school beyond 





The factual issues in the case were tried before Chief Judge 
Kinneary, USDC SD Ohio, whose findings of fact were adopted fully by the 
THREE-JUDGE COURT. The findings recited in some detail the circum-
stances of the suspensions of named plaintiffs {appellees), as testified to 
principally by appellees themselves. Some testimony was introduced by 
appellants. No hearings were held in connection with the suspensions. 
The school system provides for a post-suspension conference between 
parent and principal. This conference is not a fact-finding hearing and is -
solely rehabilitative in nature. USDC found that none of the named plaintiffs 
were in fact afforded such a hearing . The named plaintiffs who testified 
claimed that their suspensions were unwarranted, but the justification 
or lack thereof for any suspension played no part in USDC' s holding. 
Appellant Goss testified that '.3-ppellees' suspensions had no effect on their 
academic achievement as reflected in their grade point averages. Goss 
testified that suspended students were given zeros for work missed and 
were not allowed to make up lost work. Goss conceded that any absence 
from school may have negative educational effects . Appellees presented 
evidence that suspensions result in psychological harm to students. 
USDC held that the action could be properly maintained as a class 
action on behalf of students suspended on or after Feb, 1971; that the court 
had jurisdiction over the subject matter in that the suspensions were made 
under color of state law; that the court had personal jurisdiction over all 
defendants save the Columbus Board of Education; that the case is not moot ; 
that abstention is not called for; and that procedural due process attaches 
~ ,,,,,---; 
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to school sus pensions. As to the latter holding USDC held that education 
is a protected libe rty under the due process clause of the Fourte enth 
'> - --
I 
Amendment, The nature of the due process prote ctions which are t o b e 
accorded depends upon the severity of the sanction, For short sus p e n sions 
info r mal hearing proce dures may be invoked, USDC approved imme diate 
removal of a student "whose conduct disrupts the academic atmosphe r e of 
-- - ..... ..-... z:r:---e, - .... 
the school, endangers fellow students, teachers or school officials, or 
dama ges property. 11 J. S., p. 63. The student and parents must receive 
immediate written notice of the reasons for the suspension, and a hearing 
before a school administrator must be held within 72 hours of the susp e n sion, -------- - -- - -
with ari opportunity for the student to submit statements by the student and 
others in defense or mitigation of the charges. Statements in support of 
the charge are to be provided for. Presence of counsel is not requir e d . 
·' 
A decision should be made and commun,icated to the student and parents 
within 2 4 hours. In its judgment and order USDC declared 3313. 6 6 and 
the re g ula tion s adop t e d by the Columbus public sch ool system pursuant 
thereto to be unconstitutional, and ordered all reference to suspensions 
and disciplinary transfers of plaintiffs (probably also meaning the class 
plaintiffs represented) deleted. 
3. CONT E NTIO NS: Appellants contend that USDC' s decision is in 
conflict with San Antonio .Ind e p. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973), which held that e duc a tion is not a constitutional fundamental right. 
Education is not part of the concept of liberty. Further, a grievous lo s s 
must be suffered by the individual of the fundamental interest for proc e du ral 
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due process guarantees to attach. USDC' s decision conflicts with decision s 
of other courts in the federal system. 
Appellees note that USDC allowed for maximum flexibility in the 
procedures which must be accorded students subject to suspensions. 
Rodriguez held that education was not a fundamental interest which requir e d 
the application of the strict scrutiny test of equal protection. The case 
did not hold that education is not liberty or property the deprivation of 
which by the State would be covered by procedural due process guarantees. 
Education is both liberty and property. A grievous loss need not be 
suffered; the severity of the deprivation only goes to the nature of the 
hearing which might be required, not to the requirement that there be 
some form of hearing. At any rate, the harm here is serious. The result 
reached by USDC is consistent with that reached by other courts. 
4. DISCUSSION: Neither side raises the jurisdictional is sue. 
USDC did not enter any order "granting or denying .•• an interlocutory 
<\ u.w <.:..iv\ c..ct,cv{ -
or permanent injunction .~ired .•• to be heard" by a 3-judge 
court, 28 U.S. C. 1253, unless the expungement order can be considered 
such an order. The order of expungement is ~10t an injunction by its terms. 
Further, appellees state that they sought declaratory and injunctive relief, 
and expungement, distinguishi,ng_ between them. A ppellees' Brief, p. 4. 
The most direct conflict on the merits with USDC is Linwood v. 
Board of Ed., City of Peoria, etc., 463 F. 2d 763 (CA 7 1972), wherein it 
was held that a seven-day suspension did not require a pre-suspension 






may still be liberty or prope rty even if it is not a fundamental constitutio nal 
interest for equal protection analysis. 
Due process rights for school children seems to be an important 
topic. If jurisdktion is foun d the Court might want to note or possibly to 
hold for Arnett v. K e n nedy, No. 72-1118, and/or Mitchell v. W. T. Grant , 
No. 72-6160. 
There is a response in the nature of a motion to affirm. 
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No. 73-898 GOSS v. LOPEZ 
T '111is is a sumnary memo, primarily _as a "memory jog'' of 
the facts and issue presented by the above case. JThis 
l 
memorandum reflects no specific analysis, and reflects only 
a most tentative and superficial viewpoint. 
*'* * * * 
A three.-judge D1,,strict ·; court , iri~Ohio held that public 
school pupils (both elementary .and ·~•igh school) may not be 
H · · i , , ,, , ... 
susp~nded without a .due process hearing. An Ohio statute 
(§ 3313.66 Ohio Code) authorizes "the principal. of a public 
school" .to suspend a pupil "for not more than 10· days". 
Within 24 hours after any such suspension, the statute requires 
that the principal notify the parent _in ·writing, stating the 
reasons for the suspension. The pupil or the parent (or 
' ' ' 
guardian) "may appeal such action to the Board of Education", 
which "may hold a hearing" on reauest of ·the pupil r:,r parent. 
The Ohio court, correctly I think, recognized that a 
sc~ool board and school officials "possess historical inherent 
power" to discipli'ne students, and that§ 3313.66 is not 
"a source of authority but a limitation on school authorities' 
inherent power to discipline students". Jurisdictional 
Statement, p. 46. 
During a period of school disorders in 1971 in Columbus, 
Ohio; , some 75 students were ,suspended in accord with procedures 
then in effect (jurisdictional Statement, p • . 26), pursuant 
, . - - 2. 
to which the teacher would submit a written ststement to the 
assistant principal in charge of discipline. The · student 
would be given an opportunity to- disagree with the teacher's 
version of the facts, but there would be no hearing. Several 
of the suspended students instituted a class action suit 
I 
under§ 1983. A three-judge court was convened under 28 u.s.c. 
2281. The court ,concluded ,that the "right to an education is 
I 
a prQtected-" liberty tinder the 14th Amendment", and that even 
a brief suspension of such educ·ation is unconstitutional 
} .· _i ' I' ' ,. 
•' 1:
0 
I, 1 . ,. 
0 
I'. -
absent a · due ' process h~aring . ··The court recognized that 
only Hmi,niqru~•• d~e pro,cess ·. ~as required, but would include 
written notice and a hearing (but without counsel). See 
opinion of the court p. 63 and 64 .. of Jurisdictional Statement. 
Jurisdiction 
We reserved the ~uestion as to the juris~iction of a 
three-judge court. Although neither side raised the juris-
dictional issue, the District Court did not enter an order 
"granting or denying ••• an interlocutory or permanent 
injunction in any civil action ••• required ••• 'to be 
hearing by a three-judge court." 28 u.s.c. 1253. The only 
order of the court was that references to the suspensions of 
' 
plaintiffs or members of their class. be removed from all 
records of the Columbus public schools". This is not an 
injunction by its terms, although it can be argued that -
in effect, it is a mandatory injunction to expunge the records. 
- -
3. 
I will await further enlightenment on this issue. The case 
' 
hardly. seems 8:11 apprppriate ;~e i''.for . thr~e judge action. 
The Merits 
The appe\~ants , make tw~, argulll'!n~.s: (i) that public class-
• t, . •, ~ ; t' I r ' • - ; '"L • I; 
room instruction (public school edu.cation) is not an interest 
protected by the Constitution requiring due process; and (ii) 
even if continuous education without suspension is a "liberty" 
or a "property'' interest protected by the 14th Amendment, a 
( 
due process hearing is not required in the case of a short-
term suspension 'in the context of administering public school 
discipline. Appellees and numerous ~mici, argue the contrary 
on both issues, asserting that the right to an uninterrupted 
education is "liberty'' and, a "property" interest under the 
Roth 'analysis, protected by the 14th _Amendment and requiring 
a due process hearing before any child of any age may be 
suspended for any tiQJe. It is con~eded, .however, that in the 
case of disruption a suspension may be ~de without delay 
. . 
provided a hearing is held promptly .thereafter. ·, 
• I'.: 
lam i~clined to agree with appellants (the ,public
1 
school 
authorities) on both issues. But my present disposition would 
be to decide the case on the second issue, without decid~ng 
I •• 
whether or not education is a liberty or a prope~;y protected 
by the 14th Amendment. ·Even if an affirmative answer be 
assumed, I do not think the courts should extend due process 
... \ ...... - -
requirements into routine disciplinary proceedings of 
elementary and ~igh school pupils. Thia should be left to 
the school authorities. Intervention of the federal courts 
at this level of education •would open a vast new source of 













TO: Mr. Justice 
FROM: Joel 11, 1974 
U,~.:-~.---- ' ~ 
1. Jurisdiction - I think there is jurisdiction 
to entertain the appeal. While there is no jurisdiction 
for direct review of declaratory relief, Rockefeller v. 
Catholic Medical Center, 397 U.S. 820, in this case 
there was also an order expunging the records. That order 
is properly classified as a mandatory injunction and 
therefore appealable. Section 1253 allows an appeal 
from any injunction, not only one invalidating the statute. 
an 
See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, holding that/order 
suppressing evidence is appealable under§ 1253. 
/ 
2. Merits - I realize that I am leading with my chin, 
but here goes. I suggest you affirm the decision below, 
modification. Basically, I think petitioner's 
that education is not a "property" or "liber;y" 
x-
within the Fourteenth Amendment won't wash. Your 










and Sinderman pretty much accept the proposition that an 
entitlement, which education is under Ohio law, is protected 
by the constitution. I doubt, for example, that you 
would allow permanent expulsion from school without any form of 
hearing. 
Next we come to the question of what process is due. 
A brief suspension, such as the ten days involved here, 
seems to be a de minimus interest and therefore not worthy 
of procedural safeguards. See Justice Harlan's concurrence 
in Sniadach. What troubles me, however, is that the effect 
of a suspension -- i.e., its "collateral consequences" --
may be important in terms of college or job opportunities. 
Maybe I overestimate this problem, but I know that when I 
was a child I was always worried about depo.rtment entries 
on my "permanent record." 
In light of this interest I think a student should 
be given some opportunity to dispute the facts on which 
the suspension is based. I do not think a prior hearing 
need be required since it is irrelevant to the "collateral 
------""""-"-.... 
consequences" problem, and because the need for flexibility 
often 
in school administration/requir e s that suspension~ take 
opportunity to dispute the taxi:s 
\ place sunnnarily. An/ within a reasonable time after 










that the hearing could be before a school administrator, 
that only the student and his parents are to be present, 
that the student be allowed to submit supporting statements , 
and that the student receive a statement explaining the 
u ltimate decision. Frankly, these procedures seem 
relatively easy to implement, and I do not think t hey would 
create chaos in the schools. Indeed, just before this suit 
was instituted the Columbus Board of Education adopted 
recise:l:y 
"suspension" regulations requirini these kinds of 
procedures: "'l?he parent or guar dian shall be provided - ~ 
an opportunity to attend a conference with the principal, 
to review the reasons for the suspension." These regula t ions 
also pr ovide that if "any suspension is subsequently found 
to be erroneous, all references to the suspension shall 
be expunged from the school 
Similarly, as the amici brief for "The National Committee 
for Citizens In Education" et al points out, many school 
* These regulations do not moot the instant case since 
the court ordered expungements of several students' suspension 






districts presently allow these/abbreviated hearings, 
sometimes even before suspension takes place. I also 
in this case 
note that the state statute under attack/requires 
notice to the parents within 24 hours of the 
~-----:Amr- - - --
4. 
suspension. /in the case of expulsions only, the student 
can get a hearing before the Board of Education, not a 
school administrator, where the student may be represented 
by counsel. 
I realize that you have a great reluctance to intrude 
into school discipline and to constitutionalize a relatively 
strictly 
trivial issue. If you adhere/to that view, you can rely 
on the dissents of Justices Black and Harlan in Tinker which 
eloquently state the case for keeping the constitution out 
of the schools. Personally, I think a brief hearing would 
intrude only in the most limited way and would have two 
beneficial effects. First, it would give the parent a chance 
to hear both sides of the case. Frequently, parents only 
hear their child's side of the case and think the child was 
by the school. where 
wronged ./ Second, in the rare case/ a suspension was 
based on the wrong facts, the suspension should be 
expunged. When school administrators are required to act 
expeditiously, as they are in school disturbances, they 






Thus, I reconnnend that you affirm the decision 
below . subject to the condition that a prior hearing is 
never required, even though it may at times be desirable. 
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( I b ~ a,u-</p-&~ 
This is a summary memo, primarily as a "memory jog" of 
the facts and issue presented by the above case. This 
memorandum reflects no specific analysis, and reflects only 
a most tentative and superficial viewpoint. 
***-1<°'1< 
A three-judge District Court in Ohio held that public 
school pupils (both elementary and high school) may not be 
"---"- ----
suspended without a due process hearing. An Ohio statute 
(§ 3313.66 Ohio Code) authorizes "the principal of a public 
school" to suspend a pupil "for not more than 10 days". 
Within 24 hours after any such suspension, the statute requires 
that the principal nQtify the parent in writing, stating the 
reasons for the suspension. The pupil or the parent (or 
guardian) "may appeal such action to the Board of Education", 
which "may hold a hearing" on request of the pupil or parent. 
The Ohio court, correctly I think, recognized that a 
school board and school officials "possess historical inherent 
power" to discipline students, and that§ 3313.66 is not 
"a source of authority but a limitation on school authorities' 
inherent power to discipline students". Jurisdictional 
Statement, p. 46. 
During a period of school disorders in 1971 in Columbus, 
Ohio, some 75 students were suspended in accord with procedures 
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to which the teacher would submit a written statement to the 
assistant principal in charge of discipline. The student 
would be given an opportunity to disagree with the teacher's 
version of the facts, but there would be no hearing. Several 
of the suspended students instituted a class action suit 
under§ 1983. A three-judge court was convened under 28 U.S.C. 
2281. The court concluded that the "right to an education is 
a protected liberty under the 14th Amendment", and that even 
a brief suspension of such education is unconstitutional 
absent a due process hearing. The court recognized that 
only ''minimum" due process was required, but would include 
written notice and a hearing (but without counsel). See 
opinion of the court p. 63 and 64 of Jurisdictional Statement. 
Jurisdiction 
We reserved the question as to the jurisdiction of a 
three-judge court. Although neither side raised the juris-
dictional issue, the District Court did not enter an order 
"granting or denying ... an interlocutory or permanent 
injunction in any civil action. 
hearing by a three-judge court." 
required ... to be 
28 U.S.C. 1253. The only 
order of the court was that references to the suspensions of 
plaintiffs or members of their class be removed from all 
records of the Columbus public schools". This is not an 
injunction by its terms, although it can be argued that -
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I will await further enlightenment on this issue. The case 
hardly seems an appropriate one for three judge action. 
The Merits 
The appellants make two arguments: (i) that public class-
room instruction (public school education) is not an interest 
protected by the Constitution requiring due process; and (ii) 
even if continuous education without suspension is a "liberty" 
or a "property" interest protected by the 14th Amendment, a 
due process hearing is not required in the case of a short-
term suspension in the context of administering public school 
di scipline. Appellees and numerous amici, argue the contrary 
on both issues, asserting that the right to an uninterrupted 
education is "liberty" and a "property" interest under the 
Roth analysis, protected by the 14th Amendment and requiring 
a due process hearing before any child of any age may be 
suspended for any time. It is conceded, however, that in the 
case of disruption a suspension may be made without delay 
provided a hearing is held promptly thereafter. 
I am inclined to agree with appellants (the public school 
K 
authorities) on both issues. But my present disposition would 
be to decide the case on the second issue, without deciding 
whether or not education is a liberty or a property protected 
)I.' 
by the 14th Amendment. Even if an affirmative answer be 
assumed, I do not think the courts should extend due process 
- ---~ ~~ ~~~~I 9 ~~ 
/).-s>~~~~~ 
J ~ o- r fe-t:_-/-eJJ_ '-;,-~_) __ J2_;.~ r_. ~ 





- - 4. 
requirements into routine disciplinary proceedings of 
elementary and high school pupils. This should be left to 
the school authorities. Intervention of the federal courts 
at this level of education would open a vast new source of 
litigation, to the detriment of the educational process. 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FR: E. Gordon Gee G.(r. 
RE: School Transcripts 
DT: October 22, 1974 
At your request I contacted several public schools in the Washington 
metropolitan area concerning the information contained on student transcripts 
which are sent by request to possible employers or other educational institutions. 
As a general rule, school districts are reluctant to release any information 
without the prior approval of both parents and students. Where information is 
released, a transcript will usually reflect grades, test scores, class ranking, 
courses and credits earned. Any disciplinary actions involving the student 1~ 
are generally expunged from the record before a student's transcript is made 
public. 
I shall, upon rece ipt, forward any sample transcripts. 
In reviewing the school law texts which I have on my shelf, I find 
none of them to contain an adequate discussion directly on point. I suggest, 
though, that you may find Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: 
Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 545 (1971) to be an 
excellent discussion of this whole problem. 
If I can be of further service please advise me. 
Attachment: List of schools contacted 
• - • 
LIST OF SCHOOLS CON TACTED 
T. C. Williams High School 
Alexandria, Virginia 
Annandale High School 
Fairfax County, Virginia 
Bethesda - Chevy Chase High School 
Montgomery County, Maryland 
Crossland Senior High School 
Prince Georges County, Maryland 
Woodrow Wilson High School 
District of Columbia 
Cardozo High School 
District of Columbia 
~ - -
3. 
question. Accordingly, I would remand for a determination 
of whether any suspensions imposed without a hearing were 
entered on any permanent records. If so, these entries 
should be expunged. 
This approach, it seems to me, would balance 
the legitimate interests of all students, their parents , 
and the school authorities . . Its effect would be that 
neither the public schools of our country nor the courts 
will be saddled with the mutually denigrating prospect * 
of litigating student discipline cases for years to come. 
* The magnitude of this new burden upon the . 
limited resources of the courts can hardly be overestimated. 
In Cincinnati alone, in the school year 1972-73, there 
were 4,054 suspensions - some 23 per day. Some 851 of these 
were for insubordination, 557 for fighting, 512 for truancy, 
191 for assault, etc. 
According to the brief filed by the Children's 
Defense Fund, a study of only five states indicated 
suspensions in 1972-73 of more than "150,000 children in all" 
and this study only included data relating to approximately 
half of the public school enrollment in the five states 
studied. Moreover, students who were suspended more than 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Joel Klein DATE: October 22, 1974 
No. 73-898 Goss v. Lopez 
Here are my thoughts on this case: 
1. Let me start with the opinion of the 3~ court. 
The court held: (a) that education is a "liberty" protected 
('b) 
by the constitution; andLtnat "plaintiffs were not accorded 
due process of law, in that they were suspended without 
hearing prior to suspension or within a reasonable time 
therefrom." Accordingly, the Court ordered "references 
to the suspensions of plaintiffs 0r me mbers of their class 
be removed f rom all records • . . " Hence, as I see the 
case the 3-J court did not declare the Ohio statute 
unconstitutional on its face, but only as applied in this 
case. The 3-J court defined "hearing" as something before 
a "school administrator" where student and parents are 
present and where statements - presumably written statements 
and not oral testimony - in support of both sides are 






is "not required to permit the presence of counsel" or 
to "follow any prescribed judicial rules ... " 
2. I do not think you are going to persuade anyone 
that education is not a liberty or property interest protected 
by the cons titution. (Indeed, I do not think that you 
should subscribe to such a view.) Thus, it seems to me, 
the best approach would be to argue that the ~arm here is 
not sufficiently "grievous") fee McGrath quoted in Morrisey v. 
Brewer, to require a constitutional rule. This argument 
would, I think, turn on two factors. First, a student need 
not, as a result of the suspension, redo a term or year. (In 
this case, no student was harmed in this fashion.) Second, 
the suspension is not entered on the student's "permanent 
record" - i.e., the one that would go to colleges, employers, 
etc. (In this case, it appears that 3 named plaintiffs had 
entries on their records. See App. at 219, 244, 256.) 
If the school suspends without either of these harms resulting, 
I think you have a strong argument that 10 days or less is 
not a sufficient harm in itself to justify a constitutional 
rule. In any event, I think if you limit the harm as I 
suggest you might get some votes. 
A rule allowing states to suspend without any "hearing" 
for up to 10 days (or thereabouts) so long as a term need 
not be redone or a record is not made, would allow schools 





a record, or if a term will have to be redone, a brief 
hearing such as the one required by the 3-J court would 
be sufficient. 
3. 
3. If you accept the above rule, you would affirm 
the 3-J decision insofar as it required expungement from 
permanent records when no hearing was given. This would 
still leave in tact the Ohio statute in question so long 
as schools did not apply the statute in a way to effect 
either of the two harms described. 
4. As a practical matter, if I were a school 
administrator, I would discuss even a brief suspension 
with the student, and then either call or write his parents 
and inform them of the matter. If the parents have any desire 
to pursue the matter, or if the student disputes the 
decision, the principal should discuss it with the student 
and his family. Likewise, if the student claims that 
other students support his claim that "he wasn't there) or some 
such thing, I would request that the student ask the other 
students to submit their comments in writing. 
I think it is clear that school administrators 
invariably use a process like this, without formally denominating 
the process a hearing. Thus, there is really no need to 
constitutionalize this relatively trivial matter. The 





has become a red flag. School administrators, while not 
above any sugges~f arbitrariness, are basically 
reasonable. 
4. 
I note that while this case was pending before the 
3-J court, the Columb~ School Board implemented suspension 
ll> 
regulations providing:that the principal or assistant 
principal "investigate" the matter, which includes discussion 
with the student, if available; (2) that the pupil and 
his parents be "notified" of the "exact" reason for the 
suspension; (3) that the parent or guardian be given "an 
opportunity to attend a conference with the principal, to 
review the reasons for the suspension"; and (4) that if a 
suspension is subsequently found to be erroneous, it should 
be expunged from the school records. I would think that 
these kinds of procedures would justify a suspension that 
could go on the permanent record. 
the suspension could not. 
Short of these procedures, 
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Let me start with the opinion of the ~urt. 
The court held: (a) that education is a "liberty" protected 
by the constitution; and that "plaintiffs were not accorded 
due process of law, in that they -were suspended without 
hearing prior to suspension or within a reasonable time 
therefrom." Accordingly, the Court ordered "references 
to the suspensions of plaintiffs or members of their class 
be removed from all records ••• " Hence, as I see the 
case the 3-5 court did not declare the Ohio statute 
unconstitutional on its face, but only as applied in this 
case. The 3-J court defined "hearing" as sOfilethlng before 
a "school administrator" where student and parents are 
present and where statements - presumably written statements 
and not oral testimony - in support of both sides are 
The court went on to note that the administrator 
2. 
required to permit the presence of counsel"~or 
"follow any prescribed judicial rules. ;. ~·i" 
2. / I do not think you are going to persuade anyone 
that education is not a liberty or property interest protected 
by the constitution. (Indeed, I do not think that you 
should subscribe to such a view.) Thus, it seems to me, 
the best approach would be to argue that the harm here is 
not sufficiently "grievous". See McGrath quoted in Morrisey v. 
Brewer, to require a constitutional .rule. This argument 
would, I think, turn on two factors. First, a student need 
not, as a result of the suspension, redo a term or year. (In 
case, no student was harmed in this fashion.) Second, 
the suspension is not entered on the student's "permanent 
record" - .!•.!·, the one that would go to colleges, employers, 
etc. (In this case, it appears that 3 named plaintiffs had 
entries on their records. See App. at 219, 244, 256.) 
I f the school suspends without either of these harms resulting, 
... 
~. think you have a strong argument that 10 days or less is 
not a sufficient harm in itself to justify a constitutional 
rule. In any event, I i think if you limit the harm as I ~ 
suggest you might get some votes • 
A rule allowing states to suspend without any "hearing" 
for up to 10 days (or thereabouts) so long as a term need 
not be redone or a record is not made, would allow schools 
all the flexibility they need. If the school wants to Keep 
a record, or if a term will have to be redone, a brief 
hearing such as the one required by the 3-J court would 
sufficient. . - -- --- --· ~-
3. 
3. ~ If you accept the above rule, you would affirm 
.the 3-J decision insofar as it required expungement from 
permanent records when no hearing was given. : This would 
still leave in tact the Ohio statute in question so long 
as schools did not apply the statute in a way to effect 
either of the two harms described • 
4. As a practical matter, if I were a school 
administrator, I would discuss even a brief suspension ~ 
with the student, and then either call or write his parents 
and inform them of the matter. If the parents have any desire 
to pursue the matter, or if the student disputes the , 
decision, the principal should discuss ~t with the student 
and his family. Likewise, if the student claims that 
other students support his claim that "he wasn't there" or some 
such thing, I would request that the student ask the other ~ ~ 
students to submit their connnents in writing. 
"·I think i't is clear that school administrators 
:~: invariably use a process like this, without formally denominating 
~ 
the process a hearing. Thus, there is really no need to 
constitutionalize this relatively trivial matter. The 
in this case, from my view, is that the word "hearing" 
has become a red flag. School administrators, while 
above any suggest of arbitrariness, are basically 
reasonable. 
that while this case was pending before the 
School Board implemented suspension 
providing that the principal or assistant 
(1) 
principal "investigate" the matter, which includes/discussion 
with the student, if available; (2) that the pupil and 
his parents be "notified" of the "exact" reason for the 
suspension, (3) that the parent or guardian be given "an 
opportunity to attend a conference with the principal, to 
review the reasons for the suspension"; and (4) that if a 
suspension is subsequently found to be erroneous, it should 
be expunged from the school records. I would think that 
these kinds of procedures would justify a suspension that 
could go on the permanent record. Short 




TO: Mr. iJustice;: Powell DATE: ,.- October 23, 1974 
1 •. I, L 
FROM: Joel-ilein 
Goss v. Lo:e,ez 
I have the following ·coaanents on your proposed memorandum: . 
1. The major difficutty, I think, is that the record does 
not bear out your, suggestion that the entries on the three 
students' records would not be dise~inated. I have examined 
the records and they look to met~ be the kinds of permanent 
records that usually follow a student. This is particularly . ~ ' 
true of the recora on page :.244. Moreover, the testimony of 
. I • 
Superintendent Ellis, as I read it; is confused, but I do 
not think it can be read to support the proposition that these 
notations of suspensions will ~ot follow the student. _While 
the superinten4ent s~ggested that .suspensions generally do 
I 
not follow .the student, he also ~ndicated that at times they 
might. App. at 83. And he never discussed these particular 
suspensions. 
Accordingly I suggest either of the following altematives: 
. . 
(a),. Making the points you now make, but remanding 
to the three-judge court for .an explicit determination 
of which record entries would follow , the student, and 
permitting expungement of those. 
,, ~- 1"'o- .. 2. 
(b) Affirming in part on . the ground that the 
•• r ~ • l I r 
orde_r .of expungemetl;froJn _the three-judge court was 
permissible i~sofa~ 
1
_as it . applied to permanent 
. i· i· 
records. · ' 
I prefer · th_((! ,second approach -1for tactical reasons. It 
) "'· ll I 
will appear'~ t~ your colleagues th_at you have compromised, while 
you lose nothing since the opinion will make clear that. brief 
suspensions are permitted without review so long as they. do 
not go on the permanent record. 
' . 
2. I would reoDganize the memorandum somewhat since 
pages 1, 3 and 4, and the bottom of 5 deal with the general 
the top of 
problem, while 2 and/5 deal with this case. 
3. I think the memorandum is a bit long for your present 
purposes. 
4. I~ light of these proposed changes I would suggest 
something like the following: 
."I have been deeply concerned about the disposition of 
the above case. In reflecting on our unfinished discussion 
of last Friday·, it occurs to me that we are •ot in fact 
as far apart as it seemed at the time. 
Education, when provided by state law, becomes a liberty 
or property interest meriting ·appropriate protection. , But 
this cann'ot, in reason, mean that the right is absolute in 
the sense that there may .be no limitation upon it or 
discretionary control exercised over it by s~hool authorities. 
'#' • ·- 3. 
Obviously, · schools simply could not operate without punish-
ment, including removal from the classroom, for misbehavior. 
The ,range of penalties extends from sending a pupil home early 
for part of the day to total expulsion 
As tbe "right" to 'an education cannot possibly mean a 
right to be present in school at all times, one can argue with 
considerable reason that the right could well be, dfined ~n 
terms of not being deprived arbitrarily of a £ui1 and fair 
' 
opportunity to complete a semester's work. A brief suspension 
would not impair this right, whereas suspension for a 
substantial period of time - or at exam time - could impair it." 
If a suspension does nc,t require a stu'dent to lose a 
semester's work, the only other significant harm* to the 
student would result from the entry of a suspension on his 
, · ~- · I' f. , ·: • 
record'''wh'.ich is 'ij ~ent to ·colleges~ employers, etc. Hence, 
I would also'ihold 'that !a· .. brief s~spension is permissible _only 
when it ls not entered on the stud~nt's "permanent" record.** 
J ~ : ; : • ; .• " 
~e ,testil!'.0rly : of ,sev~ral ,psychologists below suggest:11 that 
psychological harm niay alsor· result from a suspension. But 
I think this sort of harm is far ·too speculative to merit 
serious consideration. As we all know most teenagers consider 
a brief suspension as a holiday. 
**I• school administrators want to enter suspensions on 
permanent sehords, they may dos~ by holding a hearing. 
,,I " - ... 
4. 
If, on the other hand, we require hearings for all 
suspensions no matter how brief, we will e:f'.fmt1:rs1y destroy 
the -most effective, - if not the only, disciplinary tool presently 
available to teachers. MostToachers, I believe, will be 
unwilling to run the risk .of being humiliated by an 
adverse decision. Loss of fac@--·and prestige by a teacher with 
her students -means ·the end of. control, discipline, and indeed 
1 
•, 'l. ~ . . 
the end of learning. The result of universally requiring 
~ • ! • :~ ' ' • ,.: ' ~1· , ~ -.. '. . 
a hearing, 4., ther,ef~re,-, will be. the ,protection of a rather 
.. . - - . ~ .. 
de minimis interest for a few, at the expense of a significant 
M • • ' . 
'l 
interest·. of the many students who .. are unable to learn because 
of •disturbances and disruptions'. 
In ·the present case I would affirm the three _judge, court 
only insofar as it ordered expungement from the pupils 
' 
permanent records,* I would also make it quite clear that 
teachers may suspend pupils for brief periods without any 
hearing or review. 
The result I proposel balances the le&itimate interests 
of all pupils, their parents, and. the school administration. 
~ ~ts effect would be that neither the public schools 
*The record suggests _that three students had entries placed 
on their permanent records. App. at 219, 244, 256. 
" .. ,-. ""' 
nor the federal courts will be saddled with the mutually 
denigrating prospect of litigating student discipline 




*The magnitude "· of this new burden upon the limited resources 
of the courts can· hardly be overestimated. In Cincinnati 
alone, in' the school year 1972-73, there were 4,054 
suspensions - some 23 per day. Some 851 of these were 
for insubordination, 557 for fighting, 512 for truancy, 
191 for assualt, etc. 
Accotding to the brief filed by the Children's Defense 
Fund, a study of only five states · indicated suspensions 
in 1972-73 of more than ~150., 000 children in a.11" and~j,his 
study only included data rel.ating to approximately hc1'"° of 
the public school enrollment· in the five states studied. 
Moreover, students who ., we_re sus·pended more than once were 
only counted'! onc'e: . 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I have been deeply concerned about the disposition of 
the above case. In reflecting on our unfinished discussion 
of last Friday, it occurs to me that we are not in fact 
as far apart as it seemed at the time. 
Educatio/ when provided by state la1 becomes a 
liberty or property interest meriting appropriate protection. 
But this cannot, in reason, mean that the right is absolute 
in the sense that there may be no limitation upon it or 
discretionary control exercised over it by school authorities. 
N.o 0ftC aisputes that disei!l1li:i::i.8 must be 1:H6:intained in the 
i1.timately enaJ ti es or p:u:i::i.ishmeH:Ht:~srrnmra~yr a~:!1gs1.1 schools and that P 
----- ~ _ ,,,is.,-. J1~ for misconduct ar vfoL,¥;??vf>~· -~ ) 
~ . ~ -- ~ ·l.kaL.a,,.i ""QQE>Sary 
V" '-.,\ te /_. A__gad1.U /... / 
. ~ c~ools /:::::~r~r~ f~ ~f.- ::-- ')(,{,qi 
~ . ~ to remO'"v"~ tbe,,.. :pup1: Ly r
range of . pil home ~
. O..W.- ds from sending a pu exten 
early for part of a day to total 
court 
·ar,ies with tfie severity of the i,ena.lty . Se~ authoriti.e._s 
2. 
The case before us does not involve expulsion. Nor 
does it involve suspension which deprives a student of 
the right to complete a XRlllRX semester's work. Rather, 
the Ohio statute under attack authorizes only a brief 
suspension, not to exceed 10 days, with a requirement that 
parents be notified. Apart from speculative opinions of 
psychologists,* the Ohio statute could impinge significantly 
on the right to education in only two respects: (i) if 
the suspension, due to its timing at an examination period 
or at the end of the Term, resulted in loss of a semester 
and opportunity for promotion, or (ii) if a permanent 
record of the suspension was available in future months 
or years to potential employers or to other educational 
institutions. None of respondents lost, as a result of 
these suspensions, a semester's work or the opportunity 
for promotion. The appendix indicates pp. 219, 244, 256 
that three respondents had entries on their records, but 
there is no showing that these would be made available 
to outsiders. Indeed, the testimony of Superintendent 
*The imagined harm to a child's emotional well being is 
far too speculative to merit serious consideration. The 
truth is, as each of us knows from personal experience, 
most children and teenagers tend to consider a suspension 
as a holiday. But whatever a pupil's emotion reaction 
may be, the loss - of eight school days at most, in the 
middle of a term - is unlikely to have any effect whatever 
upon the pupil or his ability to maintain pace with his 
classmates. 
3. 
Ell is is to the contrary. App. 
~ 
~ a right to 
As the "right" to an education cannot possibly mean 
be present in school at all times, one can 
argue with considerable reason that the right could well 
be defined in terms of not being deprived arbitrarily 
of a full and fair opportunity to complete a semester's 
wor k. A brief suspension would not impair this right, 
whereas suspension for a substantial period of time -
or at exam time - could impair it. 
~ 
But however the right may be defined, it is one to 
be shared in corrn:non with other pupils. The type of conduct 
which warrants suspension is often a serious intrusion upon 
the rights of other pupils, interferring with their 
opportunity for an education. If due process hearings -
however moderated they may be - are required for 
:iHx±gx insignificant suspensions of a few days, most 
teachers will be unwilling to run the risk of being humiliated 
before a class by an adverse decision. Loss of face 
and prestige by a teacher with her students means the 
end of control, the end of class discipline, and indeed 
4. 
the end of an effective learning process in that particular 
class. When confronted with this possibility, as would be 
the case i f hearings are required, teachers will simply 
refrain from suspending students. While other lesser 
"penalties" may be available (although they are difficult 
to identify), the absence of the penalty most frequently 
used to deal with recalcitrant, unruly or «XXNXDXR 
disorderly students (i.e. suspensions) will be largely 
denied to school teachers. This is a high price indeed, 
in terms of the quality of education and the rights of other 
pupils, to pay for according some nebulous "due process" 
hearing to xp a pupil suspended only for a few days. 
In light of the foregoing considerations, I do not 
think the judiciary should circumscribe the flexibility 
and discretion deemed appropriate by the legislature of 
Ohio. After all, this subject of school discipline is 
one as to which "conventional wisdom" changes from decade 
to decade, as does the need for disciplinary measures. 
The legislature is better postured to deal with this 
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liberty or property interest meriting appropi r ate protection. 
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~~ control exercised over it by school authorities. I No one 
disputes that discipline must be maintained in tne schools 
and that penalties or punishments may legitimate y be 
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The case before us does not involve expulsion. Nor 
does it involve suspension which deprives a student of 
the right to EX complete a semester's work. Rather, the 
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Ohio r attack authorizes only a brief suspension, 
not to exceed 10 days Apart from speculative opinions of 
psychologists,* the Ohio statute could impinge significantly 
on the right to education in only two possiele respects: 
~ 
(i) if the suspension, due to its timing at an examination /l 
or at the end of the Term, resulted in loss of a semester 
~ 
and opportunity for promotion, or (ii) a permanent 
A 
record of the suspension was ma<W whi-eh was available 
in future months or years to potential employers or to 
other educational institutions.J None of respondents 
lost, as a result of these suspensions, a semester's work 
or the opportunity for promotion. The appendix indicates 
pp. 219, 244, 256 that three respondents had entries on 
their records, but there is no showing that these would 
be made available to outsiders, ,i ndeed, the testimony 
of Superintendent Ellis is to the «m1x contrary. App. __,, 
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*The imagined harm to a child's emotional well being is 
far too speculative to merit serious consideration. 
The truth is, as each of us knows from personal experience, 
most children and teenagers tend to consider a suspension 
as a holiday. But whatever a pupil's emotional reaction 
may be, the loss - of eight school days at most, in the 
middle of a term - is unlikely to have any effect whatever 
upon the pupil or his ability to maintain pace D±«kxk 
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3. 
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one to be shared in common with q.t_her pupils. The type 
of conduct which warrants suspension is often a serious 
intrusion upon the rights of other pupils, interfering 
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with their ~ t o an education. If due process hearings -
A. 
however moderated they may be - are required for 
insignificant suspensions of a few days, most teachers 
will be unwilling to run the risk of being humiliated 
before a class by an adverse decision. Loss of face 
and prestige by a teacher with her students means the 
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4. 
the end of an effective learning process in that particular 
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When confronted with this possibility, i 4:::r-J,,. ao,;i ngs 
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.~ required, teachers will simply refrain from suspending 
A 
students. While other lesser "penalties" may be available 
(although they are difficult to identify), the absence 
of the penalty most frequently used to deal with 
recalcitrant, unruly or disorderly students (i.e. 
suspensions) will i?~eet b~ i:!i to school teachers. 
A 
This is a ~ y high price indeed, in terms of the quality 
of education and the rights of other pupils to pay for 
) 
according some nebulous "due process" hearing to a pupil 
suspended only for a few days. .:J ~ ~ ~ ~ 
In light of the foregoing/ cnns_id~ ~ 
Jl- H . d~e -
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suspension may not be applied in a manner which 
deprives a student of a semester without an appropriate 
hearing, and (ii) that no record of the temporary 
5. 
suspension should be made available to potential employers, 
to other educational institutions or indeed to anyone 
other than the school administration itself. Our opinion, 
in addition, can make clear that the present rule of the 
Columbus Board of Education meets these requirements: 
"The parent or guardian shall be provided with 
an opportunity to attnnd a conference with the 
principal, to review xkxxRx the reasons for the 
suspension." 
The new rule also provides that if "any suspension is 
subsequently found to be erroneous, all references to 
the suspension shall be expunged from the school records." 
This type of procedure would protect all interests: 
those of the pupils in question and his parents; the 
availability of suspension as a penalty would be preserved/ 
~~~ 
f.G...----&ElS--Del~~-8-1 protecting the rights of other pupils,-\ 
}.lnd 
the teachers would not have to run the 
oss of face - of some type of "hearing",; 
-ve--
neither the public schools of our country or the 
)1 
~ 
federal courts would be saddled the mutually aRHR 
I\ 
denigrating prospect of litigating student discipline 
cases for the years to come.* 
¼The magnitude of this new burden upon the limited resources 
of the courts can hardly be over estimated. In Cincinnati 
alone, in the school year 1972-73, there were 4,054 
suspensions - some 23 per day. Some 851 of these were for 





According to the brief filed by the Children's 
Defense Fund, the study of five states only indicated 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I have been deeply concerned about the 
disposition of the above case. In reflecting on our 
unfinished discussion of last Friday, it occurs to me 
that we are not in fact as far apart as it seemed at 
the time. 
Education, when provided by state law, becomes 
a liberty or property interest meriting appropriate 
protection. But this cannot, in reason, mean that the 
right is absolute in the sense that there may be no 
limitation upon it or discretionary control exercised 
over it by school authorities. Obviously, schools 
simply could not operate without punishment, including 
removal from the classroom, for misbehavior. The range 
of potential penalties extends from sending a pupil 
home early for part of the day to total expulsion. And 
I would suggest that the need - indeed the propriety -
of federal court oversight varies with the severity of 
the sanction. 
As the "right" to an education cannot possibly 
mean a right to be present in school at all times, one 
can argue with considerable force that the right could 
well be defined in terms of not being deprived arbitrarily 
of a full and fair opportunity to complete a semester's 
work. A brief suspension would not impair this right, 
whereas suspension for a substantial period of time - or 
at exam time - could impair it. 
If a susfension does not require a student 
to loie a semesters work, the only other significant 
harm to the student would result from the entry of 
2. 
a suspension on his record which is sent to colleges, 
employers, etc. Hence, I would also hold that a brief 
suspension without some hearing is permissible onl7i 
when it is not entered on the student's "permanent' 
record. 
If, on the other hand, we require hearings for 
all suspensions, no matter how brief, we will destroy 
the most effective, if not the only, disciplinary tool 
presently available to teachers. Most teachers will 
simply no longer use suspensions for fear of being 
htnniliated by an adverse decision. Loss of face and 
prestige by a teacher with her students means the end 
of control, discipline, and indeed the end of learning. 
Thus, a universal hearing requirement will protect a 
rather de minimis interest for a few students at the 
expenseof ignoring a significant interest for the many 
students who are unable to learn because of disturbances 
and disruptions. 
In the present case I would hold that the 
constitution does not require a hearing for a suspension 
unless the suspension results in losing a term's work 
or is entered on a pupil's permanent record. There is 
no serious claim that these students lost any time as a 
result of their suspensions. But there is at least some 
possibility that a notation was entered on the permanent 
records of three students. See App. at 219, 244, 256. 
The three-judge court, however, did not focus on this 
* The testimony below of several psychologists 
suggests that psychological harm may also result from a 
suspension. But I think this sort of harm is far too 
speculative to merit serious consideration. As we all 
know, most teenagers consider a brief suspension as a 
holiday. 
3. 
question. Accordingly, I would remand for a determination 
of whether any suspensions imposed without a hearing were 
entered on any permanent records. If so, these entries 
should be expunged. 
This approach, it seems to me, would balance 
the legitimate interests of all students, their parents, 
and the school authorities. Its effect would be that 
neither the public schools of our country nor the courts 
will be saddled with the mutually denigrating prospect * 
of litigating student discipline cases for years to come. 
* The magnitude of this new burden upon the 
limited resources of the courts can hardly be overestimated. 
In Cincinnati alone, in the school year 1972-73, there 
were 4,054 suspensions - some 23 per day. Some 851 of these 
were for insubordination, 557 for fighting, 512 for truancy, 
191 for assault, etc. 
According to the brief filed by the Children's 
Defense Fund, a study of only five states indicated 
suspensions in 1972-73 of more than "150,000 children in all" 
and this study only included data relating to approximately 
half of the public school enrollment in the five states 
studied. Moreover, students who were suspended more than 
once were only counted once. 
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employers, etc. · Hence, I would also hold that a brief 
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when it is not entered on the student's "permanent' 
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If, on the other hand, we require hearings for 
all suspensions, no matter how brief, we will destroy 
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question. Accordingly, I would remand for a determination 
of whether any suspensions imposed without a hearing were 
entered on any permanent records. If so, these entries 
should be expunged. 
This approach, it seems to me, would balance 
legitimate interests of all students, their parents, 
and the school authorities •• Its effect would be that 
neither the public schools of our country nor the courts 
will be saddled with the mutually denigrating prospect * 
of litigating student discipline cases for years to come. 
* The magnitude of this new burden upon the 
limited resources of the courts can hardly be overestimated. 
In Cincinnati alone, in the school year 1972-73, there 
were 4,054 suspensions - some 23 per day. Some 851 of these 
were for insubordination, 557 for fighting, 512 for truancy, 
191 for assault, etc. 
According to the brief filed by the Children's 
Defense Fund, a study of only five states indicated 
suspensions in 1972-73 of more than "150,000 children in all" 
and this study only included data relating to approximately 
half of the public school enrollment in the five states 
studied. Moreover, students who were suspend*d more than 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I have been deeply concerned about the 
disposition of the above case. In reflecting on our 
unfinished discussion of last Friday, it occurs to me 
that we are not in fact as far apart as it seemed at 
the time. 
Education, when provided by state law, becomes 
a liberty or property interest meriting appropriate 
protection. But this cannot, in reason, mean that the 
right is absolute in the sense that there may be no 
limitation upon it or discretionary control exercised 
over it by school authorities. Obviously, schools 
simply could not operate without punishment, including 
removal from the classroom, for misbehavior. The range 
of potential penalties extends from sending a pupil 
home early for part of the day to total expulsion. And 
I would suggest that the need - indeed the propriety -
of federal court oversight varies with the severity of 
the sanction. 
As the "right" to an education cannot possibly 
mean a right to be present in school at all times, one 
can argue with considerable force that the right could 
well be defined in terms of not being deprived arbitrarily 
of a full and fair opportunity to complete a semester's 
work. A brief suspension would not impair this right, 
whereas suspension for a substantial period of time - or 
at exam time - could impair it. 
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If a sus~ension does not require a student 
to lo~e a semesters work, the only other significant 
harm~ to the student would result from the entry of 
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a suspension on his record which is sent to colleges, 
employers, etc. Hence, I would also hold that a brief 
suspension without some hearing is permissible onl6 when it is not entered on the student's "permanent' 
record . 
If, on the other hand, we require hearings for 
all suspensions, no matter how brief, we will destroy 
the most effective, if not the only, disciplinary tool 
presently available to teachers. Most teachers will 
simply no longer use suspensions for fear of being 
humiliated by an adverse decision. Loss of face and 
prestige by a teacher with her students means the end 
of control, discipline, and indeed the end of learning. 
Thus, a universal hearing requirement will protect a 
rather de minimis interest for a few students at the 
expenseof ignoring a significant interest for the many 
students who are unable to learn because of disturbances 
and disruptions. 
In the present case I would hold that the 
constitution does not require a hearing for a suspension 
unless the suspension results in losing a term's work 
or is entered on a pupil's permanent record. There is 
no serious claim that these students lost any time as a 
result of their suspensions. But there is at least some 
possibility that a notation was entered on the permanent 
records of three students. See App. at 219, 244, 256. 
The three-judge court, however, did not focus on this 
* The testimony below of several psychologists 
suggests that psychological harm may also result from a 
suspension. But I think this sort of harm is far too 
speculative to merit serious consideration. As we all 
know, most teenagers consider a brief suspension as a 
holiday. 
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Mr. Justice Powell: 
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high schools in this area. 
Gordon Gee 
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SECONDARY SCHOOL RECORD-TRANSCRIPT 
STUDENT INFORMATION SCHOOL INFORMATION 
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Accredited D R eg. Accred . A ssoc . By 
Previous Secon dary Sc hool Attended (if any) I Date Left NON , I Enrollm ent in Grades 
I 
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SECONDARY SCHOOL RECORD-STUDENT DESCRIPTION SUMMARY 
Last Name First Name Middle Name 
SUMMARY OF DESCRIPTIVE SCALES 
SUMMARIZED BELOW ARE THE DESCRIPTIONS MADE BY TEACHERS OF GRADE(S) 
( 1) PARTICIPATION IN DISCUSSION (SELF . INITIATED) 
____ always involved, often initiates discussion 
____ usually participates 
___ _ often participates 
____ occasionally participates 
____ seldom participates 
____ not applicable 
( 3) PURSUIT OF INDEPENDENT STUDY 
____ considerable study and major project(s) 
____ considerable study or major project(s) 
____ some study and minor project ( s) 
____ some study or minor project ( s) 
____ no evidence of independent study 
____ not applicable 
( 5) CRITICAL AND QUESTIONING ATTITUDE 
____ often challenges 
_ ___ sometimes challenges 
_ ___ occasionally is skeptical 
____ sometimes probes 
____ rarely questions 
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( 7) PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
_ ___ always accepts fully 
___ usually accepts fully 
____ partially accepts 
_ ___ sometimes refuses 
____ often refuses 
COMMENTS 
School 
(sp ecify number al each level ) 
010 011 012 
( 2) INVOLVEMENT IN CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES 
____ very high in all activities 
____ active, usually shows genuine interest 
_ ___ mild, politely attentive 
State 
____ languid, attention often wanders 
____ distracted, does other thini;s during class 
_ _ _ _ vacillates greatly 
( 4) EVENNESS OF PERFORMANCE 
- --- exceptionally consistent 
_ _ __ even, varies no more than one mark 
_ ___ slightly uneven, often varies one mark 
_ ___ uneven, often varies two marks 
____ erratic, performance fluctuates greatly 
(6) DEPTH OF UNDERSTANDING 
____ excellent insight 
____ good understanding 
____ some insight 
____ little insight 
____ poor understanding 
____ not applicable 
(8) CONSIDERATION FOR OTHERS 
____ always considerate of others' rights and feelings 
____ usually considerate 
_ _ _ _ courteous, little evidence of consideration 
_ ___ sometimes inconsiderate 
____ often inconsiderate 
____ inadequate opportunity to observe 
HEALTH 
DO YOU KNOW OF ANY HEALTH FACTORS (PHYSICAL OR EMOTIONAL) OF WHICH TH IS COLLEGE SHOULD BE AWARE IF THIS STUDENT MATRICULATES? 
0 NO O YES (Please Ext>lai11 °" Separate Sheel) 
RECOMMENDATION TO COLLEGE / / scl,ool polic;, f)TeclNdes any recommendation, please cl,eck here 0 
Date Si1•aJNre Title 
REPRESENTATIVE• OP' AAC,-AO. ACAC, A • CA AND NA9SP HAVE COOPERATED IN THE DEVELOPMENT 01" THIS P'ORM . 
COPYIIIIGHT . 191.4 , • Y THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OP' SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS , 1201 SIXTEENTH STREET , N . W •• WASH I NGTON , D. C ., 200:JS , ALL RI G HTS RE SE RVED , 
This transcript is never sent except at the request of the s tudent. It is never shown 
to anyone except at Bethesda-Chevy Chase High School the reque s t of th: student 
excep~ for law 4301 East-West Highway enforcement agencie s o't 
security clearance. Bethesda, Maryland 20014 
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# Advanced Plac em ent 
% Non-College Prepara tory 
* Subjects in P rog re ss 
REV. 2/ 66 
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Withdrew 
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9 10 11 12 
1st 
Sem . 
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C - Averag e 




Ranking includes all students and all subj ects, includ ing repeated 
subjects, Grades 9 through 11 and summer school. 
__ Highest recommendat ion 
__ Recommended * 
__ (Capable of success in college, although academic record 
does not meet criteria noted below *) 
__ Capable of success in a terminal program 
__ Not recommended 
* Recommendat ion fo r State-aided or State-supported colleges re-
qui re~ 60% A's and B' s and no grade be low C in major subjects 
during the last two years of school . 
School accredited by Middle States Associ at ion . Total of 16 
credits requ i red for graduation. Class periods: 50 minutes, 
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BE LOW 
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~ . ~ ~ -. 
 ~ 
4. Dependabil ity ___ ___ _ ____ _ 
5 . Cooperation ~~~--
6. Stability 
7 
lntell_ect_ual ~ ~ - -- ---
. Curiosity -'"--
8 . Integrity ___ ____ ____ _ __ _ 
9 Soc ial 
· Ad justment 
~- Creati vi ty ___ ___ ___ ____ ---.1-
STUDENT ACTIVITIES and/ or WORK EXP ERi ENCE 
Date: 
Signature of Counselor 

Studen t 
Parent o r Guard ion 
Address 
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Sex D M D F Date o f Birth 
Place of Birth 
Social Secu ri ty Number 
GRADE 8 SCHOOL & LOCATION 
19 -- 19 --
COURSE T ITLE Final Units 
Engl i sh 
Health & P . E. 
--Membersh ip - - Absent --Attendance 
GRADE 11 SCHOOL & LOCATION 
19- - 19 - -
COURSE TITLE Final Units 
Engl i sH' 
__ Membersh ip --Absent --Attendance 
SUMMER SCHOOL RECORD 
OUTSTANDING HONORS ANO ACTIVITIES 
SECONDARY SCHOLASTIC RECORD 
GRADES 8 - 12 FAIRFAX COUNTY P UBLIC SCHOOLS 
SECONDARY SCHOOLS AND DAT ES OF ATTENDANCE 
Name of School Address DATE OF ,W!l DA TE OF W- C ODE RElfSoN / E NTRY WI TH DRAW C ODE 
GRADE 9 SCHOOL & L OCATION GRADE 10 SCHOOL & LOCATION 
19 -- 19 __ 19 -- 19 --
COURSE TITLE Final Uni ts COU RS·E TITLE Final Un its 
English Engl ish 
Health & P.E. Health & P . E. 
1-- Membership --Absent --Attendance ~ Membersh ip --Absent --Attendance 
I 
GRADE 12 SCHOOL & LOCATION EXTR A YEAR OR SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION: 
19 -- 19--
COURSE TITLE Final Unit s 
English 
__ Membersh ip --Absent --Attendance 
RANK IN CLASS IS D EXACTLY D AP P ROXIMATELY _ _ 
IN A CLASS OF -- BASE D ON __ SEMESTERS. ALL 
SUBJECTS ARE GIVEN EQUAL WE IGHT. 
GRADE POINT AVERAGE : 
SECONDARY SCHOOLS. 
GRADING SYSTEM, A = 94-100 = Exce ll e nt 
B = 87-93 = Above Average 
C = 80 - 86 = Average 
0 = 70-79 = Bel ow Ave rage 
F = 0-69 = Failure 
UNIT = Mimimum of 160 hours of instructi on offered. 
DATE OF GRADUATION __________ _ 
Signature of School Olli cia l Date 
(OVER) 
UNIT SUMMARY 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
English ( 5 ) 
Geog. or W. Hist. (I) 
U.S. - Va. Hist . (1) 
U.S. - Va . Govt. (I ) 
Math (2) 
Sci en ce (2) 
Heal th & P.E . (3) 
ELE CTIVES (8) 
TOTAL 
GRADUATION : 23 UNITS, GRADES 8-12; 
18 OF WHICH IN GRADES 9-12 COURSES 
FA!RFAX COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Fairfax, Virginia 
.. 
STANDARDIZED TEST RESULTS - GRADES 8 - 12 
Pupil's Name-----------------------------
NOTE: This form is to be used for the filing of test results, grades 8 through 12. 






Mr. Joel Klein 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 73-898 Goss v. Lopez 
-
DATE: November 25, 1974 
Here is another draft which combines what I hope is the 
best of the two previous drafts (yours and mine). 
In thinking further about this case, I have concluded 
that it is unnecessary to reach the "balancing" process which 
was the approach of earlier drafts. The only right entitled 
to due process protection is to the education provided by 
Ohio law. School discipline, at least the routine variety, 
is as much a part of "education" as the curriculum. This 
type of analysis also harmonizes, I believe, with our view 
that the courts have no role to play in reviewing other 
decisions made by school authorities which affect, more 
seriously than a few day's suspension, the educational oppor-
tunities of pupils. This analysis also strengthens the 
relevance of what the Court said in Epperson and Tinker, and 
sharpens the contrast with prior procedural due process cases 
such as Goldberg, Fuentes and the like. 
My revision can no doubt be improved by some further 
editing, which I would appreciate your undertaking. Sub-
sections Band C (pages 10 and 12) may be too discursive, 





and perhaps can be improved by somewhat tighter writing -
preserving the ideas. 
2. 
You need to take a good look at the footnotes, where they 
are placed, whether I have ommitted some that should be 
included, and whether some in the present draft should be 
excluded. I have not given these much thought. 
Your draft was quite helpful to me. I have endeavored 
to follow you in emphasizing the disadvantage of injecting 
the adversary approach into the schools. I included, 
substantially as you wrote ·it, the very devastating section 
(E, commencing at p. 18) on the psychological injury. If the 
majority opinion is written along the lines indicated at the 
Conference, I just do not see any conceivable answer to your 
argument. 
L.F. P., Jr. 
ss 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
-;§u:pr tmt Q}llllrl of tlrt ~h ;§mu5 
Jhudpn!Jhm, lB, QJ. 20ffe~~ 
-
December 9, 1974 
Re: No. 73-898, Goss v. Lopez 
Dear Byron, 
I agree with your memorandum in this case. 
Mr. Justice White 









December 9, 1974 
No. 73-898 GOSS v. LOPEZ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
The memorandum circulated by Byron concludes 
that the Constitution requires notice and some form of 
hearing prior to every suspension of a student from a 
public school, except that prior notice need not be 
given in emergency situations. 
As I find no basis for extending the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution to encompass routine 
classroom discipline, and also as I believe this would 
be an unwarranted intrusion by the judiciary into an 
area best left to the discretion of professional educators, 
I will circulate an opposing memorandum. 
Although we are at the threshold of two weeks 
of argument, I hope to circulate something by the end 
of this week. 
L.F .P., Jr. 
-
.iu:prttttt QJ,utti ttf tlrt ~b jtattg 
Jr a.a' lpttgfon. 10. <q. 20 ffe )l.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS December 9, 1974 
Dear Byron: 
In 73.&698, GOSS v. LOPEZ please 
join me in your memo which I hope will 
become the Court's opinion. 
\,_\ \J 
-
William o. Douglas 
Mr. Justice White 
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December 9, 1974 




MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
The memorandum circulated by Byron concludes 
that the Constitution requires notice and some form of 
hearing prior to every suspension of a student from a 
public school, except that prior notice need not be 
given in emergency situations. 
As I find no basis for extending the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution to encompass routine 
classroom discipline , and also as I believe this would 
be an unwarranted intrusion by the judiciary into an 
area best left to the discretion of professional educators, 
I will circulate an opposing memorandum. 
Although we are at the threshold of two weeks 
of argument, I hope to circulate something by the end 
of this week. 
t . 1:-r1. 
L.F .P., Jr. 
- -
.§u:p-umt ~curl ltf "rt ~nittb .§buts 
'JflUl~ ,. ~. 20,?J!.' 
CHAMBERS Of" 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
-q 
December 10, 1974 
RE: No. 73-898 Goss v. Lopez 
Dear Byron: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice White 
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CHAMBERS Of" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL December 10, 1974 
Re: No. 73-898 -- Norval Goss et al. v. Eileen Lopez 
Dear Byron: 
I am in general agreement with your memorandum 
but might add an additional word or two later. 
Sincerely, 
-;J14 ( , 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
I 
Q 
- -~u:prt1ttt C!fttnrl ttf !£rt 'Jllttlttb ~tatt,s-
:.ulp:ngfon. ,. QJ. 20ffe'l-, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. December 16, 1974 
Q 
RE: No. 73-898 - Goss v. Lopez 
Dear Byron: 
I joined the Memorandum and I also join the 
opinion in the above. 
Mr. Justice White . 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
/
A < ', -. 
,; 1--z c (i 
·/ 
lfp/8,.i/ 4/75 -9.2!! 
Jr .l•,',I b 
Distinguishing Arnett 
,. 
Part I of the draft opinion concludes that the Ohio 
sta,tute confers no right to education separate and apart 
' . 
from the authority to suspend. We thu~ conclude that 
suspension, within the statutory limits, does not constitute 
a deprivation of a protected right. 
David thinks this is an unsound view. He reasons that 
it must be assumed the Ohio legislature intended to authorize 
suspensions only where cause existed. , David thi~ks, there-
fore, that the issue in Goss is "quite similar to the problem - . 
presented in Arnett and cases dealing with job dismissal 
for cause". While he agrees that Arnett can be ,distinguished 
(on the ground that the de minimus character of the harm of 
suspension, and the complexities of discipline in the 
educational context, should prompt the Court to refrain from 
constitutionalizing suspensions), he thinks that note 4 of 
the draft represents an "oversimplification" of the difference 
between Goss and Arnett. 
Perhaps David is right, and I want to discuss his view 
with him and with Joel. Indeed, there may be prudential 
reasons for- blending parts I and II of my dissent, as Dtvid 
suggests. I am not yet persuaded, however, that the essence 
of the position taken in part I (as di~tinguished, perhaps, 
from the way we expressed it) is erroneous. 
- - 2. 
I consider that Goss is far closer to~ than to 
' Amett. The Ohio statute confers an entitlement to the 
education prescribed by the laws of that state. Those laws 
include explicit authority to a principal to suspend. There 
is no requirement that suspensions be only for "cause". Nor 
is there any requirement for a hearing, an omission accented 
by the fact that the same section of Ohio law provides for 
expulsion and. requires a hearing. It was rational for Ohio 
to confer an unqualified right to suspend in the absolute 
I 
discretion of the principal. A multitude of school decisions, 
as indicated later in the dissent, involve jud~ental~ 
or diacretionary action by school authorities. Standards 
for these simply couid not be prescribed in most instances. 
In Roth, the state had entered into a one-year employ-
ment contract with Roth that contained no provision for 
renewal. In describing contracts of this kind, the Court 
said: 
"They did not provide for contract renewal absent 
'sufficient cause'. Indeed, they made no provision 
for renewal whatsoever. 
"Thus, the terms of the respondent's appoint• 
ment secured absolutely no interest in reemployment 
for the n•xt year. They supported absolutely no 
possible claim for entitlement to reemployment. 
Nor, significantly, was there any state statute 
or university rule or policy that secured his 
interest in reemployment or that created any 
legitimate claim to it. In these circumstances, 
the respondent surely had an abstract concern in 
being rehired but he did not have a 1roperty interest sufficient to requir~ the un~verslty 
authorities to give him a h!'a:tring when they 
declined to renew his contract of employment." 
At. 578. 
- - 3. 
As our dissent notes (in discussing the asserted "liberty 
interest"), Roth' a concem in being rehired was incalculld,J:." 
more significant than the concem of a pupil - not to be 
separated entirely but merely to be: suspended for a 1im1ted 
time. The conclusion in ~ was that he had not been 
"deprived of libery or property protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment" li• 579. My view is that the student in Q.2!.!. 
likewise had been deprived of no protected liberty or property. 
In note 2 of my Arnett opinion, I said: 
"No property interest would be ,conferred, for 
example, where the applicable statutory or 
contractual te~ either expressly or by implica-
tion, did not r.rovide for continued employment 
absent 'cause' '. 
It is clear to me that the Ohio statutes conferring the ' 
entitlement to education did not limit, expressly or by 
implcation, the "authority conferred to suspend. Or, stating 
this differently, there was no statutory right to remain 
in school every day of a school term if the principal, in 
his discretion, thought it in the best interest of the pupil 
or of other pupils to suspend.* 
*I take it that even most of the Justices (perhaps all of 
th-.m) who have joined Justice White's opinion would require 
n~ocess hearing if the Ohio statute, in explicit terms, 
haa said: "The right to education conferred by the laws of 
Ohio is expressly subject to the unconditional authority of 
the principal, in his absolute discretion, to suspend a , 
pupil without being required to justify or state any reason 
therefor~' I 'think it is reasonable to construe the Ohio 
statute before us, absent any limitation on the principal's 
authority, as if the legislature had explicitly disclaimed 
the need for "cause". 
... - - 4. 
* * * 
Despite my views above, I would welcome seeing a draft 
along the lines David suggests: that is, a blending of 
present parts I and II. If we follow this course, I will 
want a footnote which at least clearly reaerves the position 
above stated. w, could say, in effect, that the deprivation 
authorized by the Ohio statute is so de minimus that it is 
unnecessary in this case to determine whether Ohio intended 
to authorize suspension• in the discretion of principals 
as a part of the educational right itself. 
L.F .P. ,. J'r. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
January 14, 1975 
Re: No. 73-898 - Goss v. Lopez 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
- -~u:pumt <!J'ourt of tlrt ~21 ~tafts 
'llhtsltingfon. l{l. QJ. 2llffe'!-' I 
CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL January 16. 1975 
Re: No. 73-898 -- Norval Goss et al. v. Eileen Lopez et al. 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me . 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely. 
-/--: //{/ ( 
'../ . 
T. M. 
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CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL January 16. 197 5 
Re: No. 73-898 -- Norval Goss et al. v. Eileen Lopez et al. 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me . 
Mr . Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely. 
c .il/ l 
T. M. 
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-ltll!p:ttgfott. ~. (!}. 2llgi"', 
CHAMBERS OF 
I 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
January 16, 1975 
Re: No. 73-898 - Goss v. Lopez 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
j~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
- -j;ttpum:t (ltllltrl lff t4t ~h j;taftg 
Jras Jringht~ J. (lt. 2llffe,." 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Re: No. 73-898 - Goss v. Lopez 
Dear Lewis: 
January 17, 1975 
Please join me in your dissent circulated 
January 16. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies ,tx:>Jhe Conference 
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· The Court holds today :for the first time that the 
' . '. - ,. ~ 
' 
federal j~4J~i~, ra~J!' than sta~_e legislatures and 
I I •. 
educational·· officials~ may determine the rules applicable 
to routine classroom discipline in the public schools. 
-:f_-t . . ; ' ' . ' . 
The ec,a.1t justifies this unprecedented intrusion into the 
processes of elementary and secondary education by 
identifying a new constitutional right: the right of 
a student not to be suspended for as much~• a. single 
day without notice, and without a due process hearing 
either before or promptly following -the suspension. 
Only six years ago in Epperson v. Arkansas, the 
Court emphasized that the public schools are "committed ., . 
to the control of state and local authorities". It went 
on to say that: 
"Courts do not and cannot intervene in the 
resolution of conflicts .which arise in the 
daily operation of school systems and which 
do not directly and sharply implicate basic 
constitutiOQ,al values." 
y a~~ - cf_~ 
~today- turns its back on this and other 
precedents. It can hardly be claimed· seriously that 
a school principal's decision to suspend a pupil for a 
2. 
single day "directly and sharply ~licatea buic 
' 
constitutional value•"· 
The right which the Court purports to procec:t i• 
the right to education afforded by Ohio lav. '!'be same 
Ohio }.., authorizes routine auapeaaiona not to· ·exceed 
eight school days - a prerogative exercised by school 
authorities since the beg1ming of education. Indeed, 
the l.eaaon of discipline ia a part of education - as 
neceaaary as learning to read.' and write. 
If a pupil is entitled to a due process hearing 
if suspended even for a day, presumably be also will 
be entitled to such a bear~ on other di~t~~ 
decision.a vhich more seriously affect the/ right t r 
t- ' 
education: for mmple, if given a failing grade; 
if not promoted; if excluded from certain extracurricular 
activities; if placed in the vocational rather t~ 
the college preparatory track; or indeed if bused long 
distance• from his residence. 
If the Court ~rceiv~s a rati~al ~istin~tion between 
I • 1 ' • l ,. - , . I I •~ ' I ·i ,_- • 
the discretionary ·deci~ion tt.> suse.end . a ": pupil. for a 
brief period, md lthe types -of _discretionan- decisions 
...1 ... ' , ... 
1 
~ . ~~·· \X ~ . ~~ ~ ·dLO .A---"\AA LA.~ 
I , 
~ ~oc~ ~·cunw< liA~ cJ ~ 
~~ Q~- V \ \ ~ 
--•· . - . _ y 
I have just mentioned, it bas failed to articulate ~y 
such distinction .in its, opinion. 
The inevitable result of today'~ decision will be 
to substitute, in many situations·, the uninformed and 
:;:::-
3. 
inexpert judgment "of federa~ c'?'1rts for ·that of the \ 
' .. ' •' '· \ 
14,000 achoolsboarda and two million public school 
teachers, who heretofore have been responsible for the 
day-to-day oper~tion of our public school system. ;,__ 
_ Perhaps today'• decision will be hailed as a liberal 
~,,,.,,.,,. "' - ~ . / one. Althougti' ,labels often are substituted for thoughtful 
analysis, the label."--.that comes to my mind ia'-~repressive". 
' ----
' . -----Until today, elected school board•, teachers and school . '·x~ 
/ authorities have been ~,:oee to~zercise their informed 
I ~ ', 
discretion in ~ ,,ti'est interest ' o~mmature pupils in 
/ . 
element~9~an.~ secondary schools. ~11 henceforth 
ac~- at the peril of judicial challenge by ~ disgruntled 
/ ,.. .,,,. 
,,,,,., or disappointed student. 
--cmur£ttuar-~ 
, h vi~ t e decision of the 
i~ons~t9tltffl l and ~ rsr~/'\
8 
unwarrant,;_d 
e , I / V a seri~ow \u , "'-b ,,,, ' "--
at!t"o, • pub:l:ic 
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~1 ~ ~g_ ~ ~ . 
--do~ ~f,vt/~~ 
l,_,,_,,l)a~- The Court holds today for the first timo/that the 
1u::f ~ · federal judiciary,/ rather than state legislatures and 
~~ educational officials / may determine the rule y applicable 
~ to rom classroom discipline in the public schools. 
~·:{-,.A Rte cmtr;.,fustifies this unprecedented intrusimy{nto the 
d.., i,)1..,,l processes of elementary and secondary educatio~/ ny 
t~ 1 identifying a new constitutional right: the right of 
/ a student not to be suspended} or as much as a ~ n~le~ 
day without notice, / and without a due process hearing/ 
either before or promptly following the suspension. 
<;;-·~-+---
Only six years ago in Epperson v. Arkansas, the 
Court emphasized that the public schooly'are "committed 
to the control of state and local authorities". It went 
on to say that: 
"Courts do not/ and canrot / intervene in the 
resolution of conflicts which arise in the 
daily operation of sch ol systemsl an~ l hich 
do not directly and sharply implicate1 _asic constitutional values." . . 
~::;J;~ its back on this/ and other 
precedents. It can hardly be claimed seriousl/ that 
a school principal's decision to suspend a pupi1J1for a 
J 
- -
single day/ 'directly and sharply implicates basic 
constitutional values". 
2. 
The right which the Court purports to protect/ is 
the right to education/ afforded by Ohio law. The same 
Ohio law/ authorizes routine suspensions not to exceed 
eight school days - a prerogative exercised by school 
authorities/ since the beginning of education. Indeed, 
the lesson of discipline - of its ~ecessi_E,Y in a 




To be sure, the process fou.n~ t:_:~ relatively 
as necessary as learning to read and write. --------
simple. Indeed, it may not afford ~ i realistic protection ,, . ~
against the occasional arbitrary suspension 1iAat1. Ohio law 
already affords. But my concern is with the principle 
and the precedent. 
distances from his residence. 
If the Court perceives a 
decision/ to 
rational distinction/ between 
suspend a pupil for a the discretionary 
brief period,/ and the types of discretionary decisions 




. . - -
I have just mentioned,/ it has failed to articulate any 
such distinction in its opinion. 
The inevitable result of today's decisioo/will be 
to substitute, in many situations , / the ':ninformed and 
i ~expE:Et judgment of f ~ s/ for that of the 
l ;!J OO~ school boards / and two milliO!l public school 
teachers,/ who heretofore have been responsible / for the 
day-to-day operation of our public school system. 
In short, it will further ~~ermine/ the already 
waning authority of school officials. 
Until today, elected school boards, teachers and 
school authorities/ have been free to exercise their 
informed discretion/ in the best interest of innnature 
pupils/ in elementary and secondary schools. They will 
henceforth act/ at the ~ 1 of judicial challenge by 
any disgruntled ~ r disappointed student. 
/ ( /-tv!. ~-~ 
In my view, ooda¥J=s/\decision is unwarranted /as 
I 
a matter of constitutional la, and will deal a serious 




Goss v. LoE_ez 
Dissent 
holds today for the first time that the 
state legislatures and 
officials, may determine the rules applicable 
in the public schools. 
this unprecedented intrusion into the 
elementary and secondary education by 
new constitutional right: the right of 
a student not to be suspended for as much as a single 
day without notice, and without a due process hearing 
either before or promptly following the suspension. 
Only six years ago in Epperson v. Arkansas, the 
Court emphasized that the public schools are "corrnnitted 
to the control of state and local authorities". It went 
on to say that: 
"Courts do not and cannot intervene in the 
resolution of conflicts which arise in the 
daily operation of school systems and which 
do not directly and sharply implicate basic 
constitutional values." 
The Court today turns its back on this and other 
similar precedents. It can hardly be claimed seriously 
2. 
that a school principal's decision to suspend a pupil 
for a single day "directly and sharply implicates basic 
constitutional values." 
The right which the Court purports to protect is 
the right to education afforded by Ohio law. The same 
Ohio law authorizes routine suspensions not to exceed 
eight school days - a prerogative exercised by school 
authorities since the beginning of education. Indeed, 
the lesson of discipline - of its necessity in a 
civilized society - is an essential element of education, 
as necessary as learning to read and write. 
To be sure, the process found by the Court to be 
due is relatively simple. Indeed, it may not afford 
as much realistic protection against the occasional 
arbitrary suspension as Ohio law already affords. But 
my concern is with the principle and the precedent. 
If a pupil is entitled to a due process hearing 
if suspended even for a day, presumably he also will 
be entitled to such a hearing on other discretionary 
decisions which affect more seriously the state-conferred 
right to education: for example, if given a failing 
grade; if not promoted; if excluded from certain 
extracurricular activities; if placed in the vocational 
-------------
3. 
rather than the college preparatory track; or indeed, 
if bussed long distances from his residence. 
If the Court perceives a rational distinction 
between the discretionary decision to suspend a pupil 
for a brief period, and the types of discretionary 
decisions I have just mentioned, it has failed to 
articulate any such distinction in its opinion. 
The inevitable result of today's decision will be 
to substitute, in many situations, the uninformed and 
inexpert judgment of federal courts for that of the 
14,000 school boards and two million public school 
teachers, who heretofore have been responsible for the 
day-to-day operation of our public school system. 
In short, it will further undermine the already 
waning authority of school officials. 
Until today, elected school boards, teachers and 
school authorities have been free to exercise their 
informed discretion in the best interests of irmnature 
pupils in elementary and secondary schools. They will 
henceforth act at the peril of judicial challenge by 
any disgruntled or disappointed student. 
In my view, the Court's decision is unwarranted 
as a matter of constitutional law and will deal a 
serious blow to public education. 
1/22/75 lfp/ss 
No. 73-898 Goss v. Lopez 
Notes for Verbal Dissent 
The Court holds today for the first time that the 
federal judiciary, rather than state legislatures and 
educational officials, may determine the rules applicable 
to routine classroom discipline in the public schools. 
It justifies this unprecedented intrusion into the 
processes of elementary and secondary education by 
identifying a new constitutional right: the right of 
a student not to be suspended for as much as a single 
day without notice, and without a due process hearing 
either before or promptly following the suspension. 
Only six years ago in Epperson v. Arkansas, the 
Court emphasized that the public schools are "committed 
to the control of state and local authorities". It went 
on to say that: 
"Courts do not and cannot intervene in the 
resolution of conflicts which arise in the 
daily operation of school systems and which 
do not directly and sharply implicate basic 
constitutional values." 
The Court today turns its back on this and other 
similar precedents. It can hardly be claimed seriously 
2. 
that a school principal's decision to suspend a pupil 
for a single day "directly and sharply implicates basic 
constitutional values." 
The right which the Court purports to protect is 
the right to education afforded by Ohio law. The same 
Ohio law authorizes routine suspensions not to exceed 
eight school days - a prerogative exercised by school 
authorities since the beginning of education. Indeed, 
the lesson of discipline - of its necessity in a 
civilized society - is an essential element of education, 
as necessary as learning to read and write. 
To be sure, the process found by the Court to be 
due is relatively simple. Indeed, it may not afford 
as much realistic protection against the occasional 
arbitrary suspension as Ohio law already affords. But 
my concern is with the principle and the precedent. 
If a pupil is entitled to a due process hearing 
if suspended even for a day, presumably he also will 
be entitled to such a hearing on other discretionary 
decisions which affect more seriously the state-conferred 
right to education: for example, if given a failing 
grade; if not promoted; if excluded from certain 
extracurricular activities; if placed in the vocational 
. . 
3. 
rather than the college preparatory track; or indeed, 
if bussed long distances from his residence. 
If the Court perceives a rational distinction 
between the discretionary decision to suspend a pupil 
for a brief period, and the types of discretionary 
decisions I have just mentioned, it has failed to 
articulate any such distinction in its opinion. 
The inevitable result of today's decision will be 
to substitute, in many situations, the uninformed and 
inexpert judgment of federal courts for that of the 
14,000 school boards and two million public school 
teachers, who heretofore have been responsible for the 
day-to-day operation of our public school system. 
In short, it will further undermine the already 
waning authority of school officials. 
Until today, elected school boards, teachers and 
school authorities have been free to exercise their 
informed discretion in the best interests of immature 
pupils in elementary and secondary schools. They will 
henceforth act at the peril of judicial challenge by 
any disgruntled or disappointed student. 
In my view, the Court's decision is unwarranted 
as a matter of constitutional law and will deal a 
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the _Woods· Atoun.d .the S~hool _ 
. From 
0
the sta~dp.oint o.f .si~ple jus-· '·, > Wh~t concern~ u~ is the dis~;bing:._ . 
tice and decency, it seems to- us hard or exciting, depending on how one 
to argu_e with the Supreme Court's . --views it-prospect presented by the· 
contention that before a child is sus- court's sudden appearance as a ·well-
pended from school for misbehavior, meaning, long-absent uncle in the dif-.._ 
he ought to be· told why. And that hav- ficult world of child behavior and· 
ing been given . this explanation, he ·, discipline, at ,home and at sch09l_. Do 
must have a chance to offer his. " the justices know what they're getting , 
."Minimum due _process," the five- ' into? ' .. . I • 
mtpi majority called it; not trial ~Y. We don't think the narrow decision . 
jury or anything grandi_~se, but just, , in question here is going to a_dd a terri7 • 
in an informal fashion, some ·state- ·. ble_ burden to teachers and principals,; 
'
1 ment as to what he allegedly did, and many of whom are al ready hard-
who says he did it, _and what does he pressed to keep ' order at school, and .· . 
Want to say for himself. · · . we don't think it's going to tip the . 
✓- A. school does this as a _ matter of scales in favor of the impossible, kid. 
course, we tell ourselves, but of · What it does do, as Justice Powell said · 
course, not all' do. In the case that in his dissent, is to equate the rights of r 
reached the highest court, students in ; children to those of adults. "No one 
Columbus, Ohio, complained that they _can for1rsee the ultimate frontiers of' 
. ·were sent home for ·as long ~s 10 days .,. the new thicket the/court now enters," 
-.~ without a statement as to why, a~d one he said . . · ·· •, ·. ~ ·: · ~ · 
_,..girl who was arrested on a roundup of · He has in mind that the courts ·may 
unruly students off scho~l grounds had.· . riow be asked to second-guess deci- '" 
no chance to protest that she was an sions on the grades a student gets, his 
iniio~ent bystander. _Ther~ would _be fai~ure ~o be pr:omoted, ,the subje_cts ·. · 1 
nothmg much to worry about, Justice he 1s obhged to take, and so on. . 
White said for Jhe majority, "j,f the . -,... · Tq.e rights of a school to _censor stu- ·, 
disciplinary process were a totally . dent publications· is another 'obvious · 
accurate, unerring process, _never '-;, concern. Does· a kid have · a right , to 
mistaken and never unfair. Unfortu- · free speech? Can a father, rising in . 
nately, this.is not the case." wrath at the dinner table, send Buster 
·- ·· · up to bed-without his supper..:_without -
---., •,,--r-;--~--------- "an informal give-and-take?" 
~;- ' l{.';J_ 'f, ·7 5 Where does it end? . 1, 
lDasHington •Dews - Our feeling is that most of these 
--- • problems can and should •be worked 
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out at the local level, with all possi-
ble ·reliance placed on common sense 
and good faith, and that the more the 
· courts _can ~eeQ. . out of it, . the better , · 
_off we're likely to be. A child who suf- . 
fers an injustice, assuming it's not· a 
. crippling one. is likely to find defend.:'.· 
. ers among his_ classmates, or la,ckfug . I 
' that, his parents br other t~achers will · 
cdme to his aid. If not,' well, the young ~ • 
are resilient and mostly they survive. ,: _i: 
•.Chalk it up to the learning process, -· · 
and on to the next chapter, say we·~ ' 
----. l ( ~ . . 
• .. , ·~~; .. .J) ~ :.;. ..... 
1.ne l'lew rurK 1..1.me:s, Jauuai.y .£..1, .1.;,1.J 
' / 
; The .Rights of . Children· ~ 
• ·. ;_ ! ' . • • \. 1,4 • 
In ruling that the public. schools may not resort to 
disciplinary suspensions without an explanation, . the 
Supreme Court has enunciated the doctrine that children, 
. too, are entitl¢ ·to the benefits of fair and evenhanded 
· justice. Obviously fair , as this dodrine may seem to be, 
there are still many adults who l'egard i-t w1th suspicion. 
The essence of the 5-to-4 decision is that the right 
to an education, once established by law, cannot be 
withdrawn on grounds of misconduct without "funda-
. . I . 
mentally fair procedures to determine whether the 
misconduct has occurred." In effect, the Court rejected 
the image of the school administrator as a benign but 
infallible ·autocrat whose edicts can be challenged only 
at peril of chaos in the schoolhouse. 
Intervention by . the highest tribunal should scarcely 1 
have been necessa_ry to make 'a point that ought to be 
self-evident to citizens of a free society and to the 
managers of pedagogically sound educational enterprises. 
Is it reasonable to expect children to grasp the importance 
of justice and due process even as they . spend their 
formative years ·in institutions which den)l them th6se 
benefits? ' · · 
1 
, I . 
The minority's anguished dissent poignantly reflects 
traditiona) opinion of the school establishment and of \ l much of adult sodety. In this view, to require. the 
, educational ·authorities to follow . fair procedures is 
,
1
. ~qu.ivalent to scutt'ling all discipline and,' as Justice Lewis 
F. Powell Jr: darkly hinted, undennirung ."the quality of 
. ' educatioo." .~ • .. ·' ' : - ' ,, . . ·. . . I . . .,.. -., . . 
The ·. narrowness of the margin within the Court 1 
1 
pram1ttfzes two conflicting currents in American society. 
Faith in ilie overriding importance of administrative 
authority was effectively challen'ged by those, including · 
a bare majority of the Court, who place even· greater 
faith in the principle of individual rights, including the · 
·rights of children. . :• . · . \ , \ ·. , ·· ,. . 
~:..;:~ '.·'· · r·/ ··' ~ .. ,,, '· ,.iii· ·'. , · 
,_ •. '-,...,.. I,. • ~, .. , • ",t.: ... ,._ .,;· ._t .. •, ; , 
tr~ 
February 12, 1975 
No. 73•898 Gosa v. Lopez 
Dear adef, Harry and Bill: 
I thoughtyou, as bi-others who joined me in failing 
to see the light in the above case, might be interested 
in the enclosed articles from the Poat. 
1be articles deal with the consequences, after four 
years{ of Judge Wright's opinion requiring the "equalization" 
of•• aries of all teachers in the manner described in 
the lead article. Ia my view, this experience well 
illustrates the adverse effect on public education - and 
on teachers and pupils - where the federal courts perceive 
and apply inflexible constitutional rules to the daily 
operation of the schools. 
The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Black:mun 
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February 18, 1975 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you so much for sending us a copy 
of the Court's opinion and your dissent --
Goss v. Lopez. We were very interested, and 
my dismay was intensified. Sometimes I wish 
the law were not so structured. If only your 
dissent had been presented first, it is hard 
to believe that the other Justices would not 
have concurred with you. Both George and I 
agree with Mr. Will -- your dissent was master-
ful. 
It may interest you to know that I loaned 
it to two young friends of mine, both of whom 
are teachers. They were shocked and bewilder-
ed at the majority decision, and asked me a 
question I cannot answer. Is it possible for 
them to write a letter to a Justice and articu-
late their feelings as to what this will mean 
to discipline in the classroom? I don't expect 
an answer immediately, or p erhaps your secre-
tary could write on a postcard: "yes" or "no"t! 
George and I had such a lovely evening 
with you and Jo and Carl and Mary the night 
before we left Williamsburg. An idea: wouldn't 
it be nice if the four of us could attend the 
Antique Forum together ne~~ 6-d ~ ~ ~. 
Love to both of you,/and we look forward 
to seeing you in May. 
As ever, 
(_r-4~ 





By Lawrence L. Knutson 
Associated Press 
A Senate subcommittee estimates 
that 70,000 U.S. teachers are victims 
of serious physical assaults each 
year and that school vandalism now 
costs about a half billion dollars a 
year. 
The projection was based on a sur-
vey of 757 school districts. It reported 
that 100 students were murdered in 
1973 in those districts and that• hun-
dreds of thousands of students in 
every section of the country are vic-
tims of assaults each year. 
"The ledger of violence confront-
ing our schools reads like a casualty 
list from a war zone or a vice squad 
annual report," said Sen. Birch 
Bayh, D-Ind., chairman of the Sen-
ate Judiciary subcommittee on juve-
nile delinquency. 
VANDALISM costs equal the 
amount spent on textbooks in every 
school in the country in 1972, the re-
port made public yesterday said: 
It called the estimated $500 million 
total "staggering" but a very con-
servative measure of the total loss to 
school districts which are paying 
vastly increased costs for security 
forces and insurance premiums. 
It noted that one study estimates 
the cost of replacing broken windows 
in the schools of an average big city 
would build a new school every year. 
The survey said that between 1970 
and 1973 assaults on teachers in-
creased _77.4 percent; assaults on stu-
dents increased 85.3 percent; rob-
beries of students and teachers 
increased 36.7 percent; rapes and at-
tempted rapes increased 40.1 
percent; homicides in schools in-
creased 18.1 percent, and the num-
bers of weapons confiscated from 
students by school personnel increas-
ed 54.4 percent. 
"The preliminary findings of the 
subcommittee present clear and 
dramatic evidence that violence and 
vandalism in the schools of our coun-
try has reached a level of crisis that 
demands immediate comprehensive 
review and legislative action," the 
report said. 
BAYH'S PANEL will hold a series 
of hearings on the subject and he will 
introduce legislation to provide 
financial aid "to reduce delinquency 
and crime in and against our public 
schools," he said. "Too often young-
sters arriving at our public schools" 
are finding "an environment domi-
nated by fear, chaos, destruction and 
violence," Bayh said. 
The survey concluded that 
vandalism and violence respects nei-
ther regional, racial or economic 
boundaries. 
In St. Louis, Mo., students threw 
mosttham.100 deti(s q\ltof.~indo~s, 
smashed several filing cahmets and 
pushed the school piano down a flight 
of stairs, it reported. 
In Green Bay, Wis., the report 
said, the number of weapons confis-
cated by school officials increased 
from 25 to 39 over the survey period 
and robbery and vandalism increas-
ed dramatically. 
IN DALE CITY, in Prince Willam 
County three teen-agers were arrest-
ed in March 1974 for committing 
about $20,000 in vandalism. "Police 
found nearly all the building's win-
dows smashed, light fixtures ripped 
out, desks splintered and their con-
tents strewn about, eight television 
sets and seven record players de-
stroyed, and water standing through 
m11r.h nf the buildinR." 
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CONCLUSION 
The preliminary findings of the Subcommittee present clear and 
dramatic evidence that violence and vandalism in the schools of our 
country has reached a level of crisis that demands immediate compre-
hensirn review and legislative action. To accomplish this the Subcom-
mittee will proceed immediately with hearings to obtain the views of 
all affected parties, and to deYelop a comprehensive record that will 
serve as a basic reference source on the many interrelated components 
of these very complex problems. As evidenced in this preliminary 
report, the etiology of school violence is as complex as the strncture 
of our society. \Ve intend to examine thoroughly the categories of 
school problem areas which we believe must be singularly and col-
lectively understood before any legislative proposal can be finalized. 
These areas include pushouts, dropouts, forceouts, truancy, gang Yio-
lence a11d terrorism, student rights, teacher rights, parent rights, 
alcohol and drug abuse, community involvement, and alternative 
approaches to correct the devastating patterns of Yiolence in our 
nation's schools. 
* * * 
(39) 
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Additionally, the Commission reports that the following rclernnt 
legislation has been proposed at the State level: 
California ________________ _ 
Maine :.: .. :_ __________________ _ 
South Carolip.a ____________ _ 
South Carolina ____________ _ 
New York __________________ _ 
Indiana ___________________ _ 
Indiana ___________________ _ 
A.B. 3-!. Requires the Department of Justice to 
study vandalism and conduct pilot programs 
to deal with vandalism and to report to the 
legislature by 1977 regarding suggested pro-
grams to reduce vandalism. 
L.D. 11. An act restricting the use of weapons 
in public schools. 
H2158. A bill to prohibit vandalism on school 
property and while on school buses and provides 
for penalties. -
!12159. Amends the South Carolina Code to pro-
vide penalties for breaking and entering school 
property and committing vandalism thereon. 
Provides for rewards leading to the arrest and 
conviction of violators. · 
A288. Requires school employees to make writ-
ten reports of assaults upon them by pupils. 
S.B. 338. A bill to control specific school dis-
turbances. 
H.B. 1365 and 1515. Bills to define procedures 
for the removal of persons from school property 
who are interfering with normal school pro-
cedures. 
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ST A TE LEGISLATION 
.A variety of legislatiYe proposals have been enacted into law at the 
state level to curb school crime. The most comprehensirn law is the 
Florida "Safe Schools Act" passed by the Florida legislature in rn73. 
The Act authorizes a program of financial assistance to school districts 
for the development of programs to cope with school security prob-
lems such as vandalism ·and disruptive students. Appropriations for 
the Act amounted to $1.85 million in 1973 and 1974 respectively. 
Funding under the Florida Act is allocated through a formula based 
on the number of full time students in a given school district for the 
year prior to the funding. In order to receive funding, the school 
district must submit a project plan for approval by the Commissioner 
of Education, Projects to date have provided security equipment, 
identification cal'ds for stndents and security personnel and have en-
abled the development of programs in such areas as human relations 
and class management. The Florida House Committee on Education 
is currently developing a proposal for a change in the Safe Schools 
Act that would aim less at "hardware" for security equipment. and 
more at innovative programming to deal with disruptive students. 
The Education Commission on the States reports some 100 prn-
posa ls enacted by states in 1!)73 and 1974 that generally relate to student 
control and school safety and secmity. The folJo,,ing are sever:,] 
examples: 
Y ear and State Leyislc,tfon 
1973: North Carolina_________ S. 286. A resolution directing a Senate committne 
to study the problem of student unrest, discipline, 
in public schools. 
1!)7,l : Oklahoma _____________ H.B. 1276. Allows for the suspension of pupils -f<•r 
possession and allows for the search and seiznr'l 
of dangerous weapons and controlled dangeroug 
substances. 
1974: Virginia _______________ II.J.R. 84. Authorizes the Virginia Advisory Lea--
islative Council to make a study to determine th,, 
need for State funds to establish programs to pr~ --
vent disruption in public schools. 
1074: Hawaii_ _______________ H.D.1; H.B. 390. Establishes a statewide school 
security patrol charged with the prevention ol' 
Yandalism, hijacking and drug sales and u;;e and 
other activities inimical to the pursuit of aca-
demic interests. 
1074: North Carolina _________ H.B. 2008. Increases from $50 to $300 the reward 
that boards of education are authorized to offer 
for information leading to the arrest and convic-
tion of per;;ons in cases of vandalism or larceny 
within public schools. 
1974: Indiana______________ H.B. 1'793. l\fakes it a misdemeanor for an:v pn-
1<on to refuse to leave the premises of any 
institution established for the purpose of theed• 
ucation of students when such persons is causing 
a cliRturbance-if requested by the principal or 
the assistant principal. 
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"safe schools" concept but they tend to emphasize the necessity for 
broader, long range pro()'rams to combat school crime. Dr. Harvey 
Scribner, former Chancellor of New York City Schools in one example 
of such sentiment stated: 
Principals are legitimately concerned about the social and educationa l effects 
of acts of violence and crime which take place in the school or in its immediate 
vicinity. l\Iy personal conclusion, however, is that the placing of security guards 
in the schools cloes not represent a permanent, long-range solution to the prolllem 
of unsafe schools. 
It is, at best, merely a short-ra11ge and necessarily limited treatment of a symp-
tom. Security guards, whateyer their numbers, will not, in my judgment, co11-
tribute in any substantial way to elimination of the factors which cause schools 
to be unsafe. 
A community school superintendent in ?\ew Yor-k City has observed-accu-
rately, I belieYe--that you can make a school an armed camp, and that won·t 
make it secure. Kor, I would add, will it enhance the school's ability to educate. 
Although school authorities clearly must make all possible efforts to make 
schools safe by using a yariety of means, the major emphasis should be the de-
velopment of long-term solutions to the causes of unsafe schools. 
'l'be I;~ederal Government, through legisla tion, can help significantly br en-
cournging the development of safe-schools efforts which seek to reach below the 
surfa ce of the problem. It is my hope, in short, that the Congress, in prornoting 
,-;afer schools, will place more emphasis on the support of substantive program,; 
designed to deal with the cau,:es of unsafe schools than on the funding of efforts; 
that is, security guards, llurglar alarms, spedal equipment, et cetera, which deal 
primarily with the symptoms of crime. 
It is not a matter of either-or; it is a matter· of emphasis. In particular. I 
would strongly recommend the support of programs which involve students, and 
varents as well, in the design and operation of programs for safe schools. 
Other reservations that resulted in Congress not approving an opera -
tional program ,rnre motivated by concern that such a program might 
prematurely be sponsored at the federal level, when state and local 
prerogatives and existing solutions had not been fully investigated or 
more definitive information on the nature and extent of the problem 
had not been developed. 
The Subcommittee has determined through this preliminary s111·w:v 
of crime in the schools that federal legislation in this critical al'ea is 
w'<lrranted. Bnt our examination of available data suggests that while 
previous "safe schools" legislative proposals may serve as a point of 
departure, realistic and effective federal legislation cannot be fina lizecl 
,rithout fnrther exhausti\-e Congressional inYestigation. 
OUR NATION'S SCHOOLS-A REPORT CARD: "A" IN 
SCHOOL VIOLENCE AND VANDALISM 
IN"TRODUCTIO~ 
The purpose of this preliminary report by the Senate Subcommittee 
to I1westigate Juvenile Delinquency is to direct the attention of the 
Congress and the American people to a most disturbing and costly 
problem-violence and yandalism in the schools of our nation. Since 
1971 the Subcommittee has been involved with a variety of issues 
which have a very fundamental and critical bearing upon the causes, 
preYention and treatment of delinquent behavior exhibited by young 
citizens in every region of our country. 
Dming the past four years the Subcommittee has held 55 clays of 
hearings and receiYed testimony from 419 witnesses on numerous 
topics, some of ·which im·olYed the extent and causes of drug abuse, 
nmaway youth, school dropouts, and the confinement of junniles in 
detention and conectional facilities. 
The legislation deYcloped to deal with these problems and which 
promises to greatly assist our efforts to combat and prewnt juyenile 
delinquency is the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prenntion Act 
o-f 197-:1: (P.L. 93-415). This Act is designed to prevent young people 
from entering our failing juyenile justice system, and to assist com-
mnniti.es in creating more sensible and economic approaches for 
youngsters already in the juYenile justice system. Thus, the ,TuYeni.le 
.fostice and Drlin'quency PreYention Act of 1974 proYides incentives 
to cleYelop delinquency prm·ention programs and community based 
alternatives to incarceration of youthful offenders. 
Dnring the course of our hearings, the Subcommittee de.-eloped 
a serions concem over the rising level of student violence and yandal-
ism in our na6on·s public school systems. Since many aspects of 
jnnnile problems are intimately connected with the natme and quality 
of the school experience, it became apparent that, to the extent our 
schools were being subjected to an increasing trend of student .-iolPnce 
an_d nmdalism, they won ld necessarily be contributing to the nncler-
lyrng causes of juvenile delinquency. The President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Hl67, found 
that: 
RPcPnt research has rf'lated instances of clC'linqnent conduct to the ,:chool-child 
relationship and to rn·oblems either created or complicated by schools themselves. 
Fir,:t. in its own methods and practice,:, the ,:chool may simply be too passh-e to 
fnltill its obligations as one of the last social institutions with an opportunity to 
rescue the child from other force,:, in himself and in bis environment. ,;,.·hich are 
pu,:hing him toward delinquency. Second. there is con,:iderallle evidence that some 
f<Chools mny have an indirect effect on delinquenc.r by the use of methods that 
create the conditions of failure for certain students. 
(I) 
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In order to more fully understand the nature and extent of this 
problem, the Subcommittee sent a questionnaire in August 1973, 
to the superintendents of 757 public school districts throughout the 
conntry with an enrollment of 10,000 pupils or more ranging from 
grades K-12. The questionnaire ,ms designed to obtain categorized 
information to determine the extent and scope o-f violence, vandalism, 
and dropouts in the systems surveyed for the school years 1970-71, 
]!)71-72. and 1972-73. A Subcommittee follo.Y-up letter was mailed to 
thP non-respondent school districts in December 1973. To date'. 516 
school districts or 68.1 percent of the school districts surveyed haYo 
responded to the questionnaire. Several districts fonnd it necessary 
to refer the study instruments to the municipal police department 
because the school did not maintain records of certain school-related 
offenses. Of the 516 respondents, 220 school districts retnrned inrom-
plete ouestionnaires. Useful information was. ho-n·ever, gleaned from 
these incomplete responses. The incomplete rp1estionnaires were pri-
marily from school districts which were unahle to provide the Sub-
committee with the information requested due to the lack of adequate 
recordkeeping procedures for the entire three-years or from districts 
which had not implemented recordkeeping systems pertaining to 
school crimes until 1972 or 1973. 
Also in August 1973, the Subcommittee corresponded with 150 school 
sPcmit~· directors requesting their assistance in furnishing the Sub-
committee with any a.-ailable information they desired to contribnte to 
the discussion of crimes committed by youngsters in the pnblic school 
systems. (The directors ,,ere informed that a Subcommittee question-
naire had been circulated to over 700 school superintendents.) The 
Subcommittee was particular]~· interested in receiYing the school se-
curit:v directors recommendations for deYeloping federal legislation to 
proYide the research, coordination. and resources necessary for the 
prevention and deterrence of crimes and violence in our nation's 
schools. Twenty school secnrity directors responded to the Subcom-
mittee·s request for assistance. 
This preliminary Subcommittee report discusses the information 
obtained from these sources, together with various additional studies 
of school violence and vandalism gathered by the Subcommittee. The 
report is diYided into several sections, the first of which is a general 
oYerYiew of some of the trends and causes of school violence and van-
dalism throughout the country. The second section is a regional break-
down of the Subcommittee's findings on how school violence and van-
dalism is affecting the Northeast, Northcentral, South and West areas 
of the country. The third and fourth sections deal with federal and 
state legislation in this area under study. Our final section details the 
subcommittee's future goals. 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
Legislation proposing Federal financial assistance to local education 
agencies in order to reduce and prevent school crimes was first intro-
duced in the 92nd Congress by Representative ,Tonathan Bingham of 
K e,Y York as R .R. 3101. This legislation titled, "The Safe Schools 
Act" ,ms slightly revised and reintroduced in September 1971 as II.R. 
106-U. Hearings werc held on both bills by the General Subcommittee 
on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor in 
the fa 11 of 1971 but no report was issued on the legislation. 
The "Safe Schools Act" as initially proposed -would have established 
a new category of grants for schools under Title I of the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act to assist schools in the development and 
implementation of locally approved school security plans to reduce 
crime against the school, their children, employees, and facilities. Con-
ceiYably, the grants could have been used to develop greater profession-
alization and expansion of school security forces; increase adult pres-
ence in the schools through the use of trained parent patrols; install 
surveillance devices and alarm systems as crime deterrants; and im-
prove student identification and accounting methods. 
The "Safe Schools ....\.ct" was reintrod11ced in the 93rd Congress as 
H.R. 2650, with provisions identical to H.R. 106-H in the previons 
Cong:ress. The proposal had oYer 20 cosponsors. Hearings were again 
held by the General Subcommittee on Education, but no report ,ms 
issued. A companion measure, S. 485, was introduced in the Senate 
bnt there ,vas no further Senate action. Later in the 93rd Congress, 
the "Safe Schools Study Act," H.R. 11962 was introduced. It required 
the Department of Health. Educ·ation, and "\Velfare to conduct a "foll 
and complete i1westigation and study" of crime in elementary and 
Reeondary schools. IT.R. 11962 was subsequently adopted by th(' Horn::e 
Committee on Education and Labor as an ·amendment to H .R. 69. 
the "Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1974." 
A Srnate version of the amendment was adopted dnring Senat(' con-
sideration of the ESE.A amendments of 197 4 ( S. 1539) . The conferencr 
report subsequrntly adopted the provisions of thr House bill rxcPpt 
for por~ions of the Senate Yersion which required the study to coyer 
tlw ])('nod of enactment throngh fiscal year 1976. 
The ESEA amendments of 1974 were signed into law August 21, 
1974 with the Safe School Study provision intact (P.L. 93-380). 
Reaction to Federal "Safe Schools" legislation has been mixed. 
School security personnel charged with immediate responsibility for 
dealing with criminal offenses in the schools continue to be very sup-
portirn of "safe schools" proposals in Congress. The majority of our 
responses from school security directors across the country included 
recommendations that the initial "Safe Schools Act" be enacted into 
law as a significant step toward winning the battle against crime in the 
schools. We have found educators to be generally supportive of the 
(35) 
The Subcommittee survey of the ·western Region indicates that the 
increasing trend of violence and vandalism found throughout this 
area is .at least as serious, if not more so, than the other three regions 
of the country. ~\lthough, the survey results show that the extent of 
the problem may vary somewhat between the extremely critical situ-
ation in some larger, urban and suburban areas and the less extreme 
problem in some of the more sparsely populated states, it should be 
understood that ,vhile the level of destruction and violence may differ, 
it has increased over the last several years to unacceptable levels 
·throughout this area. 
NATIONAL TRENDS 
There has always been a certain level of violence and vandalism 
in our nation's public school system. Professor Alan F. ·vv estin of 
Columbia University in a study of urban school violence in the years 
between 1870 and 1950 has found a rather steady stream of disrup-
tions occurring throughout that entire period. If, however, the system 
has never been totally immtme from incidents of student misbehavior 
such problems have historically been viewed as a relatively minor con-
cern seldom involving more than a few sporadic and isolated incidents. 
As recently as 1964 a survey of the nation's teachers found that only 
3 percent of their students could be considered disci-pline problems. 
Overall, teachers were able to rate 70-80 percent of their classes as 
exhibiting good to excellent behavior. 
Today, however, the situation has changed and the level of violence 
and rnndalism in onr schools i;, rap-idly mcreasing in both intensity 
and frequency. Dr. Frank Brown, Chairman of the National Com-
mission for Reform of Secondary Education, contends, "The major 
concern confronting secondary schools today is the climate of fear 
,,here the majority of students are afraid for their safety." A Grand 
,Jury in San Francisco issued a report last Januarv which declared. 
"The most serious problem_ facing the city is the deterioration of its 
public school system." In a survey of teacher needs conducted in 1972 
fully 54 percent of the teachers found student disruption of their class-
rooms to be a problem of moderate to critical proportions. Syracuse 
University Research Corporation conducted a survey of urban second-
ary schools which found that 85 percent of these institutions had 
experienced some type of student disruption in the period between 
1967 and 1970. The Syracuse report concluded, "The disruption of 
education in our high schools is no longer novel or rare. It is current, 
it is widespread and it is serious." 
It is alarmingly apparent that student misbehavior and conflict 
,,ithin our school system is no longer limited to a fist fight between 
individual students or an occasional general disruption resulting from 
a specific incident. Instead our schools are experiencing serious crimes 
of a felonious nature including brutal assaults on teachers and stu-
dents. as well as rapes, extortions, burglaries, thefts and an unprec-
edrnted wave of wanton destruction and vandalism. 11foreover our 
preliminary study of the situation has produced compelling evidence 
that this level of violence and vandalism is reaching crisis proportions 
which seriously threaten the ability of our educational system to carry 
out its primary function. 
Quite naturally the rising tide of violence in our schools has en-
gendered an increasing awareness and concern among the American 
prople. In a 1974 Gallup poll most adults and high school students 
surveyed cited the lack of discipline as the chief problem confront-
(3) 
4 
ing schools today. In fact three of the top four problems cited by 
most of those polled were directly related to various problems of 
student behavior.' 
Our recently completed nationwide survey of over 750 school dis-
tricts demonstrates that this concern is well founded. The statistics 
gathered by the Subcommittee indicate that violence in our schools 
affects every section of the nation and, in fact, continues to escalate 
to even more serious levels. The preliminary Subcommittee survey 
found that in the three years between 1970 and 1973 : 
(A) Homicides increased by 18.5 percent; 
(B) Rapes anu attempted rapes increased by 40.1 percent; 
( C) Robberies increased by 36.7 percent; 
(D) Assaults on students increased by 85.3 percent; 
(E) Assaults on teachers increased by 77.4 percent; 
(F) Burglaries of school buildings increased by 11.8 percent; 
( G) Drug and alcohol offenses on school property increased by 
37.5 percellt; and 
(H) Dropouts increased by 11.7 percent. 
An e,en more ominous statistic for the future course of school safety 
is the fact that by the end of the 1973 school year the number of 
weapons confiscated by school authorities had risen by 54.4 percent in 
three years. These ,Yenpons include knives, clubs, pistols and even 
sawed-off shotguns clesigned to be easily concealed within a student's 
locker. 
The conclusions to be dra,,n from the Subcommittee survey are sup-
ported by other studies of these problems. Simply put. the tr<'ncl in 
school violence over the last decade in America has been, and continues 
to be, alarmingly and dramatically upward. 
In a 1964 survey by the National Educational Association (NE.A), 
14.7 percent of the teach<'rs surveyed reported that a teacher had been 
physically assaulted in their schools. By 1973 a similar survey showed 
that 37 percent of the nation's public school teachers reported an inci-
dent of teacher-oriented assault in their schools, and almost 50 percent 
of the teachers in the larger school systems ( over 25,000 students) were 
aware of specific assaults on other teachers in their schools. Data from 
an earlier survey of large urban school districts conducted by the Sub-
committee sho,,ed that assaults on teachers in those systems increased 
612 percent between 1964 and 1968. In Chicago alone the number of 
such assaults went from 135 to 1,065 in that same period. 
The returns from the Subcommittee's current nationwide surrny 
slmws that this problem continues to exist and in :fact to worsen. Be-
tween 1970 and 1973 assaults on teachers in school systems throughout 
the country increased again over previous levels bv 77.4 percent. The 
NEA esti1!1ates that in the 1972-73 school year alone 69,000 teachers 
were physically attacked by students and 155,000 teachers had their 
personal property maliciously damaged. Another study found that 
75,000 teachers are injured badly enough each year to require medical 
attention. 
In response to this increase in assaults on tPachers, the United Feel-· 
0ration of Teachers recently issued to its m0mbers a booklet on how to 
handle ,iolence in a ,·ariety of school situntions including hallways, 
• 
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The Orange County School system expended $615,288.05 on van-
dalism related repairs during FY 1973. Anaheim High School alone 
had over $124,000 in costs attributable to vandalism. One study esti-
mates that the State of California will be spending well over $10,000,-
000 every year on vandalism repairs. 
Although Cali,fornia is by far the most heavily populated State in 
the Subcommittee's ,;v estern region, and quite naturally therefore has 
the largest volume of violence and vandalism in the area, the remain-
ing States also report serious crime problems in their schools. In the 
Seattle schools, for example, serious assaults increased by 70 percent 
and robbery by 100 percent between the 1970-71 and 1972-73 school 
:rears. In 1972 alone there were 1,886 crim<'S committed against students 
and school employees ranging from homicides to possession of firearms 
on the school groi.mcls. Vandalism cost the Seattle schools over $1 mil-
lion in 1972. A report on school security for the State of ,vashi ngton 
finds: 
Additionally, the problem has taken a turn for the worse because our ;;chools 
are no longer safe for the majority of students and faculty. Hardly a day goes by 
where an incident or incidents in our schools do not occur. Teachers a re a fraid, 
students are apprehensiYe, and parents are concerned with the mounting security 
related problems in our educational system. 
The Boulder, Colorado, Schools reported $65,000 in annual vandal-
ism losses and a 1072-73 security budget of $60.000. In 1970-71 that dis-
trict had 17 robberies, but by tlie end~of the 1973 school )·ear that num-
ber had risen to 31. The Denver Public schools recentlv installed a 
silent alarm system and hired a full time security supervisor in an 
attempt to reduce its Yandalism costs. The AdministratiYe Director of 
the system states. "The installation of silent alarms is extr0mely dif-
ficult to finance within the parameters of a school budget." 
Last September the Intermountain School in Brigham City, Utah 
"·as the scene of a series of fights among Indian students from different 
tribes. Police arrested 14 students and confiscated numerous knives 
and clubs after a particularly serious flareup at the school. School 
authorities also reported several attempts to burn down the school 
building. In 1972 Salt Lake County schools lost more than $400,000 
in destroyed or stolen properties. This loss ,ms estimated to be equal 
to the yearly operating costs of two medium sized elementary schools. 
.A report prepared at the end of the 1973 school year by the U tah Asso-
ciation of School Administrators on violence in the State's schools 
found, "Dissent, disruption and violence are beginning to run r ampant 
in some areas." 
The Subcommittee ,found a total of 138 serious assaults on students 
and 16 assaults on teachers during the 1972-73 school year in tlw 
Phoenix Union High School System in Phoenix, Arizona. That same 
system also reported $35,000 in vandalism related damages. The Roose-
velt School District, also located in Phoenix, had over $16.000 in educa-
tional equipment stolen in FY 1973 and suffered an additional $16,760 
loss from equipment being maliciously damaged. 
In Las Vegas, ~ernda, the Clark County School District report<'cl nn 
increase in the number of narcotic offenses being committed on school 
property :from 38 in 1970 to 134 by 1973. In the same period burglaries 
increased from 7!) to 200, and major vandalism incidents from 19 
to 671. 
tJ~ 
cernbcr a gun fight between bvo students at the Manual Arts High 
School campus left one 16-year-old dead ancl another 17-year-old 
badly wounded. A Los Angeles high school principal declared, "For 
teachers and students alike, the issue unfortunately is no lon_ger learn-
ing hnt survival." 
School and juvenile authorities attribute some of this increase in vio-
lence in Los Angeles schools to the presence of numerous well orga-
nized gangs in these inst it ntions. The head of the Youth Services Divi-
sion of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department stated last year that the 
schools are ",-irtually armed camps" as a result of violence from gangs. 
In the 1971-72 school year there were 200 gang related shootings, 29 of 
,,hich were fatal. It has been estimated that Los Angeles has 150 gangs 
in the city, many of "·hich are operating in the schools. One of the 
largest of these organizations is called the Crips. The name is a short 
form o-f Cripples which in turn is derived from the gang's trademark 
of maiming or crippling their victims. The Crips also have two auxil-
iary units: The Cripetts, composed of girl members, and the Junior 
Crips made up of elementary school children. A social worker working 
"·ith the Los ~\ngeles gangs says: 
The trend ii-; to1;-ard eYen more violent acts. Our biggest problem is with the 
8 t-o 11 :vear olds, not the teenagers. They're into everything-n111dalism, assault, 
vet(.y theft and extortion at school. 
Los Angeles. of course. is not the only city in the ·western region 
,vi.th gang related problems in its schools. In San Francisco many of 
the most organized gangs are found in Chinatov,n. Two years ago one 
of these gang leaders "·as assassinated by a rirnl 15 year old high 
school student who riddled his victim's body with seYen shots from a 
. 25 ca libcr pistol he had concealed in his pocl(et. . 
;\lthough only about 1 percent of the youths living in Chinatown 
belong to these gangs they are capable of repeated serious acts of vio-
lence and disruption in the city schools. These groups have names like 
the Jnnior V{ah Ching. l'eportedly found in Galileo and Washington 
High Schools. the Baby ·wah Ching, made of 12 to 15 year olds, and 
the Sney Sing. In addition to this gnng related Yiolence, San Fran-
cisco experiences the usual kinds of unorganized mayhem found 
throughout schools in the ·western Region. In the first two weeks of 
the 1972 school year for instance, one student was killed and five others 
wound ed in knife attacks at three different San Francisco schools. 
Additi onally. three other separate fights resulted in serious injuries 
to six other students. Dnring January 1973, four high school students, 
three of them girls, were expelled for carrying guns . 
In Sacramento a school disciplinary officer reported that instances 
of extortion are increasing fastc1· than other forms of school crime. 
l\Iost of the students inYohed in these- crimes arc in the 6th, 7th, or 8th 
grades and are apparently motivated by the "sheer delight of scaring 
the --- out of some small kid." 
The costs of nnda li sm in California are also extremely high. In 1971 
Los Angeles lost $3.700,000 to intentional destruction and theft of 
school property, enough to construct two or three new elementary 
school buildings. Superintendent of Schools Johnston estimates that 
hetween ]!)68 and 1973 nmdalism cost Los Angeles approximately 
$11 million . 
lunchrooms and classrooms. The booklet also contains advice to 
teachers on how best to combat sexual assaults: 
This is especially true for female teachers. Most rapes and other sex crimes 
occur in classrooms, faculty rooms and workrooms-when th~ teacher is alone. 
'1.'he surest means of vreventing sea:ital att<icks is never to be alone. 
The teacher who is confronted by a sexual assailant should take account of 
Police Department recommendations. If a rapist is armed, the police urge that 
hi8 Yictim offer no resistance, lest she be maimed or fatally injured. If he is not 
armed, a woman should remember that her knee or almost any instrument can 
uccome a weapon : a Bic pen will open a beer can-or a kidney or an eye. 
There are indications that student violence and vandalism occurs 
more often in larger urban secondary schools. A survey of newspaper 
al"ticles between October 1969 and February 1970 revealed that 63 
percent of the major school disruptions occurred in urban areas. A 
Yandalism and Violence study published by the School Public Rela-
tions Association estimated that 55 percent of the major incidents oi 
<lisrnption occurred in cities larger than one million :12eople and 26 
percent occurred in cities of less than 100,000 populat10n. It should 
bo emphasized, howeYer, that this is not a problem found exclusively 
in large cities or solely inYolving older students. A guidance counselor 
for a school system on the ,Vest coast commented: 
"\Ye get thousands of reports on assaults. It's astonishing to see what happens 
in the elementary grade,;, teachers being hit and called filthy names, assaulted 
l,y little kids who really can't hurt them much. But the thing is, what are you 
1rning to do about these kid,; so they change their n·ay of thinking about things, 
their attitude and beha,·ior? 
~\lthough the level of Yiolencc, directed against teachers revealed 
by these statistics, is indeed alarming, the principal victims of the 
rising tide of crime in om· schools are not the teachers, but the students. 
The Subcommittee's smuTey found that violent assaults on students 
increased by 85.3 percent o,·er a three year period, while reported rob-
beries of students increased by 36.7 percent. 
The Subcommittee suney found that incidents invoh·ing the use 
o-f elm.gs and alcohol on public school property went up 37.5 percent. 
A study released this year by the NEA estimates that drug-related 
crimes in schools had increased by 81 percent since 1970, and that 30 
percent of the 18 million students in secondary schools use illegal 
drngs. 
The ~ational Highway Safety .Administration estimates that 50 per-
cent of the nation's high school students go to drinking parties ewrv 
month and that 61 percent of that group gets chunk once a month. The 
Highway Safety Administration also found that these students rep-
resent a remarkable cross-section of our schools: 
They are not far out, drop out alienated or under achieving types. On the 
contrary, they represent all le,·els of scholastic achievement and aspiration. They 
report the same range of sport and extracurricular activities as the student;;; who 
nre not inYolvecl with drinking. 
It is important to stress that the Subcommittee survey findino-s, as 
well as thos_e of other suneys on violence within the school sy~tem, 
are only estnnates of the nature and extent of the problem. A report 
?n ~he New York City school system found that the rate of unreported 
mc1clents ranged between 30 percent and 60 percent. Albert Shanker, 
-HJ-483'--75--2 
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President o:f the American Federation o:f Teachers, explained teachers' 
reluctance to :fully report such incidents as :follmYS: 
'l'eachers find that if they report to the principal an assault, the principal who 
feels that his own reputation or her reputation or the school's reputation is at 
stake here, will very frequently turn around and start harassing the teacher 
by saying, "Well, if rou had three assaults, how come rou are the one alwars 
complaining. You must have more observation or better planning, or this or 
that." So the teacher soon finds out that bringing these reports to the attention 
of the principal is something that is not wanted and tends to suppress that 
information. 
In conducting our sun-ey, the Subcommittee found that many o:f the 
schools contacted did not keep records o:f violent incidents involving 
their students or personnel, which obviously makes the task o:f gauging 
the levels and directions o:f violence a difficult one. A uniform, national 
reporting system for our schools would be particularly helpful in this 
regard. 
In addition to the ,·iolrnce directrd against both teachers and stn-
dents within the school system, there is also a continuing and rapidly 
increasin~ level o:f destruction and the:ft o:f school property. A survey 
conducted by the Baltimore, Maryland, public schools o:f 39 cities 
across the country found that in 1968-69 these cities had reported 
vandalism losses o:f over $12,000,000. In a 1971 report prepared by 
Education U.S.A. and the National School Public Relations Associa-
tion, it was estimated that yandalism was costing $200 million an-
nually. Barely two years later Dr. Nonnan Scharer, President o:f the 
Association o:f School Security Directors, stated: 
A conservative estimate of the cost of ,andalism, thefts and arson to schools 
in this country this year will reportedly be over a half a billion dollars. I say 
conservative because out of the almost 15,000 school systems the top five account 
for $15--20 million dollars of this cost. 
This $500 million vandalism cost represents oyer $10 per year for 
every school student, and in fact equals the total amount expended on 
textbooks throughout the country in 1972. 
A 1970 survey conducted by the School Product N" ews found that 
damages from vandalism cost an average o:f $55,000 for e,·ery school 
district in the country. By the end o:f the 1973 school year the average 
cost per district had risen to $63,031. Although these figures indicate 
that the incidents o:f vandalism are certainly widespread, it is in the 
larger urban districts with upwards o:f 25,000 stnclents where the most 
costly destruction occurs. Almost 60 percent o:f all vandalism takes 
place in these larger districts "-ith an average cost per district in 1973 
at $135,297. 
The source o:f this destruction ranges from broken windows, found 
in over 90 percent o:f our districts, to firrs reportrd by 35 percent o:f 
the districts. Signific:fant incidents o:f the:ft and malicious destruction 
o:f educational equipment occurs in 80 percent o:f the school districts 
in the country. 
Staggering as these figures are they undoubtedly represent a very 
conservative estimate of economic loss attributab]r to school vandalism. 
A study o:f school vandalism by Bernard Greenberg o:f t lw Stanford 
Research Institute found: 
It should be noted that the cost figure is gro~~ly understated because it does 
not include in all instances losses attributable to burglary, theft and property 
D. WEST 
For purposes o:f our surrny the Subcommittee's ·western region is 
comprised o:f Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, ··washington, ,vyoming, 
Guam. the Canal Zone and the Trust Territories o:f the Pacific Islands 
and American Samoa. 
Questionnaires were sent to 130 school districts in this region and 
69.8 percent o:f them responded. 
The Subcommittee found that in schools in the ,v estern region be-
tween 1970 and 1973 : 
(A) Assan lts on students increased 77.4 percent; 
(B) Assaults on teachers increased 6.4 percent; 
( C) Major acts o:f vandalism increased by 15.7 percent; 
(D) Robberies increased by 98.3 percent; 
(E) Burglaries increased by 2.7 percent; 
(F) Rapes and attempted rapes increased by 52.3 percent; 
( G) Homicides increased by 26.6 percent; and 
(H) Drug offenses in schools increased by 18.1 percent. 
Perhaps one o:f the best indicators o:f the rising tide of school vio-
lence in this region is the fact that the number o:f weapons being seized 
:from students by school authorities increased by 90.3 percent :from 
1970 to 1973. Obviously, more and more students are becoming acutely 
a"~are of the escalating level o:f violence within their schools. 
The Subcommittee also found an increasing concern among state 
nnd local school authorities throughout the region. The California 
State Department o:f Education, :for example, commissioned a year-
long state wide hwestigation o:f the problem by a special task force. 
The final report concluded that: 
Every relevant source of information studied hy the 'rask Forre indicated tlrnt 
general crime is a serious problem showing an unmistakable increase in the 
schools of the State. Vandalism in particular appeared to the Task Force to he 
a Rerious problem for most schools. Indications were that it was increasing in 
frequency although the rate of increase did not appear to he as great for Yanda-
lism as for some other types of school crimes. 
The Superintendent o:f Schools for the City o:f Los Angeles, ,vmiam 
J. Johnston, in a, letter to the Subcommittee writes: 
The problems of jm·enile crimes in our communities and on ,;rhool campus<>s 
giYes us serious concerns. It should be noted that assaults and batteries in cam-
pus related incidents inrreased 44 percent last rear. Rohberie;;; on school cam-
puses more than doubled, while a total of 167 incidents iln-olved the use of 
weapons. 
A:fter an extrnsive, undercover investigation o:f 24 high schools last 
year, the Chie:f o:f the Los Angeles High School Juvenile Division 
estimated that, "80 percent of the students with whom police agents 
came in contact while posing as students and attending classes were 
using drugs o:f some kind." In the first fom months of the 1972-1973 
school year tlwre were 60 gun episodes in Los Angeles schools, one o:f 
which involved the death of a Locke High School student. Last De-
(81) 
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You have young people today who for eight hours a day, nine months a year, 
are having to go to school facing racism, isolation, and unfair treatment with the 
disappearing number of minority teachers and administrators. But these stu-
dents just aren't going to take any stuff. ,ve have found that there are variances 
in the student's response to the situation they're in. :F'rom a preliminary inquiry 
we learned from students and the few teachers who would respond that the 
major problem in the average school in our region is conflict. Under the umbrella 
of conflict we found that the number one problem was conflict between stndents 
and teachers. Ranking number two was conflict bet\Yeen students and admini s-
trators. Ranking number three was conflict between students and students and 
the unfair enforcement of rules. 
The findings of the Southern Regional Council with regard to con-
flict is dramatically underscored by the Subcommittee's survey. 
These special problems in the Southern region emphasize the need, 
uationwide, to assure due process for teachers and students in all 
school proceedings, but particularly those of a disciplinary natme. 
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damage repaired by resident maintenance staffs. Nor does it take into account 
costs to equip and maintain special security forces, which are considerable for 
the larger school districts, and law enforcement costs to patrol and respond to 
calls reporting school incidents. Many school districts carry theft insurance, but 
the costs are exceedingly high. Where data on selected school districts theft 
losses are available, the dollar amounts are significantly high. 
Spiraling insurance rates are a significant, but often oYerlooked, 
factor in the overall cost of vandalism. The Greenberg study found a 
vV est Coast state which underwent a 40 percent rise in fire insurance 
costs within one year. Another survey stated : 
Many school administrators point out that only a few years ago schools were 
wooed by the insurance industry as good risks. Now this has changed. And 
~chool districts all over the country are reporting difficulty in obtaining insurance. 
Half the districts answering the Education U.S.A. survey said rates have in-
creased. Many are either paying higher premiums, higher deductibles, or in 
all too many instances, having policies cancelled or flatly rejected. 
In addition to insmance ratf's, school_ districts are facing increas-
ing costs for security guards, fencing, intrusion and fire detectors, 
special lighting, emergency communications equipment and vandalism 
resistant windows. In 1965, for instance, the Los Angeles school system 
had a total of 15 security guards, but in six years that force was com-
pelled to increase to over 100 members at a cost of over $1 million per 
year. During the 1972-73 school year Los Angeles spent onr $2 million 
for security agents. A report of the Panel on School Safety for New 
York City found that in 1971 the taxpayers had paid $1,300,000 for 
security guards, over $3,500,000 for police stationed in schools, and 
in spite of such effort incurred at least $3.700,000 worth of -rnndalism 
damage. It was estimated that New York City schools had oYer 248,000 
window panes broken at a replacement cost of $1.25 million. Over 
65 percent of the urban districts polled in the 1973 School Product 
News survey reported they were using special vandalism resistant 
"·indows, and 62 percent had at least one security guard assigned to 
their schools. -
The overall impact of violence and vandalism on our educational 
system cannot, of course, be adequately com-eyed by a recitation of the 
numbers of assaults and the dollars expended. Every dollar spent on 
replacing a broken window or installing an alarm system cannot be 
spent on the education of students. J. Arlen Marsh, editor of a study 
on school security costs estimates that: 
The cost of replacing broken. vdndows in the average big city would build a new 
school every year. 
The School Public Relations Association study found that a $60,000 
loss, approximately the aYerage Joss for a school district, could pay for 
eight reading specialists or finance a school breakfast program for 133 
children for a year. It is quite clear that in some areas of the country the 
high costs of vandalism is resulting in the reduction or elimination of 
needed educational programs. 
The natural reaction to these enormous amounts of wasted money 
is to wonder over the apparently senseless nature of this destruction. 
A study entitled Urban School Crisis, howeyer, questions whether 
vandalism is as irrational as it may appear: 
Perhaps the most serious aspect of vandalism is the set of messages i t co1weys : 
that students look upon the school as alien territory, hostile to their ambitions 
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and hope~: that the education which the system is attempting to pro\"icle la<:ks 
meaningfulness; that students feel no pride in the edifices in which tlley spend 
most of their clays. 
In addition to requiring the din'rsion of funds from academic and 
scholastic projects to secmity and repair programs, the atmosphere of 
Yiolcnce and vandalism has a deYastating impact on the ability of our 
,educational system to continue with the instruction of its students. The 
<Cxtent to ,Yhich this atmosphere permeates our children's educational 
experience can perhaps be best illustrated by a letter sent to the Sub-
committee from a '\Vest Coast police official: 
It if'11°t only in the school or the schoolyard that the student,; are likely to be ex-
poRed to ,iolence. School buses, in addition to being mechanically unsound and 
totally cle,oid of the slighteRt semblance of safety devices, are frequently a terrify-
ing experience for the children who are capti,e passengers. They are the scene 
of rip-offs for lunch money. physical violence, and pressure to indulge in the illegal 
use of drugs or narcotics. \\'e appear to have accepted without effective challenge 
th is mass intimidation simply because, naiYely, some of UR hope it will "go a,vay."' 
StuclentH who are normally nom·i:'olent ha Ye started carrying guns and kniYes and 
lengths of bicycle chains for protection on campus. Th·ough I am obvious!~• con-
cerned about the millions of dollars of property loss which occurs in our schools, I 
am far more concerned about our apparent willingness to accept ,iolence as a 
condition of our daily exi,;tence. 
Few students can be 0xpected to learn in an atmosphere of fear, 
assaults and disorcler. There can be little doubt that t.he significant 
lewl of Yiolent activity. threats and coercion renaled by the S11b-
committee ·s preliminaT')' snITey ,voulcl have a detrimental effect on the 
psyrholoffical and eclncational dm,elopment of children and young 
adults. )Ioreornr a continuous pattern of destruction of school equip-
ment and buildings naturally makes nearly impossible the already 
challenging process of education. The extent and continued gro,Yth of 
this chaotic and threatening climate in our schools is a serious threat 
to our educational system. 
C.\USES 
Kot smprisingly, the nnclerlying causes for this ,rnve of Yiolence 
and Yandalism in our schools is a subject of intense debate and dis-
agreement. In a certain sense thr school system may be viewed as 
mere]~, a conYenient battleground for the pen-asi v0 societal problem of 
juYenile crime. As this Subcommittee pointed ont in its recent Annual 
Report Yiolent jm,enile crime has increased by 24-6.5 percent in the 
last thirteen years. 0Yer the same period crimes directed against prop-
erty by youths incre[lsed by 10.J..6 percent. Today persons nnder 2;; 
years old are committing 50 percent of all Yiolent crimes and 80 per-
cent of all property crimes. Since our school systems are charo-ecl with 
] 
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t 1e care and custody of a large percentage of our young people it is 
reasonnhle to assnmr that the incidents of Yiolence and vandalism with-
in onr e~luc~tional in~titutions would follow patterns similar to those 
d~velopmg m the ~ociety at large. A study conducted in 1973 by Pan l 
Ritterbrand and Richard SilbPrstein concluded that the roots of school 
problems could be traced to problems existino- in the o-eneral American 
society rather than to conditions or failures
0
within the school system 
itself. • 
Other studies, howeYer, "'hile acknowledo-ino- the substantial effect 
general societal conditions would ha Ye on tlwb conduct of school be-
ha,·ior, lrnYe indicated the existence of senral "in school" conditions 
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students and teachers are treated as well as student beh:avior in general. 
Kumerous national and local southern organizations ham studied this 
special aspect of the problem in some depth. 
The NEA estimates there are as many as 50,000 black "push-outs" 
throughout the south . ..A. .June 1973 report on suspensions, expulsions, 
and dropouts in the Raleigh, :N'.C. public schools prepared by the 
Raleight Community Relations Committee gives some insight into 
the impact of desegregation on southern school children. Suspension 
records for the 1972-13 school year showed that black high school 
students composed 64 percent or 509 out of 791 dismissal cases in 
Raleigh schools. Comparisons of these figures ,Yith those of the two 
previous terms, shmYed that black high school suspensions had in-
creased from 40.4 percent to 59 percent since 1970-71. The largest 
categories of offense were truancy and fighting which may be precipi-
tated by the newly structured makeup of desegregated school 
populations. 
The Raleigh Cornmm1ih- Relations Committee observed several 
factors in their report ,Yhich may present some insight into school 
violence and disruption in ne"·Jy integrated schools both South and 
Xorth: 
:\"early 100 parents, students, or other interested persons talked with RCRC 
Staff during thiR study. ;\lost were blacks who Hpoke repeatedly of rejection and 
unea;;ine,:R as feelings associated 1Yith the schools. 
Black parents " ·ho made attempts to hold conference,; with teacher,;. prin-
cipals, or comrnelors ,;poke of lack of respect accorded them in many instanceH 
either heran,;e of direct insults or the general tone of their reception. 
'l'ho;;e parentR who did not attempt to look into problems experienced hy their 
ehildren Raid they feared the reception tlwy would receive or felt that there was 
no point in even trying. 
Black i:;tudentR talked of: 
(1) Verbal insult,; from student,; aml .\.<lmini<:trators: 
(2) Their feeling that they were not wantPd at the schools, high f'chools 
in particular; 
(3) A general unea;;inp,:;;, 
One RtudPnt expreRRed thi,; by saying "Yon just ran't relax over therP." A feeling 
of frnRtration and disappointment was also clearly apparent in most convpr-
,:atio1rn. 
Dnrin!T March 1P73. 220 white c-hilclrm werp rPmonrl bv their 
narents from the Rogpr B. Tanry .Tnnior I-ligh School in· Camp 
Springs, Maryland after a racial brawl. The rarial tension was attrib-
11ted to comt orderrrl integration in ,Tannarv 1!)73 which resnlted. in 
th(:\ bnsin.g of 2:'iO hlnrk students from Seat Pleasant, Maryland to 
T;\neY. Some hlack st11dents and administrators said they saw thP 
school as a white world hostile to the hlarks. fnll of subtle and not-
so-snhtle rarial slights and innnendor,-; that rut deep and have caused 
the hostilities to esralatP on both sides. '\Vhite stndents and their 
narPnts on the othrr hand sairl thrv felt. !!enPrally that the inflnx of 
blarks had lowered the quality of teaching hv causinP- teachers to 
spPnd jnneasing amounts of timP discinlining hlack stndents. 
Leon Hall. Director of the Southern Regional Council's School De-
RP2Tegation Project aclclressed this iss1ie dming n, 1973 National Ecln-
cntion A,-;socjation confPrence on "Student Displacement/Exclusion." 
::\fr. Hall makes pointed referencP to thP Pxnerience of manv hlnrk 
stmlpnts in thP c:011tlwrn rr1.tion and to thr findin[)"s of his orP-rP1.i,rntirn1's 
joint study with the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial, on school conflirt : 
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stroying school equipment and threatening the liYes of students and 
teachers. In response to this dangerous situation, the Birmingham 
Board of Education banned all lethal TI"eapons from school grounds 
unless specifically authorized by the Superintendent. 
The possession o-f firearms and other lethal weapons in the schools 
is frightening, but eYen more startling is the growing number of 
reports of actual shootings in the schools. For example, in Febrnar,v 
rnn, in Richmond, Virginia, at the Armstrong High School, a 17 
year-old boy was killed and a 14 year-old girl was wounded when 
caught in the cross-fire of a gun battle between two youths in a school 
corridor. 
Lawlessness in this region's schools is also e,-idenced by the increas-
ing level of personal violence, short of murder. Armed robbery, extor-
tion and assault are not uncommon in many schools. Gangs of thug:s 
are often involved in these crimes. For example, in September 1973, 
nine students at Nortlnvestern High School in Prince Georges County, 
Maryland, including a blind 12th grader, were robbed by what an-
thorities described as a "roving band" of armed teenagers ! Similarly, 
at one District of Columbia high school, last year, three teenagers. 
one armed with a pistol, robbed the school bank at midday. Th<.' school 
principal claimed that fire regulations prohibited the school from 
locking its doors, however, the fire chief indicated that schools coulcl 
arrange their doors to prevent entrance while simultaneously per-
mitting quick exit in case of an emergency such as fire. 
Lik<>,Yise, Yanclalism of school property as well as that of sdiool 
officials, teachers and students is increasing in this region. For <:'Xam-
ple, during the 1972-19n academic year. in Prince Georges County, 
Maryland, $267,000 worth of school property was either damaged or 
stolen. This cost to the school system was 14 percent higher than the 
previous :v.ear's loss of $226,000. We also learned that the maintenance 
cost of the Houston. Texas school sccuritv force increased from 
$20.000 in 1972 to $38!:J,000 in 1973. · 
Similarly, in fiscal 1973. 46,810 window panes were broken in the 
District of Columbia schools at a cost of $621,660 and the Memphis 
Board of Education indicated in 1974 that in the previous 4 years 
,·,indalis111 had cost almost $-1 million. The Broward Countv. Florida 
school board reported a 17 percent increase of assault incidents for 
the 1!)72-73 school year, including one murder. The number of arsons 
doubled compared to the previous year, and was responsible for losses 
of srhoo] equipment valued at nearly $207,060. 
Furthermore, in March 1974, three teenage youths were arr0st<.'cl in 
Dale City, Virginia, ekmentary school after inflictinq approxirnatel:v 
$20,000 in vandalism. Police fonnd nearl? all the buikling's windows 
smashed. light fixtures ripJ)ed out, desks splintered and tlwir contrnts 
strewn about. ei!tht television sets and seven record plavers destroved, 
and water stan.ding throughout much of the building. One police 
officer said. "You name it and they'did it". 
On<.' of the Subcommittee's primary concerns is the impact thnt the 
atmosphere of violence and vandalism in the school has on the abilitv 
of teachers to teach and students to ]earn. In this region. howen•r. it 
appears that in ad<lition to these roncerns. the advent of school 
desegreation has had an important impact on the manner in which 
';;I 
,d1ich may contribute to the lenl of youthful disoi:der. O1ie po~~ible 
contributino- factor is the various methods of excludmg students from 
school. A 1974 report entitled, "Children Out of School in America," 
prepared by the Children's Defense Fund, estimates that hundreds of 
thonsands of students are removed from schools each year by short-
term, loner-term or indefinite expulsions and suspensions. ,Vhile most 
educators° concur in the necessity for the exclusion of seriously dis-
ruptive troublemakers from the school environment, the Children's 
Defense Fund study found the numbers of students being suspended 
,rnre far in excess of those who must be removed as a means of main-
taining order. Tl~e study recounted the history of one youngster's 
long-term suspens10n: 
Dale llicCutcheon, 13, is in the eighth grade of his local public school. Ile is 
an eneuretic, a bedwetter. 
Dale's school had a policy requiring every eighth grade boy to ~pend a long 
weekend in the country to learn to live outdoors. Most boys adore this trip. Dale 
dreaded it as early as fifth grade after he heard it was compulsory. l'i'hen the 
time came, he begged his mother to keep him home, but she refused. 
The first night of the excursion, Dale woke several times and cautiously felt 
around his waist, but eYerything was dry. The next day his spirits were high 
and he enjoyed learning how to make food from wild plants and to classify 
mushrooms. The secret problem he had carried for so long seemingly had 
vanished. 
It was different the second night. He did not awake until morning "·hen the 
sounds of boys talking and laughing startled him. The two boys sharing his tent 
had discovered the wetness. They hounded Dale mercilessly and he wept. '!.'he 
boys told the counselors, who lectured him. Later, someone cracked a joke about 
Dale·s accident and all the boys exploded with laughter. Humiliated, he wanted 
to run away and dreaded the thought of returning to school. The third night he 
remained dry but the damage bad been done. 
Dale never told his parents about the incident. He refused to go to school for 
two days and pretended he was sick. But by the end of the week, his sister had 
become the butt of other children's insults about Dale, and she reported the in-
cident to her parents who were painfully embarrassed and angry with Dale. 
Two weeks after the excursion, the principal of Dale's school asked his parents 
to come in for a meeting. The principal wasted no time outlining the serious-
ness of Dale's situation for the boy as well as for the school. The problem was 
not, he explained, the other children. "They'll probably forget the whole thing 
in another week or so. It's Dale's teachers-how do we know he "·on·t just, yon 
know, pop off at any time in one of his classes?" Mrs. Mccutcheon explained 
that it was only a nighttime problem but the principal replied, "We can·t take 
any chances. I can't stop him from going to school. But I can stop him from 
going to this school and that's exactly what I'm doing. The boy's out for a 
month, or until a time you can proYe to us that he is able to control himself, 
night and day." 
And so Dale was out of school. 
There are in fact so many students being subjected to expulsi.-e dis-
ciplinary practices that the phenomena has been referred to as the 
"Pushout" problem. 
Another facet of the pnshout problem which may operate as a con-
tributing factor to school disorders was revealed in a report recently 
released by the Department of Health, Education. and "\Velfar0. In 
statistics gathered at the end of the 1973 school y<.'ar it ,rns demon-
strated that while Blacks represent only 27 percent' of the total student 
enrollment in the 3,000 school districts surveyed, they accounted for 
37 percent of the expulsions and 42 percent of the snspensions from 
those districts. The disparity among these figures raises serious ques-
tions concerning possible widescale bias in the administration of sus-
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pension and expulsion. Such policies can only result in anger and hos-
tility on the part of students. 
In addition to these forms of compulsive absence from schools there 
are the related problems of "force outs" and truancy which contribut~ 
to the large numbers of children and young adults who attend school 
in only a Yery irregular fashion. The "force out" concept is the erluca-
tional system's version of a plea bargain, so common in our criminal 
justice s~·stem. A student involved in academic or behavioral difficulty 
may be informally presented with the options of failing courses, fac-
ing expulsion or voluntary removal from school. In many instances the 
student ,Yill opt for "dropping out" and therefore be removed tem-
porarily or permanently. Truancy, of course, is an accepted and tradi-
tional fact of life in schools, but the modern rates of truancy especial-
ly in the large urban systems, reveal numerous students attend school 
only in the most erratic fashion. 
At first glance it might appear that the expulsion, suspension~ push-
out, force out and truancy phenomenon, although certainly tragic for 
those inYolved, might at least create a some,Yhat more orderly atmos-
phere for those remaining in school as a result of the absence of 
youngsters evidently experiencing problems adjusting to the school 
environment. The opposite, however, appears to be the case. The Syra-
cuse study, for instance, found that in schools where the average daily 
attendance was lower, the disrnptions, violence anrl vandalism rates 
were higher. This may be explained by the fact that the vast nmjority 
of students who are voluntarily or compulsively excluded from schools 
do. in time, return to those schools. In many instances their frustrntions 
and inadequacies which caused their absence in the first place have 
only been heightened by their exclusion and the school community will 
likely find itself a convenient and meaningful object of revenge. 
As the Subcommittee's statistics reYeal, the use of drugs and alcohol 
by students in secondary schools continues to increase. These trends 
cannot be ignored as a contributing factor to the problems confront-
ing the schools. A report on violence in the Boston Public Schools, for 
example, states : 
Regarding behavior, most administrators and teachers felt a person occasional 
ly "high on drugs" could be very difficult to handle. There was no question that 
drugs ,Tere a very important cause for the increase in stealing and fighting in 
the schools. 
Another cause of disruption and violence found mainly in large 
nrban centers on the East and ,Vest Coasts is the presence of youthful, 
but highly organized, gangs within the school system. A school which 
finds itself being used as the center of a gang's illegal activitiPs can 
quickly deYelop a very hostile environment. A security director for a 
metropolitan school system in a letter to the Subcommittee states : 
Although the number of gang members, in proportion to the overall student 
population in most schools is minimal, the trouble they cause is at times, cata-
el,vsmic. Students are robbed. intimidated, raped, bludgeoned and sometimes 
fatally wounded. Teachers and other adults in the schools are threatened and 
on occasions, physically assaulted. '.rhe peace of any school is breached and the 
learning climate seriously polluted by gang activity, however slight. 
In some schools, gang activity is so intense that it is necessary for school 
security officers and the local police to escort one gang through the territory of 
a ril'al gang at dismissal time. At certain schools, Safety Corridors have been 
established which provide safe passage for neutral students under the protection 
C.SOUTH 
For purposes of our suney the southern region includes the states of 
Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, 1'Test Virginia, and the District of Colum-
bia, Purrto Rico and the Virgin Islands. ' 
The Subcommittee sent two hundrell sixty.one questionnaires to 
school districts in the southern region. One hundred eighty-seven or 
71.6 percent were returned 1 completed. This "·as the highest completion 
pel'ccntage of the four regions. 
Onr clabt indicate that all categorirs of school violeHce and vandal-
ism offenses increased significantly between the 1970-71 and 1972-73 
school years: 
(A) Homicide increased by 25.4 percent; 
(B) Rape and attempted rape increased by 28.4 percent; 
(C) Robbery increased by 51.7 percent; 
(D) Student assault on student increased by 276.9 pel'Cent; 
(E) Student assault on school personnel increased by 316.4 per-
crnt; and 
(F) Burglary and larceny increased by 28.1 percent. 
Tlrn Snbcommittee suney rernaled drama.tic evidence of the dropout 
phenomena in this region. Dropouts increased by 18.8 percent more 
than twice the increase of any other region. Expulsions, however, de-
creased by :s.9 percen t. Tlw "clrcrease" in expulsion rates· may "·ell 
reflect the application of the "force-out" practices which would account 
in part for the increase in "drop-ouf' ratrs in every region. 
There appearn to br no significant difference in the types of violent 
incidents in s011lhern schools from those occurring throughout the 
co1mJ-ry. ,ve dill learn of a rather shocking example of such conduct. 
in rnking elrmentarv school youngsters that vi ,·idly demonstrates the 
se riousness v( problems eonfronting the school community. In April 
rn,;1, three third grnclr pupils, in ,Vinston-Salem. :~forth Carolina. 
" ·ere charged "·ith robbery for allegedly forcing two nine year-old 
classmates to p,1y rn'arly $1,000 in extortion payments over an eight 
month periotl The three boys. two aged nine and one aged eleven, al-
legedly threatened their classmates with beatings or death if the money 
was not paid. 
In some <·omnmnities teachers and school officials are responding to 
the increase,l le,·el and seri011sm'ss o f violence by arming themsrlves. 
In fact, some schools are litm·ally armed camps. For example, it has 
been reported by the Birmingham Schools Superintendent, Dr. 1Vil-
rner Cocl_v. that last yrar so mnny school officials were carrying gnns to 
school that he had to designate certain specified persons to carry fire-
arms for their protection. School officials contended the guns were 
needed because outsiders, including violent gang members, "·ere de-
(27) 
4'iU 
necessarily more sen're. in these particular institutions or in urban 
ar0as in general, than in submba11 or rural districts. In a small town 
in lndiana, for instanre, two boys " ·ere discovered operating an exto1·-
tion ring in an elementary school which victimized more than 40 school 
chilcln,11 clnrillg the 1073 school )'('DI'. A study conducted at a suburban 
hig·h ic:rhool in ]lli11eif by tlw Colnmbia University School of Public· 
H ealth and ~\..clrnini strati\·e J.leclic·ine found that 3-!.1 percent of the 
students had nf'ecl 111:irijuana, 18.2 percent tried barbiturates, 15.7 per-
cent used :unphetarnines, 26 p..-n·ent used LSD or· other phychedelics, 
8.2 percent had tried cocaine and 4.7 percent had tried heroin. The Su-
peri11tenclen1, of the school stated: 
The superintendent that says he does not have a drug problem in his high school 
either is guilty of a shameful c:oyernp, or he just does not know the facts. 
It wou1d be a 1,eri0t1s mis,.1kc to infer from the fc,y examples we hani 
pointcu out that Yiolenc-e 1111d YanJalism exists only in schools in the 
larger citi0s of the Northccntrnl region. On the contrar_y, the Subcom-
mittee study has found very few echools within this region that do not 
haxe serious problems in this regard. 
of school security personnel and police, through the hostile territory. Needless 
to say, these measures provide at best, temporary relief. They do not begin to 
attack the root causes of the problem. 
Schools of course cannot escape the impact of racial and ethnic 
dislike and distrust ~f contemporary American society. Moreover, the 
intense concentration of individuals within the school confines coupled 
" ·ith the naturally vigorous personalities o_f students e~acer~ate these 
antagonisms. Following a fight at one of its schools, mvolv~ng _mo!·e 
than seventy students in Octob~r 197~, a _sub1;1rban sc~oo_l d1stnct ~n 
Viro-inia conducted a thorough mvest1gat10n mto the mc1dent. The11· 
repgrt, released earlier this year, concluded that racial tensions and 
antao·onisms were a significant cause of the disruptions at the school. 
The ~eport found that students were being bullied and intimidated in 
the hall s of the school and a widely held belief existed among students 
of both races that disciplinary measures ,,ere not being fairly admin-
istered. It must be emphasized that this situation is in no way unique 
to this particular district, but, in fact, represents a widespread prob-
lem confronting schools across the country. 
One common thread of particular interest to the Subcommittee 
rnnning through many of the underlying causes of school violence and 
nmdalism is what may be called the crisis of Due Process. Quite nat-
urally schools, like other institutions, are compelled to issue rules and 
regulations concerning the conduct of persons within their jurisdiction. 
It is clear that ,vithout fair and meaningful control and discipline the 
schools would quickly lose their ability to educate students. Increas-
ingly. though, educators and administrators are finding that the extent 
of student conduct " ·hich is sought to be regulated, as well as the 
methods of regulation, are causing more problems than they are con-
trolling. A 1D75 NEA study interviewed a large number of students 
from diffC'rent schools and found that, "Many students spoke of the 
need for consistent, fair discipline." 
For example: the Subcommittee found that in numerous institutions 
across the country, students, administrators and teachers are em-
broiled in ~onstant ongoing disputes over restrictions on dress, hair 
style, smokmg, hall passes, student newspapers and a myriad of other 
aspects of school life. The Syracuse study observes that intense efforts 
to control clothes or hair styles may, in fact, be counterproductirn to a 
well ordered environment: 
This remains a constant bone of contention between students and staff ancl 
when it takes on racial or ethnic features, the contention becomes far 'more 
s~r!ons. Vi·e suspect _that e~er3:one would agree that nakedness at school is pro-
h1b1tecl because, by itself, 1t disrupts education. On the other hand, restrictions 
again~t bell bottom pants, long hair, 'A.fros', and beads are probably useless ancl 
offensn-e. 
. I_n anotllC'r are_a, administratiYe attempts to control student publi-
~at10ns h~,:e at times appeared to be overly restrictive and conducted 
m a capnc10us manner. A 1!)74 report by the Commission of Inquiry 
Into High School Journalism found that: 
. Cens~rshil) and th~ sys~ematic Jack of freedom to engage in open. responsible 
Journalism characterize high school ,iournalism. Unconstitutional ancl arbitran· 
restraints are so deeply embedded in high school journalism as to overshadow it·~ 
ach iHernents, as well as its other problems. 
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.As discussed earlier. the manner in which suspensions an<l expul-
sions are administered haYe in some instances been arbitrary and dis-
criminatory. Students in some schools _arc suspende~ without bei~1g 
O'iven an opportunity to answer or explam charges agamst them, "·lule 
~ther students are suspended for improper conduct which results only 
in a reprimand for other students engaging in identical activity. ~\ 
study of the student pushout phenomenia undertaken by the Southern 
Regional Council and the Robert F. Kennedy memorial found that: 
:\lost obser,ers acknowledge the need for rules and the power to enforce them. 
The pragmatic obsener will concede that there are those individual students. just 
as some older citizens, ,..,.ho finally will not or cannot conform to any Focietal stand-
ards. The misuse of discipline. howeYer, often occurs because racial, cultural an(] 
generation differences cloud the judgment and ae;tions of teachers and admini~-
trators alike. 
On a more positive level certain efforts ha Ye been made to rationalize 
and reform the rule making and disciplinary functions in our schools. 
The Supreme Court held recently in Gross Y. Lopez 95 S. Ct. 720 
(Ul75) that student expulsion or suspension procedures must be gov-
erned by at least the minimal standards of Due Process. The Court 
stated: 
In holding as ,ve do, we do not believe that we have imposed procedures on 
school disciplinarians which are inappropriate in a classroom setting. Instead we 
have imposed requirements which are, if anything, less than a fair minded school 
1,riucipal would impose upon himself in order to aYoid unfair suspen~ions. 
The KEA has dcYcloped a Student Rights and Responsibility state-
ment which recommends that the standards of conduct to be followed 
at a particular school be dra"·n up ,Yith participation by stndcnt rep-
resentatiYes, and that they be distributed to all members of the school 
community in written form . This practice ,-.,-ould insure that students 
as well as teachers haYe a clear and understandable statement of the 
rules and regulations governing their conduct ,,hile in school. Many 
schools have in fact amended or instituted written student codes which 
contain a statement of student rights and responsibilities and ,vhich 
set forth the grounds for suspension and expulsion along with " ·hat-
ever procedural protections arc to be used prior to such action. The 
mere practice of committing school regulations to "Titing helps insme 
an even-handed administration of student discipline within the 
institution. 
In addition to students, many teachers arn anxious for clear ancl 
closely foll°'Ycd disciplinary codes ,vithin schools. Following the 
shooting death of a t~acher in Philadelphia by a junior high school 
s~udent "·ho had contJ_nu~msly caused trouble at the school, both prin-
ciples and teachers ,ntlnn that system demanded a new and stricter 
<'ode for dealing with repeatedly disruptiYe students. Many teachers 
feel that only "·hen. seriously disrnptive studen~s are properly con-
trolled can the remamder of the school commumty continue the task 
of education. 
The proper response to the problem of the seriously disruptirn stu-
dent is a difficult and complex issue. On the one hand, a small o-roup of 
clisrnptive and violent students can create conditions which ~ake the 
task of education impossible and dangerous for both teachers and other 
studen~s. On the other hand, however, seYeral studies indicate that mass 
expulsions of these students from schools often creates groups of re-
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.A Duluth, Minnesota public school district of about 20,000 students 
estimated that window breakage alone costs $20,000 per year to repair. 
Burglaries resulted in equipment losses of ornr $10.000 per year. 
The Cleveland Public Schools reported to the Subcommittee that 
.672 teachers were assaulted in its schools in the survey period while 
the number of narcotics violations being committed on school property 
increased from 26 in 1970 to 42 in 1973. Several years ago a 15 yea'r 
old student at Franklin D. Roosevelt Junior High School in Clen~-
land was shot to death in a second floor boy's room by four of his 
classmates who fired six bullets from a rifle into his head. At Shaw 
High School in East Cleveland, a student fired four shots from a 
revolver at the school football coach who was standing in the hallway. 
On the day before this incident, the coach had reprimanded the stu-
dent for reading a newspaper during class. 
~\ school district in Cincinnati, Ohio reported to the Subcommittee 
that burglaries at the school increased from three in 1970 to thirteen 
in 1973 while the number of serious vandalism incidents rose from 
ten to eighteen in that same period. The Toledo Public School system 
found that the number of students involved in drnnk and disordcrlv 
offenses, both on and off the school campuses, increased from seventce11 
to forty-eight in a three year period. 
The Wichita Kansas Public School system told the Subcommittee 
that the number of windows being broken in their school building 
had increased by 300 percent between 1963 and 1973, and the overall 
cost to the system for vandalism and burglary had increased from 
$18,777 to $112,177 in that same ten year period. 
The Security Police Report of the Indianapolis Public School sys-
tem for 1973 reported 142 assaults on students and 19 assaults on 
teachers. One school building had over $3,000 in broken wind°',s in 
that year alone. 
In November of 1973, there were 18 burglaries of school builcling:s 
in the Indianapolis system with losses such as $275 tape records, $12 
w·orth of orange juice, $315 in tape players, $74 in athletic equipment 
and a $245 adding machine. 
A school counselor for the Des Moines Public School system in a 
letter to the Subcommittee states that local school officials arc par-
ticularly concerned over three disturbing trends: the increasing pos-
session, use and sale of narcotic drugs in the schools, the increasing 
number of vandalism incidents directed against school property, and, 
the consistently high percentage of dropouts within the system. 
Th 1 KenoBha Wis<'onsin Unified School District ~o. 1 reported to 
the Snhcommittce tlmt th0 number of rohb0ri0r- "ithin the ,whool in-
creased from 6 in the 1970-71 school year to 53 in the 1972-7:1 sdiool 
:-,·car. The nnmhrr of major Yandalism incidents went from (i!) to 80 
over that same period. In the Green Bav Public Schools the number of 
"·capons being ron fis<'ated bY school officials increased from 2G to 29, 
and incidents of rolibcry and Yandalism han• both increaced dramati-
cally over the snn-ey period. In the 1970-71 school year there were li5 
ofl'cnst·s in the Ran <:lair schools invoh-ing the possession or sale of 
narcotics. By rnn the nnmber of snch offenses increased to 26. 
It is important to emphasize that althongh the schools brief!~, 
discussed above are located in predominantly urban areas, the prob-
lem of criminal activity within schools is not limited to, or cy.," 
what else to do. Drugs have increased sharply in the last two years 
and we have to have something for the teachers to go by." 
The Chicago school system reported a total of 2,217 assaults on 
teachers in their schools between 1971 and 1973. In one instance an 
8th grade student brought a set of .45 and .38 pistols to school where 
he killed his principal and wounded a school security official. Security 
personnel in Chicago schools are now permitted to carry firearms for 
their protection. Another firearm related incident in Chicago schools 
last year involved a 16 year old high school student who was shot to 
death when he refused to pay another student a 5-cent card game bet. 
One teacher reported that a great deal of the violence and vandalism 
within the city schools are caused by expelled, suspended, or truant 
students who return to the schools during the day: 
They wait till lunchtime, then they sneak in and mingle with the students. 
You can tell which is which because the outsiders don't always know the rules. 
Anyway they smoke dope, threaten the kids and try to mess with the girls. 
The Subcommittee also learned that over $3 million was spent in 
1973 to repair or replace damaged or stolen property in Chicago 
schools. Several teachers and students indicated that at least part of 
this violence and vandalism within the schools can be attributed to 
gang activity. The number of gangs in Chicago has been estimated as 
high as 700 with several organized within the elementary school system. 
The Detroit school system also reported serious problems with vio-
lence and vandalism. The school Security Department states : 
For years, the main problem of 1building security was the protection against 
minor vandalism. Broken windows, ink and paint materials spilled about rooms, 
occasional loss of equipment were the general trend. In the past 12 years, the 
problems have grown rapidly. We still face the occasional "rip-up" in schools, 
while the theft and burglary costs have skyrocketed. 
In the 1972-73 school year over $1,000,000 was lost to destruction 
and theft of school equipment in Detroit. In that same period there 
were 483 serious assaults on students. A teacher at one east side junior 
high school states: 
Its just a sick place to be in. It's so chaotic, it's not like teaching at all. Some-
times I have to spend 40 of the 50 minutes ·of class time just getting the students 
to sit down. I'm hoarse from shouting when I leave school. I know I could lose 
my job for saying this but who minds losing a bad job? · 
Last year in Detroit, a 17 year old girl in a city high school was 
awarded $25,000 in damages for physical and psychological injuries 
following an incident where she was attacked by about thirty of her 
classmates who knocked her down, beat her and stabbed her with 
pencils. The motive for the incident was a feeling among these students 
that the victim was more attractive and had better grades. 
A principal o:f a high school on the city's west side emphasized 
that most students are relatively well behaved and only a small per-
centage of the overall student population causes serious problems. 
This principal finds: 
They're usually students who are not doing well academically and students 
who have excessive ·absences. 
In nearby Grand Rapids vandalism cost the school system $110,000 
in 1973. In a letter to the Subcommittee the school board indicated 
that the installation of alarm systems, plastic windows and special 
lights was having some success in reducing vandalism losses. 
... .., 
sentful youngsters who return to the school community to seek 
vengence. 
Unfortunately, not all the sources of school violence and vandalism 
discussed in this report are as amenable to solution as the promulga-
tion and fair administration of rules and regulations affecting both 
teachers and students. Some of these causes are obviously beyond the 
direct control of administrators or teachers, while others no doubt re-
main largely unidentified. Many school districts are attempting to 
identify and confront those problems, but their nature and cure are 
not readily treatable solely by teachers or administrators. What is 
shockingly apparent from the Subcommittee survey, however, is that 
our school system is facing a crisis of serious dimensions, the solutions 
to whic~ must b_e found if the SJ.Stem is ~o survive in a meaningful 
form. It 1s essential that the· American public school becomes a safe and 
secure environment where education, rather than disruption, violence, 
and vandalism, is the primary concern. 
49-483-75--3 
B.NORTHCENTRAL 
For purposes of our survey the Subcommittee included the States of 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, :Missouri, Ne-
braska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and ·wisconsin in the 
K orthccntral region. 
The Subcommittee sent a total of 172 questionnaires to school dis-
tricts in every State in this region and received 68 percent of these 
in return. The data compiled from these returns demonstrates a sig-
nificant increase in almost every category of school violence and 
vandalism throughout this region. 
The Subcommittee's preliminary findings are that between 1970 and 
1973: 
(A) Assaults on teachers in schools increased by 52.4 percent; 
(B) Assaults on students in schools increased by 20.5 percent; 
(C) Number of weapons found in schools increased by 6.7 
percent; 
(D) Rapes and attempted rapes in schools increased by 60 per-
cent; 
( E) Maj or _ acts of vandalism increased by 19 .5 percent; 
(F) Drug and alcohol offenses in schools increased by 97.4 per-
cent; and 
( G) Burglaries of school buildings increased by 2.1 percent. 
The only survey categories which did not show an upward trend 
throughout these years were in the areas of homicide and robbery. The 
number of robberies, in fact, decreased by almost 8 percent since 1970. 
In all other categories, however, the incidents of school violence and 
vandalism in this region continues to grow. Moreover, the results of 
the Subcommittee study indicate that no area within the N orthcentral 
re~ion has been spared the costly results of this increase in school 
crimes. 
The St. Louis, Missouri school system, for instance, spent $250,000 in 
1974 on repairs for buildings and equipment damaged by vandals. 
Over $7,000 worth of damage was caused by elementary school pupils 
at one school in the city's West End district. In a single wave of de-
struction these youngsters threw more than 100 desks out of windows, 
smashed several filing cabinets and pushed the school piano down a 
flight of stairs. · 
The Subcommittee study found 16 shootings in Kansas City schools 
during the 1972-73 school year. The security manager for the school 
system spoke of the increasing problem of weapons in his schools: 
We have a major problem and it's a tough one to beat. Some kids carry guns 
for protection. Others carry guns for extortion attempts. Some say they brandish 
guns as a status symbol. 
The District Attorney for Kansas City announced that he was pre-
paring a booklet for school administrators and teachers which would 
explain procedures for handling and apprehending students suspected 
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resulted in violent conflict between black and white students and their 
respective communities. The impact on students and the educational 
process in the city has been devastating. Attendance at newly inte-
grated schools has at times dn,pped by more than 65 percent. Some 
parents have permanently removed their children from school and in 
many schools students and teachers have joined in opposition to 
desegregation. 
A report prepared for the Boston School Committee has reYealecl 
that since the implementation of the desegregation order, at least 
10,000 students, most of them white, have left Boston's public schools. 
School officials have stated that several of the city's 200 schools may be 
forced to close and cutbacks in teaching and other staffs made neces-
sary. l;he withdrawals represent more than 10 percent of Boston's 
9-!,000 elementary and secondary school students. Some 7,529 students 
are no longer in the public school system; 3,047 have transferred to 
private or parochial schools; 927 have been discharged to seek em-
ployment, and, 3,555 are listed as dropouts. 
An interesting feature of the Northeastern region was the number 
of categories of offense which, reportedly, declined, as compared to the 
other three regions. This may be attributed to incomplete returns from 
New York City or that the incidence of such offenses as student as-
saults on students and burglary and larceny have been so historically 
high in this region that percent increase is falling while actual fre-
quency remains disturbingly high. The Subcommittee will give fur-
ther examination to this development. 
• 
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9. Since 1964, the Board of Education has reported to the Karcotics Register 
that only thirty-one students were heroin addicts. 
10. Even if a child admits to dealing in drugs in a school building, most school 
administrators do not discharge the student as he is not "disorderly or disruptive." 
11. Even if a student is arrested for a serious drug crime, very often the 
Family Court ( if under 16) or the Criminal Court (if over 16) releases the child 
only to return the next school day to his respective school as a hero. 
12. Many Depai:tment of Health physicians assigned to the schools do not 
examine students for drug abuse and certify students as addicts. 
13. Although a 1952-state law mandates narcotics education in the schools, 
,ery few schools have complied. 
14. There is no policy from the Board of Education, regarding the proper 
procedures to be used when a teacher has reasonable cause to believe a student 
deals in drugs or abuses drugs. 
15. There is an unofficial "exchange student policy," where drug addicts and dis-
ruptive students are transferred from one school to another. This policy is instru-
mental in creating mass truancy and encourages the dropout rate. 'l'here is no 
effective alternative education for the drug abuser or chronic truant. 
16. The Board of Education has increased the number of security guards in 
the schools. However, there have been a number of cases of guards who were 
dealing in drugs at the schools. 
17. Some school officials do not deem it to be their obligation, as educators, to 
stop drug traffic on school premises. In these schools, drug dealing is open and 
common. 
18. Across the United States drug abuse is spreading to almost all urban areas. 
A survey by this office indicates that although the magnitude of the drug problem 
in areas outside New York is much less severe than in New York, there appears 
to be in many cities in the United States a greater dedication to tackling the 
problem and more resourcefulness used to stopping the spread of drug abuse 
among youngsters. 
A recent surn~y of 10:000 New York City junior and senior high 
E:chool students revealed that 12 percent of the students reported a 
pattern of drinking frequency, amounts, and e:ff ects which can be classi-
fied as alcoholic or problem drinking. Eighty percent of the students 
suneyed drank to some extent, most of them occasionally, and in 
limited amounts. It appears that too many parents are now saying, 
"Thank God, my child is only drunk." The emphasis on harmful effects 
of other drugs by school drug abuse and education programs has ap-
parently enhanced the nse of alcohol and the result has been an increase 
in alcohol abuse and alcoholism. Unfortunately, many youths believe 
that the abuse of alcohol is a "less harmful" means of dealing with 
peer pressures, family problems, and social aggressiYeness. 
Boston is the only major city in the country that does not haYe a 
security system. There are alarm systems in only 33 of the city's 204 
school buildings. Five of these systems ;,ere stolen during 1978. 
A considerable amount of food was also stolen from Boston schools, 
that year, including 161 pounds of coldcuts, 580 pounds of hotdog·s, 
211 pounds of ham, 186 pounds of sausage, 230 pounds of chicken, 
1.048 pounds of butter, 60 pounds of pastrami, 65 pounds of salisbury 
steaks, and 18 fully cooked turkeys. 
In 1973. 139 teachers in the Boston public schools were assaulted and 
664 vandalism incidents were reported resulting in the loss of thousands 
of dollars worth of equi1)ment and the destruction by arson of two high 
school facilities. Overall cost for that year exceeded $1 million. 
As of September 12, 1974, violence and vandalism in the schools of 
Boston, Massachusetts increased drastically when school officials beg-an 
bnsing more than 18,000 students under a federal court order to de-





For purposes of our survey the Northeastern region includes the 
states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
One hundred thirty eight questionnaires were sent to school systems 
in the northeastern region and 59.4 percent were returned completed. 
The pattern of increasing violence and vandalism in the northeast-
ern school districts surveyed by the Subcommittee was mixed. We 
found between the 1970-71 and 1972-73 school years that: 
(A) Homicide increased by 20.1 percent; 
(B) Rapes and attempted rapes increased by 37.9 percent; 
(C) Robbery increased by 39.3 percent; 
(D) Student assaults on students decreased by 2.2 percent; 
(E) Burglary and larceny decreased by 2.9 percent; 
(F) Weapons increased by 20.6 percent; 
( G) Drugs and alcohol increased by 14.8 percent; 
(H) Dropouts increased by 8.0 percent; 
(I) Vandalism decreased by 12.0 percent; and 
(J) Expulsions decreased by 9.7 percent. 
During 1973, there were almost 10,000 reported crimes committed in 
schools or on school property in New York City alone, including three 
murders and 26 forcible and attempted rapes. In one year New York 
City schools spent $4 million to restore vandalism-caused damage. 
Violence in the schools of the northeastern region is very strongly 
related to student gang involvement, drug abusel alcohol abuse, and 
school integration. Large scale gang warfare withm this region is con-
centrated in two large cities-New York and Philadelphia. Many 
schools in these cities are severely disrupted by gang-involved students. 
In April 1972, a 17-year-o]d student at George Washington High 
School in upper Manhattan was clubbed on the head with a pistol butt 
and stabbed in the spine outside the school by youths described as mem-
bers of the Saints, a local gang. The stabbing followed a fight several 
days before between the Saints and the Galaxies, a rival gang. 
Some 350 students were kept home from Adlai Stevenson High 
School in New York City from September 1971 to March 1972 out of 
fear for their safety. Parents stated that this action was warranted 
because of children being mugged, robbed, intimidated, harassed, 
and stabbed by other students who were members of Bronx gangs. 
Such spillover of gang activity into the schools occurs with alarming 
frequency. One New York City educator observed: 
The values the schools try to instill are countered by the gang spirit-a dark, 
frightening, anti-intellectual credo that glorifies the violent life of the street. 
Gang activity in Philadelphia has had severe impact on the city's 
schools. In 1974, there were 165 reported assaults on teachers by stu-
clents. Pupils fear of attack by other students has contributed to a 
dropout rate which exceeds 30 percent. The Philadelphia system has 
(17) 
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initiated programs to bus children across "rival turf" and to provide 
"safe corridors" for students through hostile neighborhoods by using 
community volunteers to police safe routes to and from school. 
In a recent report, Dr. Robert L. Poindexter, Executive Deputy 
Superintendent of Philadelphia Public Schools, described the stag-
gering impact of gang terrorism and violence on the education process 
and the continuing frustration of his school system in obtaining 
sufficient resources to combat gang related problems: 
Gang violence has a tremendous impact on public education. Even though 
gangs usually consider school buildings neutral territory just the fear of what 
might happen is enough to literally frighten a student out of an education. 
When gangs in the area of a school are fighting each other after school and 
in the evenings, attendance at the school drops sharply during the day. 
In many instances the simple fact that a student has to cross the turf of a 
rival gang in order to get to school is enough to keep him home. 
In other cases, the fear by nongang members of being assailed in or around 
school by gang members not only increases absenteeism, but also causes students 
to think more about personal safety than about getting an education. 
In short, gentlemen, fear generated by jnTenile crime and youth gangs is a 
powerful force working against the learning process. 
To be quite frank, the gang problem in Philaclelphin has reached alarming 
proportions. Immediate steps must •be taken to deal with the situation, and the 
primary responsibilities rest with the police and the courts with the full coopera-
tion of the schools, the communities, the city's business and industry, and the 
State and Federal Governments. 
We in the schools feel strongly that an important part of the long-range 
answer lies in a vastly expanded educational program in the city's schools. We 
are extremely concerned that with the city's limited finances and with the 
reluctance so far of the State or the Federal GoYernment to come to the rescue, 
such improvement in the educational process may still be a long way off. 
Thus we must deal with the present situation. We must face the facts that 
gangs have become ingrained into the social structure of the urban community. 
What we must do, then, is to find ways to divert their energies and talents 
into constructive, rather than destructive actiYities. 
Two of the best ways .of accomplishing this are better employment oppor-
tunities for the post high school youth and greatly accelerated programs to keep 
potential dropouts in school. 
The availability of more jobs would go a long way toward substituting con-
structiTe activities for destructive idleness. This is where business and indtrntry 
must help out. 
We must also secure the finances to combine part-time jobs, school work and 
better vocational training in our constant fight to prevent dropouts. 
But we are faced with the stark facts that the Federal Government has cut 
back drastically on education funds and that it has not funded adequately a11y 
of our dropout prevention programs; that we have not enough school construc-
tion money even to get rid of 35 firetraps, housing more than 25,000 students 
much less to build adequate vocational educational facilities; and that our 
operating revenues are, at present, millions of dollars short of providing Hen 
a basic educational program for our 290,000 pupils. 
Financial restrictions like these prevent us from mounting any kind of a 
concerted, long-range effort to offer constructive alternatives to gangs. 
For instance we must get more money to strengthen our counseling program. 
As it stands now we have one counselor for every 700 pupils in the elementary 
schools; one for each 400 in junior and senior high scho,>ls. 
There is no way that a counselor facing thef-e odds can hope to give the 
attention on an individual ba~is that each student needs. 
Yet, just to double our force of 500 counselors would ·rost more than $5 
million in salaries alone. But we don't haYe the money. And on top of the short-
age problem, counselors simply must •be retrained to better meet the challenges 
presented by such current problems as student hostilities and Yiolence. This 
will cost even more money. 
We would also like to spend far more time. f'l'fort. and money dealing with 






elementary schools that we should begin dealing with these matters before a 
student gets a chance to turn to gang activity. Yet, our finances prevent us 
from implementing any such new programs. 
Eighteen months ago we proposed a $1 million dropout prevention program, 
incorporating jobs and motivational activities to be funded under title VIII of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. The funding has never 
materialized. 
Last year, we testified in Washington before the House Appropriations Sub 
committee asking for restoration of money to the Vocational Education Act of 
1968. It was originally proposed to fund the act to the total of $822 million 
this year but that was •cut drastically by the administration. This type of educa-
tional budget slashing simply means delay in upgrading our vocational educa-
tion program to provide our boys with greater salable skills and to keep them 
away from the despairing world of gangs and gang violence. 
'rile trend becomes clear. Everyone agrees that to get at the root causes of 
dropouts and unemployment we must upgrade the educational process but the 
State and Federal Government are not doing their share to support this 
upgrading. 
The Subcommittee has found instances in which schools have been 
used for organized youthful criminal activity. The 1974 report, "Crime 
in the Schools", issued by the Select Committee on Crime of the New 
York State Legislature revealed that in some New York City high 
schools there were student-run brokerages where teenagers buy and 
sell guns, narcotics, or the services of youthful male and female prosti-
tutes. In many instances the students buy the guns and drugs for resale 
at higher prices on the streets. The report maintained that teachers 
generally know about these illegal activities, but they are usually 
afraid to talk about them for fear of retaliation. 
Drug and alcohol abuse in the Northeastern region increased 18.8 
percent between the 1970-71 and 1972-73 school years. This increase is 
lower than the national increase of 37.5 percent and lower than the 
increase in the other three regions surveyed. However, the Subcommit-
tee views the increase in the Northeastern region as indicative of an 
ever worsening problem since youthful drug abuse has historically 
been highest in the Northeastern United States. The Southern region, 
for example, experienced a 151.6 percent increase in drug and alcohol 
abuse over the same period, reflecting a dramatic increase in a category 
of offense not historically prevelant. 
A July 1971 report titled, "The New York City School System an<l 
Drng Addiction-The Price New York City Pays for Drug Abuse 
and Addiction Among Young People", is a poignant reminder of a 
crisis which potentially threatens every major school system in the 
nation. The report findings stated : 
1. Drug addiction and abuse crosses all socioeconomic levels and reaches every 
high school in the City of New York. 
2. Some high schools are marketplaces for the sale of drugs. 
3. Some school principles admit to a serious drug problem in their schools. 
Others deny its existence. 
4. Hospitalization, due to overdose of drugs is a common occurrence in many 
high schools. 
5. Some high school pushers admit selling up to $600 a day in drugs at schools. 
6. A very small percentage of the teachers in the school system have received 
some training to sensitize them to drug abuse and to drug abusers. 
7. Many teacher colleges are not complying with the Education Law in training 
teachers about drug Abuse. 
8. Even when a student is known to be a heroin addict, school authorities <lo 
not exercise their authority under the law and discharge the student from school. 
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v. the Southern District of 
Eileen Lopez et al. Ohio. 
[December - , 1974] I 
I 
Memorandum of MR. JusTICE WHITE. ' 
This appeal by various administrators of the Columbus, 
Ohio, Public School System ("CPSS") challenges the 
judgment of a three-judge federal court, declaring that 
appellees-various high school students in the CPSS-
were denied due process of law contrary to the command 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in that they were tem-
porarily suspended from their high schools without a 
hearing either prior to suspension or within a reasonable 
time thereafter, and enjoining the administrators to 
remove all references to such suspensions from the stu-
dents' records. 
I 
Ohio law, Rev. Code § 3313.64, provides for free edu-
cation to all children between the ages of six and 21. 
Section 3313.66 of the Code empowers the principal of an 
Ohio public school to suspend a pupil for misconduct 
for up to 10 days or to expel him. If he does, he must 
notify the suspended student's parents within 24 hours 
and state the reasons for his action. A pupil who is ex-
pelled, or his parents, may appeal the decision to the 
Board of Education and in connection therewith shall be 
permitted to be heard at the board meeting. The board 
may reinstate the pupil following the hearing. No sim-
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ilar procedure is provided in § 3313.66 or any other pro-
vision of state law for a suspended student. Aside from 
a regulation tracking the statute, at the time of the impo-
sition of the suspensions in this case the CPSS had not 
itself issued any written procedure applicable to sus-
pensions.1 Nor, so far as the record reflects, had a,ny of 
the individual high schools involved in this case.2 Each, 
1 At the time of the events involved in this case, the only Ad-
ministrative regulation on this subject was § 1010.04 of the Admin-
istrative Guide of the Columbus Public Schools which provided : 
"Pupils may be suspended or expelled from school in accordance 
with the provision of § 3313.66 of the Revised Code." Subsequent 
to the events involved in this lawsuit, the Department of Pupil 
Personnel of the CPSS issued three memoranda relating to :,uspension 
procedures dated August 16, 1971, February 21, 1973, and July 10, 
1973, respectively. The first two are substantially ,,imilar to each 
other and require no fact-finding hearing at any time in connection 
with a suspension. The third , which was apparently in effect when 
this case was argued, places upon the principal the obligation to 
' ·investigate" "before commencing suspension procedures"; and 
provides as part of the procedures that the prmcipal shall discuss 
the case with the pupil, so that he may "be heard with respect to 
1he alleged offense," unless the pupil is "unavailable" for such a 
discussion or "unwilling" to participate in it. The suspensions in-
volved in this case occurred, and records thereof were made, prior 
to the effective date of the cu rrent memorandum. The District 
Court's judgment, including its expunction order, turns on the pro-
priety of the procedures existing at the time the suspensions were 
ordered and by which they were imposed. 
2 According to the testimony of Phillip Fulton, the principal of one 
of the high schools involved in this cat;e, there was an informal 
procedure applicable at the Marion-Franklin High School. It pro-
vided that in the routine ca:,e of misconduct, occurring in the pres-
ence of a teacher, the teacher would describe the misconduct on a 
form provided for that TJUrpose and would send the student, with 
the form, to the principal's office. There, the principal would 
obtain the student's version of the story, and, if it conflicted with the 
teacher 's written version, would send for the teacher to obtain the 
teacher's oral vers10n-apparently in the presence of the student. 
Mr. Fulton testified that, if a discrepancy still existed, the teacher's 
73- 898-MEMO 
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however, had formally or informally described the con-
duct for which suspension could be imposed. 
The nine named appellees, each of whom alleged that 
he or she had been suspended from public high school in 
Columbus for up to 10 days without a hearing pursuant 
to § 3313.66, filed an action against the Columbus Board 
of Education and various administrators of the CPSS 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The complaint sought a 
declaration that § 3313.66 wa nconst1tu 10na in that it 
permittea pu ic sc ool administrators to deprive plain-
tiffs of their right to an education without a hearing of 
any kind, in violation of the procedural due process com-
ponent of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also sought to 
enjoin the public school officials from issuing future sus-
pensions pursuant to § 3313.66 and to require them to 
remove references to the past suspensions from the 
records of the students in question. 3 
The proof below established that the suspensions in 
question arose out of a period of widespread student un-
rest in the CPSS during Februar:t and March of 1971. 
Six of the named plaintiffs, Rudolph Sutton, Tyrone 
Washington, Susan Cooper, Deborah Fox, Clarence Byars 
and Bruce Harris, were students at the Marion-Franklin 
High School and were each suspended for 10 days on 
version would be believed and the principal would arrive at a dis-
ciplinary decision based on it. 
3 The plaintiffs sought to brmg the action on behalf of all students 
of the Columbus Public Schools suspended on or after February 
1971, and a class action was declared accordingly. Since the com-
plaint sought to re,;tram the "enforcement" and "operation" of a 
state statute "by rn,training the action of any officer of such state 
in the enforcement or execut10n of such statute," a three-judge court 
was requested pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 and convened. The 
students also a!Ieged that the conduct for which they could be sus-
pended was not adequately defined by Ohio law. This vagueness 
and overbreadth argument was rejected by the court below and the 





account of disruptive or disobedient conduct committed 
in the presence of the s<ilio~ 1inistrator who ordered 
the suspension.4 One of these. Tyrone Washington, was 
among a group of students demonstrating in the school 
auditorium while a class was being conducted there. He 
was ordered by the school principal to leave, refused 
to do so and was suspended. Rudolph Sutton, mtlie 
presence of the principal, physically attacked a police 
officer who was attempting to remove t yrone vVashington 
from the auditorium. He was immediately suspended. 
The other four Marion-Franklin students were suspended 
for similar $Onduct. None was given a hearing to de-
termi'n'e The operative facts underlying the suspension, 
I 
but each, together with his or her parents. was offered the I 
opportunit to atten a conference, subse~ 
effective date of t e suspension, to discuss the student's 
future. 
Two named plaintiffs, Dwight Lopez and Betty Crome, 
were students at the Central High School and McGuffey 
~ At.ho"§i)respectively. The former was sus-
pended in connection with a disturbance in the lunch-
room which involved some physical damage to school 
property. 5 Lopez testified that at least 75 other students 
were suspended from his school on the same day. He also 
testified below that he was not a party to the destructive 
4 Deborah Fox wa.; given two separate 10-da)· suspensions for 
misconduct occurring on two separate occasions-the second fol-
lowing immediate1y upon ·her return to school. In addition to his 
suspension, Sutton was transferred to another school. 
5 Lopez was actuall)· absent from ,;chool, following hi.; suspension, 
for over 20 days. This s!'em,; to have occurred because of a mis-
nndNstanding as to the length of the suspension. A letter sent to 
Lopez after he had been out for over 10 days purports to as,;ume 
that, being over compuh;ory school age, he was voluntarily staying 
away. Upon learnmg that this wa;; not the case, Lopez was trans-
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conduct but was instead an innocent bystander. Be-
cause no one from the school testified with regard to this 
incident, there is no evidence in the record indicating 
the official basis for concluding otherwise. Lopez never 
had a hearing. 
Betty Crome was present at a demonstration at a high 
school different from the one she was attending. There 
she was arrested together with _others, taken to the police 
station, and released without being formally charged. 
Before she went to school on the following day, she was 
notified that she had been suspended for a 10-day period. 
Because no one from the school testified with respect to 
this incident, the record · does not disclose how the Mc-
Guffey Junior High School principal went about making 
the decision to suspend Betty Crome nor does it disclose 
on what information the decision was based. It is clear 
from the record that no hearing was ever held. 
There was no testimony with respect to the suspension 
of the ninth named plaintiff, Carl Smith. The school 
files were also silent as to his suspension, although as to \ ~ 
s~e. bu~l. of the other named plaintiffs the files 
contained either direct references o t eir suspens10ns 
or copies o e ers ent o eir paren s a vismg t em 
of th~ns10n. 
On the basis of this evidence, the three-judge court 
declared that plaintiffs were denied due process of law 
because they were "suspended without hearing prior to 
suspension or within a reasonable time thereafter" and 
that § 3316.66 Ohio Rev. Code and regulations issued ~ 
pursuant thereto were unconstitutionalJn permitting such ' 
suspensions. 6 It was ordered that all references to plain-
tiffs' suspensions be removed from school files 
8 
·--;; In ·its judgment, the court stated that H1e statute is unconstitu-
tional in that it provides "for suspension without first affording the 
-&tuq.ent due _proce1:,s of law." (Emphasis supplied.) However, the-
6 
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Although not imposing upon the Ohio school admin-
istrators any particular disciplinary procedures and leav-
ing them "free to adopt regulations providing for fair 
procedures which are consonant with the educational 
goals of their schools and reflective of the characteristics 
of their school and locality," the District Court declared 
that there " inimum re ui~nts of notice and 
h~a!i~ __pr~~sion, ex~a-
ti.9Ei-'' -In explicati011,'the court stated that relevant 
case authority would: (1) permit "immediate removal 
of a student whose conduct disrupts the academic at-
mosphere of the school, endangers fellow students, teach-
ers or school officials, or damages property'' ; (2) require 
notice of suspension proceedings to be sent to the stu-
dents' parents within 24 hours of the decision to conduct 
them; and (3) requ"ire a hearing to be held, with the stu-
dent present, within 72 hours of his removal. Finally, 
the court stated that, with respect to a hearing, the rele-
vant cases re'quire'd that statements in support of the 
charge be produced, that the student and others be per-
mitted to make statements in defense or mitigation, and 
that the school need not permit attendance by counsel. 
The del'enaant sc ool admimstrators ave appea ed 
the three-judge court's decision. Because the order below 
granted plaintiffs' request for an injunction-ordering de-
fendants to expunge· their records-this Court has juris-
diction of t~h· al ursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253. I 
suggest that e affirm. 
II 
At the outset, appellants contend that because there is 
no constitutional right to an education at public expense, 
language of the judgment must be read in light of the language in 
the opinion whrnh expressly contemplates that under some circum-
stances students may properly be removed from school before a 
hearing is held, so long as the hearing follows promptly. 
73-898-MEI\IO 
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the Due Process Clause does not protect against ex-
pulsions from the public school system. This position 
misconceives the nature of the issue and is refuted by 
prior decisions. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids 
the State to deprive any person of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law. Protected interests in prop-
erty are normally "not created by the Constitution. 
Rather, they are created and their dimensions defined" 
by an independent source such as state statutes or rules 
entitling the citizen to certain benefits. Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972). 
Accordingly, a state employee who under state law, 
or rules promulgated by st-ate officials, has a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to continued employment absent 
sufficient cause for discharge may demand the procedural 
protections of due process. Cannell v. Higginbotham, 
403 U. S. 207 (1971); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 
183, 191-192 (1952) ; Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 
(1974), 164 (POWELL, J., concurring); 171 (WHITE, J., 
concurring and dissenting). So are welfare recipients 
who have statutory rights to welfare as long as they 
maintain the specified qualifications. Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254 (1970). Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 
( 1972), applied the limitations of the Due Process Clause 
to governmental decisions to revoke parole, although a 
parolee has no constitutional right to that status. In 
like vein was Wolff v. McDonald, 42 U. S. L. W. 5190 
(1974), where the procedural protections of the Due 
Process Clause were triggered by official cancellation of a 
prisoner's good-time credits accumulated under state 
law, although those benefits were not mandated by the 
Constitution. 
Here, on the basis of state law, ~ppe~es plainly had 
legitimate cl.aims of entitlement to a public education. 
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thorities to provide a free education to all residents be-
tween six and 21 years of age, and a compulsory attend-
ance law requires attendance for a school year of not less 
than 32 weeks. Ohio Rev. Code § 3321.04. It is true 
that § 3313.66 of the code permits school principals to 
suspend students for up to two weeks; but suspensions 
may not be imposed without any grounds whatsoever. 
All of the schools had their own rules specifying the 
grounds for expulsion or suspension. Having chosen to 
extend the right to an education to people of appellees' 
~
class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on 
grounds of miscon · uct absent fun amentally fair pro-
cedures to determine whether the misconduct has oc-
curred. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 164 (POWELL, J., 
concurring); 171 (WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting); 
206 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
Although Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated 
to establish and maintain a public school system, it has 
nevertheless done so and has required its children to at-
tend. Those young people do not "shed their consti-
tutional rights" at the schoolhouse door. Timken v. 
Des Moines Community School District, 393 U. S. 503, 
506 (1969). "The Fourteenth Amendment as now ap-
plied to the States, protects the citizen against the State 
itself and all of its creatures ... boards of education not 
excepted." West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 lJ. S. 624, 637 
(1943). The authority possessed by the State to pre-
scribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools, al-
though concededly very broad, must be exercised con-
sistently with constitutional safeguards. Among other 
things, the State is constrained to recognize a student's 
legitimate enTit1e~wnt1o"'a pub ic education as a property 
interest w ic is pro ec e y the Due Process Clause 
aria which may not be taken away or misconduct with-
out adherence to the minimum procedures required by 
that clause. 
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The Due Process Clause also forbids arbitrary depriva-' 
tions of liberty. "[W]here a person's good name, repu-
tation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the 
Government is doing to him." the minimal requirements 
qf the clause must be satisfied. fVisconsin v. Constan~ 
tineau, 400 U. S. 433. 437 ( 1971) ; Board of Regents v. 
Roth, supra, at 573. School authorities here suspended e,},~ 
appellees from school 111§ ( I J ii>-for periods of 
up to 10 days based- on charges of misconduct. If sus-
f 
tained and recorded, those charges could seriousl d age 
the student~ing with their ellow pupils and their 
teac ers as well as inter ere with later opportunities for 
h~ducation and employment. 7 It is
1
apparent that / ~~ fv\A.JL 
the claimed right of the State to determine unilaterally 
and without process whether that misconduct has oc-
c_urred immediately collides with the requirements of the· 
Constitution. ·------- --- - - ~ ------
7 Amfoi Curiae, Children's Defense Fund of the Washington Re-
search Project, Inc., and the American Friends Service Committee· 
assert in their brief that four of 12 randomly selected Ohio 
colleges specifically inquire of the high school of every applicant for 
admission wh~ther the applicant has ever been suspended. Amici 
also contend that many employers request similar information .. 
Con~ has recently enacted legislation limiting access to infor-
l 
mation contained in the files of a school receiving federal funds . 
Education Amendments of 1974, P. L. 93-380, § 513. That section 
would preclude riliase of "verified reports of serious or recurrent 
behavior patterns" to employers without written consent of the 
student's parents. While § 513 (b) (1) (B) permits release of such 
information to "other schools . . . in which the student intends to 
enroll," it does so only upon condition that the parent be advised 
of the release of the information and be given an opportunity at a 
hearing to challenge the content of the information to insure against 
inclusion of inaccurate or misleading information. The statute does 
not expressly state whether the parent could contest the underl?ing 
basis for a suspension, the fad of which is contained in the student's, 
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Appellants proceed to argue that even if there is a-
right to a public education protected by the Due Process 
Clause generally. the clause comes into play only when 
the State subjects a student to a "severe detriment or 
grievous loss." The loss of 10 days. it is said, is neither 
severe nor grievous and the Due Process Clause is there-
fore of no relevance. Appellee's argument is again re-
futed by our prior decisions; for in determining "whether 
clue process requirements apply in the first place, we must 
look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest 
~ -----c::--~------~ at stake .. , Board of Regents \'. Roth, supra, at 570-571. 
Appe}Tees were excluded from school only temporarily, it 
is true. but the length and consequent severity of a depri-
vation. while another factor to weigh in determining the 
appropriate form of hearing, "is not decisive of the basic 
right" to a hearing of some kind. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 
U. S. 67. 86 (1972). The Court's view has been that as 
~~ 
--





~Jrivation is not de minimis, its gravity_J_s 
irrelevant to the question whether account must be taken 
of the Due Process Clause. Sniadach v. amily Finance --~ ·--------------
lc-0~ 
~ · 
Corp., 395 U.S. 337,342 (Harlan, J., concurring); Boddie 
v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 378-379; Board of Regents 
v. Roth, supra, p. 5.70 n. 8. A 10-day suspension from I 
school is not de minimis in our view ancfmay7'ioti'ie"tm- j 
p~gard of the Due Process Clause. 
A short suspension is of course a far milder deprivation 
than expulsion. But. "education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local government." 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954) , 
and the total · the educational process for 
more Tiiaff a tri viiil perio , 1d certainly if the suspension 
is for 10 days. · the life of the sus-
pe12ded child. Neit er 1e perty interest in educa-
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in. reputation , which is also implicated, is so insubstantial 
that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any 
procedure the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary.8 
8 Since the landmark decision of the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in Dixon '"· Alabama State Board of Education, 294 
F . 2d 150 (CA5 1961). tht> lower federal courts have uniformly held 
the Due Process Clause applicable to decisions made by tax sup )orted 
educational institutions to remove a student rom mstitution 
lor~genoug11lo~tlie'removal to be classified as an expulsion. Hago-
pian \'. Knowlton, 470 F. 2d 201, 211 (CA2 1970) ; asson ,·. Tr_ow-
bridge, 382 F. 2d 807, 812 (CA2 1967); Woods v. Wright, 334 F. 2d 
369 (CA5 1964); Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F. 
2d 1077, 1089 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 965 (1970); 
Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (ED Mich. 
1969); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F . Supp. 889 (ED Ill. 1970); 
Fielder v. Board of Education of Schoo! District of Winnebago, Neb., 
346 F. Supp. 722, 729 (Neb. 1972); De Jesus v. Penberth y, ;344 F. 
Supp. 70, 74 (Conn. 1972); Soglin v. Kaufman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 
994 (WD Wis. 1968) , aff'd, 418 F. 2d 163 (CA7 1969) ; Stricklin v. 
Regents of University of Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp. 416, 420 (WD Wis. 
1969), appeal dismissed, 420 F . 2d 1257 (CA7 1970); Buck v. Carter, 
308 F. Supp. 1246 (WD Wis. 1970); General Order on Judicial 
Standards of Procedure and Substance m Review of Student Disci-
pline in Tax Supported Institut10ns of Higher Education, 45 F. R. D. 
133, 147-148 (WD Mo. 1968), en bane. The lower courts have been ! 
less uniform , howeve~, on the question whet_h:r removal_ fro_m school 
for some shorter penod ma~· ever be ,;o tnvial a depnvat1on as to 
require no process, and, if so, how short the removal must be to 
qualify. Circuit court°' have held or assumed the Due Process 
Clause applicable to long suspensions, Pervis v. LaMargue Ind. 
School District, 466 F . 2d 1054 (CA5 1972), to indefinite suspensions, 
Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, 475 F. 2d 1071 
(CA5 1973), the addition of a 30-day suspension to a 10-day sus-
pension, Williams v. Dade County School Board, 441 F. 2d 299 
(CA5 1971), to a 10-day tiU<ipension, Black Students of North Fort 
'JI.I yei-s Jr.-Sr. High School v. Williams , 470 F. 2d 95i (CA5 1972), 
to "mild"· suspension~, Farrell Y. Joel, 437 F . 2d 160 (CA2 1971) , 
and Tate Y. Board of Education , 453 F . 2d 975 (CA8 1972) , and to 
a three-day suspension, Shenley v. Northeast Ind. School District, 
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III 
"Once it is determined that due process applies, the 
question remains what process is due.' ' M orrisseyv. 
Brewer, supra, at 481. We turn to that question, fully 
realizing as our cases regularly do that the interpretation 
and application of the Due Process Clause are intensely 
practical matters and that "the very nature of due process 
negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally 
applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafeteria 
Workers i'. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,895 (1961). We are 
also mindful of our own admonition that 
"Judicial interposition in the operation of the public 
school system of the Nation raises problems requir-
ing care and restraint. . . . By and large, public 
inapplicable to a seven-day suspension, Linwood v. Peori,a, 463 F. 
2d 763 (CA7 1972) , a three-day suspension, Dunn v, Tyler, 460 F. 
2d 137 (CAS 1972), and to a suspension for "not more than a few 
cfo~·s," l\,Jurray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 472 F. 2d 
438 (CA5 1973). Th0 federal district C'Ourts have held the Due 
Process Clause applicable to an interim suspens10n pending expul-
;:ion proceedmgs in Stricklin v, Regents of University of Wisconsin, 
supra. and Buck v. Carter, supra, to a 10-day suspension, Banks v. 
Board oj Public Instruction of Dade County, 314 F. Supp. 285 (SD 
Fla . 1970), to ;:uspen~ion;: of undn five days, Vail v. Board of Edu-
cation, 354 F. Supp. 59:2 (~- H. 1973), and to all suspensions, Mills 
v. Board of Educatiw. 384 F. Supp. 856 (D. C. 1972), and Givens 
v. Poe. 346 F. Supp. 202 (WD;\'C 1972); and mapplicable to sus-
pensions of 25 days, Hernandez \'. School Disti-ict Number One, 
Denver, Colorado, 315 F. Supp. 289 (Colo. 1970), to :,uspensions 
of 10 da)·s , Bal-.-et v. Downey City Board of Education, 307 F. Supp. 
517 (CD Cal. 1969), and to ,;uspen1<10n::; of eight days, Hatter v. 
Los Angeles City High School Distnct, 310 F. Supp. 1309 (Cal. 
1970), rev 'd on other grounds, -t52 F. 2d 673 (CA9 1971). In the· 
ea:<e:; holding 110 proces,:; neces:::a ry 111 connection with short suspen-
sions, it ts not nlway:; clear whether the court viewed the Due 
Proce,;:; Clnusc• :1~ inapplicable, or simpl)' felt that the process· 
received wu,; "due'' even in the ab:,;rnC'e of ::iOfile kind of hearing; 
procedure. 
73-898-MEMO 
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education in our ~ ation is committed to the control 
of state and local authorities." Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U. S. 97, 104. 
There are certain bench marks to uide us, however. 
Mullane v. entral Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 
(1950), a case often invoked by later opinions, said that 
"many controversies have raged about the cryptic and 
abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can 
be no doubt that at a minimum they require that depri-
vation of life, liberty or ·property by adjudication be 
preceded by ~nd opportunity for a nearmg appro-
priate to the nature of the case." d., at 13. "[T]he 
fundamental requisite of due rocess of law is the OJ) or-
tumty o e heard," Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 
39~ that "has little reality or worth unless 
one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose 
for himself whether to ... contest. " Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Trust Co., supra, at 314. Armstrong v. Manzo, 
380 U. S. 545, 550 (1965); Anti-Fascist Committee v. 
McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168-169 (1951) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring). At the very minimum, therefore, stu- 1 
dents f~ ing suspe~sion ana the consequent interfer~ 
with a protected property interest must be given some 
kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing. "Par-
~ ..-- ;-enn 
ties whose rights are to be affected are en 1tled to be 
heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they 
must first be notified." Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U. S. 223, 
233 (1863). 
It also appears from our cases that the timing and 
content of the notice and the nature of the hearing will 
depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing 
interests involved. Cafeteria Workers v. M cElroy, supra, 
at 895; Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 481. The stu-
dent's interest is to avoid unfair or mistaken exclusion 
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consequences. The Due Process Clause will not shield 
~uspensions properly imposed, but it disserves 
both his interest and the interest of the State if his sus-
pension is in fact unwarranted. The concern would be 
mostly academic if the disciplinary process were a totally 
accurate, unerring process, never mistaken and never 
unfair. Unfortunately, that is not the case, and no one 
suggests that it is. Disciplinarians, although proceeding 
in utmost good faith , frequently act on the reports and 
advice of others; and the controlling facts and the nature 
of the conduct under challenge are often disputed. The 
risk of error is not at all trivial, and it should be guarded 
against if that may be done without prohibitive cost or 
.interference with the educational process. 
The difficulty is that our schools~d complex. 
S me m · um of disci line ~der is essential if the 
e ucational funct10n is to e performed. Events calling 
for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes 
require immediate, effective action. Suspension is seen r 
as not only a necessary tool to maint~ 
educational device. The prospect of imposing ela orate 
hearing rt'qui r~nts in every suspension case is viewed 
with great concern, and many school authorities may well 
prefer the untrammeled power to act unilaterally, un-
hamnered by rules about notice and hearing. But it 
would be a strange disciplinary system in an educational 
institution if no communication was sought by the disci-
plinarian with the student in an effort to inform him of 
his defalcation and to let him tell his side of the story 
in order to make sure that an injust~· ·., not done . 
" [F] airness can rarely be obtained by ~et one-sided 
determination of the facts decisive of rig , . . Secrecy 
is not congenial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness 
gives too slender an assurance of rightness. No better 
instrument has been d.evised for ar:Jsing at truth than 
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case against him and opportunity to meet it." Anti-
Fascist Committee v. McGrath, supra, at 170-172 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) .9 
9 The facts involved in this case illustrate the point. Betty Crome 
was suspended for eonduct which did not occur on school grounds, 
and for which mass arrests were rr,ade--hardly guarantying careful 
individualized factfindmg by the police or by the school principal. 
She claims to have been involved in no misconduct. However, she 
was suspended for 10 days without ever being told what she was 
accused of doing or being given an opportunity to explain her pres-
ence among those arrested. Similarly, Dwight Lopez was suspended 
along with many others, in connection with a disturbance in the 
lunchroom. Lopez says he was not one of those in the lunchroom 
who was involved. However, he was never told the basis for the 
principal's belief that he was involved, nor wa8 he ever given an 
opportunity to explain his presence in the lunchroom . The school 
principals who suspended Crome and Lopez may have been correct 
on the merits, but it is inconsistent with the Due Process Clause to 
have made the decision that misconduct had occurred without at 
some meaningful time giving Crome or Lopez an opportunity to 
persuade the principals otherwise 
We recognize that both suspensions were imposed during a time 
of great difficulty for the school administrations involved. At least. 
in Lopez' case there may have been an immediate need to send home 
everyone in the lunchroom in order to preserve school order and 
property; and the administrative burden of providing 75 "hearings" 
of any kind is considerable. However, neither factor justifies a 
disciplmary suspension without at any time gathering facts relating 
to Lopez specifically, confronting him with them, and giving him an 
opportunity to explain. 
Appellants point to the fact that :,ome process is provided under 
Ohio law b~· way of jud1crnl review. Ohio Rev Code § 2501.06 
Appellants do not cite any case 111 which th1~ general administrative 
review statute ha~ been used to appeal from a disciplinary decision 
by a school official. If it be asrnmed that 1t could be so used, it is 
for two reasons insufficient to save inadequate procedures at the 
:-chool level. First, although new proof may be offered in a § 2501.06 
proceedmg, Shaker Coventry Corp. v. Shaker Heights, 176 N . E. 2d 
:332, the proceeding is not de novo In re Locke, 294 N. E. 2d 230. 
Thu,s the d~cision by the ::ichool-even if made upon inadequate pro, 
~Y 
~ -
~ , .. ~v 
~ 
~ ), ~ <A/ oJL ~ 
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µ, ~j/JvA,I authorities must be -t~tally free from notice'and hearing requirements if their 
schools "' to operate with acceptable efficiency. Stu-
dents acing temporary suspension have interests qualify-
ing for protection of the Due Process Clause, and due 
pr~es, in connect1';n ~ith a s~sion of 10 
days or less, that the student be given oral or written 
notice of the charges againstlum and, if he denies them, 
~planation of the evidence th~uthorities have and 
a.n opportunity to present his side of the story. The 
clause requires ~ast th'ese rudimentary precautions 
against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct and 
arbitrary exclusion from school 
There 12eed be ~o delay between the time "notice" is t 
given and the time of the hearing. In the great majority l 
of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the 
alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has -< 
occurred. We hold only th.,_at, in being given an O_£E9r-
tunity to explain his v · of the facts at this discus-
sion, the student rst be to what he is accused of <loin 
and what t e basis of the accusation is. Lower courts 
whicli7iaveacloressea the question of the nature of the 
procedures required in short suspension cases have 
reached the same conclusion. Tate v. Board of Educa-
tion, supra, at 979; Vail v. Board of Education, supra, at 
603. It follows, therefore that as a general rule notice 
and hearin~ sho~ d ~ e removal of the ~ent from 
scnool. We agreewith the District Court, however, that 
there are recurring situations in which prior notice and 
hearing cannot be insisted upon. Students whose pres-
ence poses a continuing danger to persons or property or 
cedures-is entitled to weight in the court proceeding. Second, with-
out a demonstration to the contrary, we must assume that delay will 
attend any § 2501.06 proceeding, that the suspension will not be 
stayed pending hearmg, and that the student meanwhile will irrepa-
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an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may 
be immediately removed from school. In such cases, the 
necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow 
as soon as practicable. as the District Court indicated. 
In holding as we do, we do not believe that we have 
imposed procedures on school disciplinarians which are 
inappropriate in a classroom setting. Instead we have l 
imposed requirements which are, if anything , less than 
a fair-minded school principal would impose upon him-
self in order to avoid unfair suspensions. Indeed, accord-
ing to the testimony of the principal of Marion-Franklin 
High School, that school had an informal procedure, 
remarkably similar to that which we now require, appli-
cable to suspensions generally but which was not fol-
lowed in this case. Similarly, according to the most 
recent memorandum applicable to the entire CPSS, see 
n. 1, supra, school principals in the CPSS are now 
required by local rule to provide at least as much as the 
constitutional minimum which we have described. 
V{e stop short of construing the Due Process Clause 
~~,..__...,.,...-,-=--,---........----~--
to require. countryw1 e. t 1at hearings m connection with 
short suspensions must afford the student the o Jportunity 








s~ charge or to ca 1 1s own witnesses to • 
verify his version of ilie incident. 13n"ef discmlinary ·~ 
su~ ees,1ons are ajm_9st countless. To impose in each 
such case full trialty;; proce3ures might well overwhelm 
administrative facilities in many places and. by diverting 
resources. cost more than it would save in educational 
effectiveness. Moreover, further formalizing the sus-
pension process and escalating its formality and adver-
sary na.ture may not only make it too costly as a regular 
disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as lJart ~ 
of the teaching process. ~ 
On the other hand. requiring effective notice and in-
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of the events will provide a meaningful hedge against 
erroneous action. At least the disciplinarian will be 
alerted to the existence of disputes about facts and argu-
ments about cause and effect. He may then determine 
himself to summon the accuser, permit cross-examination 
11nd allow the student to present his own witnesses. In 
more difficult cases. he may permit counsel. In any 
event, his discretion will be more informed and we think 
the risk of error substantially reduced. 
Requiring that there be at least an informal give-and-
take between student and disciplinarian, preferably prior 
to the suspension , will add little to the factfinding func-
tion where the disciplinarian has himself witnessed the 
conduct forming the basis for the charge. But things 
are not always as they seem to be, and the student will at 
least have the opportunity to characterize his conduct 
and put it in what he deems the proper context. 
We should also make it clear that we have addressed 
ourselves solely to the short suspension, not exceeding 
10 days. Longer suspensions or expulsions for the re-
mainder of the school term, or permanently, may require 
more formal procedures. Nor do we put aside the possi-
bility that in unusual situations, although involving only 
a short suspension, something more than the rudimentary 
procedures will be required. 
I 
The District Court found each of the suspensions in-
volved here to have occurred without a hearing, either 
before or after the suspension, and that each suspension 
was therefore invalid and the statute unconstitutional 
<insofar as it permits su0h suspensions without notice or 
earing. Having no reason to disagree wit t e ju g-
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MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. / 
This appeal by various administrators of the Columbus, 
Ohio, Public School System ("CPSS") challenges the 
judgment of a three-judge federal court, declaring that 
appellees-various high school students in the CPSS-
were denied due process of law contrary to the command 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in that they were tem-
porarily suspended from their high schools without a 
hearing either prior to suspension or within a reasonable 
time thereafter, and enjoining the administrators to 
remove all references to such suspensions from the stu-
dents' records. 
I 
Ohio law, Rev. Code § 3313.64, provides for free edu-
cation to all children between the ages of six and 21. 
Section 3313.66 of the Code empowers the principal of an 
Ohio public school to suspend a pupil for misconduct 
for up to 10 days or to expel him. In either case, he 
must notify the student's parents within 24 hours 
and state the reasons for his action. A pupil who is ex-
pelled, or his parents, may appeal the decision to the 
Board of Education and in connection therewith shall be 
permitted to be heard at the board meeting. The board 
may reinstate the pupil following the hearing. No sim-
✓ 
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ilar procedure is provided in § 3313.66 or any other pro-
vision of state law for a suspended student. Aside from 
a regulation tracking the statute, at the time of the impo-
sition of the suspensions in this case the CPSS had not 
itself issued any written procedure applicable to sus-
pensions.1 Nor, so far as the record reflects, had any of 
the individual high schools involved in this case.2 Each, 
1 At the time of the events involved in this case, the only Ad-
ministrative regulation on this subject was § 1010.04 of the Admin-
istrative Guide of the Columbus Public Schools which provided : 
"Pupils may be suspended or expelled from school in accordance 
with the provision of § 3313.66 of the Revised Code." Subsequent 
to the events involved in this lawsuit, the Department of Pupil 
Personnel of the CPSS issued three memoranda relating to suspension 
procedures dated August 16, 1971, February 21, 1973, and July 10, 
1973, respectively. The first two are substantially similar to each 
other and require no fact-finding hearing at any time in connection 
with a suspension. The third, which was apparently in effect when 
this case was argued, places upon the principal the obligation to 
"investigate" "before commencing suspension procedures"; and 
provides as part of the procedures that the principal shall discuss the 
case with the pupil, so that the pupil may "be heard with respect to 
the alleged offense," unless the pupil is "unavailable" for such a 
discussion or "unwilling" to participate in it. The suspensions in-
volved in this case occurred, and records thereof were made, prior 
to the effective date of these memoranda. The District 
Court's judgment, including its expunction order, turns on the pro-
priety of the procedures existing at the time the suspensions were 
ordered and by which they were imposed. 
2 According to the testimony of Phillip Fulton, the principal of one 
of the high schools involved in this case, there was an informal 
procedure applicable at the Marion-Franklin High School. It pro-
vided that in the routine ca8e of misconduct, occurring in the pres-
ence of a teacher, the teacher would describe the misconduct on a 
form provided for that purpose and would send the student, with 
the form, to the princ1pal's office. There, the principal would 
obtain the student's version of the story, and, if it conflicted with the 
teacher's written version, would send for the teacher to obtain the 
teacher's oral, version-apparently in the presence of the student. 
Mr, Fulton testified that, If a discrepancy still existed, the teacher's: 
13-898-0PINION 
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however, had formally or informally described the con-
duct for which suspension could be imposed. 
The nine named appellees, each of whom alleged that 
he or she had been suspended from public high school in 
Columbus for up to 10 days without a hearing pursuant 
to § 3313.66, filed an action against the Columbus Board 
of Education and various administrators of the CPSS 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The complaint sought a 
declaration that § 3313.66 was unconstitutional in that it 
permitted public school administrators to deprive plain-
tiffs of their rights to an education without a hearing of 
any kind, in violation of the procedural due process com-
ponent of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also sought to 
enjoin the public school officials from issuing future sus-
pensions pursuant to § 3313.66 and to require them to• 
remove references to the past suspensions from the 
records of the students in question.3 
The proof below established that the suspensions in 
question arose out of a period of widespread student un-
rest in the CPSS during February and March of 1971. 
Six of the named plaintiffs, Rudolph· Sutton, Tyrone 
Washington, Susan Cooper, Deborah Fox, Clarence Byars· 
and Bruce Harris, were students at the Marion-Franklin 
version would be believed and the principal would arrive at a dis-
ciplinary decision based on it. 
3 The plaintiffs sought to bring the action on behalf of all students 
of the Columbus Public Schools suspended on or after February 
1971, and a class action was declared accordingly. Since the com-
plaint sought to restrain the "enforcement" and "operation" of a 
state Rtatute "by restraining the action of any officer of such state-
in the enforcement or execution of such statute," a three-judge court 
was requested pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 and convened. The· 
students also alleged that the conduct for which they could be sus-
pended was not adequately defined by Ohio law. This vagueness-
and overbreadth argument was rejected by the court below and the 
$fud.ents_ have wt appeared. from this part of the court's decision_ 
i 
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High School and were each suspended for 10 days 4 on 
account of disruptive or disobedient conduct committed 
in the presence of the school administrator who ordered 
the suspension. One of these, Tyrone Washington, was 
among a group of students demonstrating in the school 
auditorium while a class was being conducted there. He 
was ordered by the school principal to leave, refused 
to do so and was suspended. Rudolph Sutton, in the 
presence of the principal , physically attacked a police 
officer who was attempting to remove Tyrone Washington 
from the auditorium. He was immediately suspended. 
The other four Marion-Franklin students were suspended 
for similar conduct. None was given a hearing to de-
termine the operative facts underlying the suspension, 
but each, together with his or her parents, was offered the 
opportunity to attend a conference, subsequent to the 
effective date of the suspension, to discuss the student's 
future. 
Two named plaintiffs, Dwight Lopez and Betty Crome, 
were students at the Central High School and McGuffey 
Junior High School , respectively. The former was sus-
pended in connection with a disturbance in the lunch-
room which involved some physical damage to school 
property. 5 Lopez testified that at least 75 otp.er students 
were suspended from his school on the same day. He also 
testified below that he was not a party to the destructive 
4 Deborah Fox was given two separate 10-day suspensions for 
misconduct occurring on two separate occasions-the second fol-
lowing immediately upon her return to school. In addition to his 
suspension, Sutton was transferred to another school. 
c Lopez was actually absent from school, fol1owing his suspension, 
for over 20 days. This seems to have occurred because of a mis-
understanding as to the length of the suspension. A letter sent to 
Lopez after he had been out for over 10 days purports to assume 
that, being over compulsory school age, he was voluntarily staying 
away. Upon learning that this was not the case, Lopez was trans,.. 
forreq to another school. 
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conduct but was instead an innocent bystander. Be-
cause no one from the school testified with regard to this 
incident, there is no evidence in the record indicating 
the official basis for concluding otherwise. Lopez never 
had a hearing. 
Betty Crome was present at a demonstration at a high 
school different from the one she was attending. There 
she was arrested together with others, taken to the police 
station, and released without being formally charged. 
Before she went to school on the following day, she was 
notified that she had been suspended for a 10-day period. 
Because no one from the school testified with respect to 
this incident, the record does not disclose how the Mc-
Guffey Junior High School principal went about making 
the decision to suspend Betty Crome nor does it disclose 
on what information the decision was based. It is clear 
from the record that no hearing was ever held. 
There was no testimony with respect to the suspension 
of the ninth named plaintiff, Carl Smith. The school 
files were also silent as to his suspension, although as to 
some, but not all, of the other named plaintiffs the files 
contained either direct references to their suspensions 
or copies of letters sent to their parents adv.ising them 
of the suspension. 
On the basis of this evidence, the three-judge court 
declared that plaintiffs were denied due process of law 
because they were "suspended without hearing prior to 
suspension or within a reasonable time thereafter," and 
that § 3316.66 Ohio Rev. Code and regulations issued 
pursuant thereto were unconstitutional in permitting such 
suspensions.6 It was ordered that all references to plain-
tiffs' suspensions be removed from school files. 
6 In its judgment, the court stated that the statute is unconstitu-
tional in that it provides "for suspension without first affording the 
&tu.dent due proceiis of law." (Emphasis supplied.) However, the 
6 
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Although not imposing upon the Ohio school admin-
istrators any particular disciplinary procedures and leav-
ing them "free to adopt regulations providing for fair 
procedures which are consonant with the educational 
goals of their schools and reflective of the characteristics 
of their school and locality,'' the District Court declared 
that there were "minimum requirements of notice and 
hearing prior to suspension, except in emergency situa-
tions." In explication, the court stated that relevant 
case authority would: (1) permit "immediate removal 
of a student whose conduct disrupts the academic at-
mosphere of the school, endangers fellow students, teach-
ers or school officials, or damages property"; (2) require 
notice of suspension proceedings to be sent to the stu-
dents' parents within 24 hours of the decision to conduct 
them; and (3) require a hearing to be held, with the stu-
dent present, within 72 hours of his removal. Finally, 
the court stated that, with respect to the nature of the I 
hearing, the relevant cases required that statements in 
support of the charge be produced, that the student and 
others be permitted to make statements in defense or 
mitigation, and that the school need not permit attend-
ance by counsel. 
The defendant school administrators have appealed 
the three-judge court's decision. Because the order below 
granted plaintiffs' request for an injunction-ordering de-
fendants to expunge their records-this Court has juris-
diction of the appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253. J 
We affirm. 
II 
At the outset, appellants contend that because there is 
language of the judgment must be read in light of the language in 
the opmion which expressly contemplates that under some circum-
stances students may properly be removed from school before m 
b.~aring is held, so long as the he_aring follows promptly. 
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no constitutional right to an education at public expense, 
the Due Process Clause does not protect against ex-
pulsions from the public school system. This position 
misconceives the nature of the issue and is refuted by 
prior decisions. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids 
the State to deprive any person of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law. Protected interests in prop-
erty are normally "not created by the Constitution. 
Rather, they are created and their dimensions defined" 
by an independent source such as state statutes or rules 
entitling the citizen to certain benefits. Board of Re-
{Tents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 ( 1972). 
Accordingly, a state employee who under state law, 
ffl' rules promulgated by state officials, has a legitimate 
elaim of entitlement to continued employment absent 
sufficient cause for discharge may demand the procedural 
protections of due process. Connell v. Higginbotham, 
403 U. S. 207 (1971); Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 
183', 191-192 (1952); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 
(W74), 164 (POWELL, J., concurring); 171 (WHITE, J., 
concurring and dissenting). So may welfare recipients 
whO' have statutory rights to welfare as long as they 
maintain the specified qualifications. Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254 (1970). Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 
(1972), applied the limitations of the Due Process Clause 
to governmental decisions to revoke parole, although a 
parolee has no constitutional right to that status. In 
like vein was Wolff v. McDonald, 42 U. S. L. W. 5190 
( 197 4), where the procedural protections of the Due 
Process Clause were triggered by official cancellation of a 
prisoner's good-time credits accumulated under state 
law, although those benefits were not mandated by the 
Constitution. 
Here, on the basis of state law, appellees plainly hacf 
legitimate claims of entitlement to a public education. 
Ohl<a: :Rev. Code §§ 3313'.48 and 3313.64. direct local au-
8 
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thorities to provide a free education to all residents be-
tween six and 21 years of age, and a compulsory attend-
ance law requires attendance for a school year of not less 
than 32 weeks. Ohio Rev. Code § 3321.04. It is true 
that § 3313.66 of the code permits school principals to 
suspend students for up to two weeks; but suspensions 
may not be imposed without any grounds whatsoever. 
All of the schools had their own rules specifying the 
grounds for expulsion or suspension. Having chosen to 
extend the 'right to an education to people of appellees' 
class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on 
grounds of misconduct absent fundamentally fair pro-
cedures to determine whether the misconduct has oc-
curred. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 164 (POWELL, J., 
concurring); 171 (WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting); 
206 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
Although Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated 
to establish and maintain a public school system, it has 
nevertheless done so and has required its children to at-
tend. Those young people do not "shed their consti-
tutional rights'' at the schoolhouse door. Tinker v. 
Des Moines Community School District, 393 U. S. 503, 
506 (1969). "The Fourteenth Amendment as now ap-
plied to the States, protects the citizen against the State 
itself and all of its creatures ... boards of education not 
excepted." West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 
(1943). The authority possessed by the State to pre-
scribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools, al-
though concededly very broad, must be exercised con-
sistently with constitutional safeguards. Among other 
things, the State is constrained to recognize a student's 
legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property 
interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause 
and which may not be taken away for misconduct with-
out adherence to the minimum procedures required by 
that clause. 
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The Due Process Clause also forbids arbitrary depriva.: 
tions of liberty. 'TW]here a person's good name, repu.; 
tation, honor. or integrity 1s at stake because of what the 
Government is doing to him," the minimal requirements 
of the clause must be satisfied. Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau, 400 U. S. 433. _437 (1971); Board of Regents v. 
Eoth, supra, at 573. School authorities he~e suspended 
appellees from school for periods of up to 10 days based / ~ 
bn charges of misconduct. , If sustained and recorded, 
those charges could seriously damage the students' stand-
ing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as 
interfere with la(er opportunities for higher education and 
employment.7 !t is apparent that the claimed right of 
the State to determine unilateraily and without process 
whether that misconduct has occurred immediately col-
iides with the requirements of the Constitution. 
1 Amici Curiae, Cl1ildren'~ Defense Fund of the Washington Re-
search Project, Inc., and the American Friends Service Committee 
assert in their brief that four of 12 randomly selected Ohio 
colieges spedfically inquire of the high school of every applicant for 
admission whether the applicant has ever been suspended. Amici 
also contend that many employers request similar information. 
Congress has recently enacted legislation limiting access to infor-
mation contained in the files of a ~chool receiving federal funds. 
Education Amendments of 1974, P. L. 93-380, § 513. That section 
would preclude release of "verified reports of serious or recurrent 
behavior patterns" to employers without written consent of the 
student's parents. While § 513 (b) ( 1) (B) permits release of such 
information to "other schools .. . In which the student intends to 
enroll,'' It does so only upon condition that the parent be advised 
of the release of the information and bP, given an opportunity at a 
hearing to challenge the content of the information to insure against 
inclusion of inaccurate or misleading information. The statute does 
not expressly state whether the parent can contest the underl:ving 
basis for a suspension, the fact of which is contained in the student's · 
school· record. 
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Appellants proceed to argue that even if there is a. 
right to a public education protected by the Due Process 
Clause generally , the clause comes into play only when 
the State subject& a student to a "severe detriment or 
grievous loss." The loss of 10 days, it is said, is neither 
severe nor grievous and the Due Process Clause is there-
fore of no relevance. Appellee's argument is again re-
futed by our prior decisions; for in determining "whether 
due process requirements apply in the first place, we must 
look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest 
at stake." Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 570-571. 
Appellees were excluded from school only temporarily, it 
is true, but the length and consequent severity of a depri-
vation, while another factor to weigh in determining the 
appropriate form of hearing, "is not decisive of the basic· 
right" to a hearing of some kind. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 
U. S. 67, 86 (1972). The Court's view has been that as 
Jong as a property deprivation is not de minim-is, its grav- / 
ity is irrelevant to the question whether account must be 
taken of the Due Process Clause. Sniadach v. Family Fi-
nance Corp., 395 U. S. 337, 342 (Harlan, J., concurring); 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 , 378-379; Board of 
Regents v. Roth, supra, p. 570 n. 8. A 10-day suspension 
from school is not de minim-is in our view and may not be 
imposed in complete disregard of the Due Process Clause. 
A short suspension is of course a far milder deprivation 
than expulsion. But, "education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local government." 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954), 
and the total exclusion from the educational process for 
more than a trivial period, and certainly if the suspension 
is for 10 days, is a serious event in the life of the sus-
pended child. Neither the property interest in educa-
t ional benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest; 
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in reputation, which is also implicated, is so insubstantial 
that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any 
procedure the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary.8 
,~ 
8 Since the landmark decision of the Court of Appeals· for the 
Fifth Circuit in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 
F. 2d 150 (CA5), cert. denied. 368 U.S. 930 (1961), the lower federal / 
courts have uniformly held the Due Process Clause applicable to de-
cisions made by tax ,-upported educational institutions to remove a 
student from the institution long enough for the removal to be 
classified as an expuls10n. Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F. 2d 201,211 
(CA2 1970); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F. 2d 807,812 (CA2 1967); 
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F. 2d 1077, 
1089 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 965 (1970); 
Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (ED .Mich. 
1969); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889 (ED Ill. 1970); 
Fielde.r v. Board of Education of School District of Winnebago, Neb., 
346 F. Supp. 722, 729 (Neb. 1972); De Jesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. 
Supp. 70, 74 (Conn. 1972); Soglin v. Kaufman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 
994 (WD Wis. 1968), aff'd, 418 F. 2d 163 (CA7 1969); Stricklin v. 
Regents of University of Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp. 416, 420 (WD Wis. 
1969), appeal dismissed, 420 F. 2d 1257 (CA7 1970); Buck v. Carter, 
308 F. Supp. 1246 (WD Wis. 1970); General Order on Judicial 
Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Disci-
pline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F. R. D. 
133, 147-148 (WD Mo. 1968), en bane. The lower courts have been 
less uniform, however, on the question whether removal from school 
for some shorter period may ever be so trivial a deprivation as to 
require no process, and, if so, how short the removal must be to 
qualify. Circuit courts have held or assumed the Due Process 
Clause applicable to long suspensions, Pe1'vi.s v. LaMargue Ind. 
School Di.strict, 466 F 2d 1054 (CA5 1972), to indefinite suspensions, 
Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Di.strict, 475 F. 2d 1071 
(CA5 1973), the addition of a 30-day suspension to a 10-day sus• 
pension, Williams v. Dade County School Board, 441 F. 2d 299 
(CA5 1971), to a 10-day suspension, Black Students of North Fort 
Myers Jr.-Sr. High School v. Williams, 470 F. 2d 957 (CA5 1972), 
to "mild" suspensions, Far1'ell v. Joel, 437 F. 2d 160 (CA2 1971), 
and Tate v. Board of Education, 453 F. 2d 975 (CA8 1972), and to 
a three-day suspension, Shenley v. Northeast Ind. School District, 
Be~r Count11, Texas, 462 F. 2d 960, 967 n. 4 (CA5 1972); aml 
12 
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III 
"Once it is determined that due process applies, the 
question remains what process is due." Morrissey v. 
Brewer, supra, at 481. We turn to that question, fully 
realizing as our cases regularly do that the interpretation 
and application of the Due Process Clause are intensely 
practical matters and that "the very nature of due process 
negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally 
applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafeteria 
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). We are 
also mindful of our own admonition that 
"Judicial interposition in the operation of the public 
school system of the Nation raises problems requir-
inapplicable to a ~even-da~· suspension, Linwood v. Peoria, 463 F. 2d 
75:3 (CA7), crrt. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972), a three-day suspen- / 
sion, Dunn ,·. Tyler, 460 F. 2d 137 (CA5 1972), to a susprnsion for 
"not more than a frw day:;," Murray Y. West Baton Rouge Parish 
School Roard. 472 F. 2d 438 (CA5 1973), and to all suspension:; no 
matter how short. Blad· Coalition Y. Portland Sclwol District No. 1, 
484 F. 2d 1040 (CA5 1973). The frderal district courts have hrld the 
Du(' Prores,- Clause applicable to an interim suspension pending expul-
sion proceedings in Stricklin v. Regents of University of Wisconsin, 
supra. and Buck v. Carter, supra, to a 10-day suspension, Banks v. 
Board of Public ln8truction of Dade County, 314 F. Supp. 285 (SD 
Fla. 1970), to ~uspensions of under five days, Vail v. Board of Edu-
cation, 354 F. Supp. 592 (N. H. 1973), and to all suspensions, Mills 
v. Board of Education, 384 F. Supp. 866 (D. C. 1972), and Givens 
v. Poe, 346 F Supp. 202 (WDNC 1972); and inapplicable to sus-
pensions of 25 days, Hernandez v. School District Number One, 
Denvei-, Colorado, 315 F. Supp. 289 (Colo. 1970), to suspensions 
of 10 days, Baker v. Downey City Board of Education, 307 F. Supp 
517 (CD Cal. 1969). and to suspensions of eight days, Hatter v. 
Los Angeles City High School District, 310 F. Supp. 1309 (Cal. 
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 452 F. 2d 673 (CA9 1971). In th& 
cases holding no process necessary in connection with short suspen-
sion!", it is not always clear whether the court viewed the Due 
Proces.;; Clause as inapplicable, or simply felt that the process 
receiYed was "due" even in the absence of s.ome kind of hearing 
procedure. 
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ing care and restraint. . . . By and large, public 
education in our Nation is committed to the control 
of state and local authorities." Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U. S. 97, 104. 
There are certain bench marks to guide us, however. 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 
(1950), a case often invoked by later opinions, said tha.t 
"many controversies have raged about the cryptic and 
abstract words of the Due Process Clause but .there can 
be no doubt that at a minimum they require that depri-
vation of life, liberty or property by adjudicatio·n be 
preceded by notice and opportunity for a hearing appro-
priate to the nature of the case." Id., at 313. "[T]he 
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the oppor-
tunity to be heard," Granni,s v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 
394 (1914), a right that "has little reality or worth unless 
one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose 
for himself whether to ... contest." Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Trust Co., supra, at 314. Armstrong v. Manzo, 
380 U. S. 545, 550 (1965); Anti-Fascist Committee v. 
McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168-169 (1951) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring). At the very minimum, therefore, stu-
dents facing suspension and the consequent interference 
with a protected property interest must be given some 
kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing. "Par-
ties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be 
heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they 
must first be notified." Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U. S. 223, 
233 (1863). 
It also appears from our cases that the timing and 
content of the notice and the nature of the hearing will 
depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing 
interests involved. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, supra, 
at 895; Mormsey v. Brewer, supra, at 481. The stu-
dent's interest is to avoid unfair or mistaken exclusion 
from the educational process, with all of its unfortunate 
14 
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consequences. The Due Process Clause will not shield 
him from suspensions properly imposed, but it disserves 
both his interest and the interest of the State if his sus-
pension is in fact unwarranted. The concern would be 
mostly academic if the disciplinary process were a totally 
accurate, unerring process, never mistaken and never 
unfair. Unfortunately, that is not the case, and no one 
suggests that it is. Disciplinarians, although proceeding 
in utmost good faith, frequently act on the reports and 
advice of others; and the controlling facts and the nature 
of the conduct under challenge are often disputed. The 
risk of error is not at all trivial, and it should be guarded 
against if that may be done without prohibitive cost or 
interference with the educational process. 
The difficulty is that our schools are vast and complex. 
Some modicum of discipline and order is essential if the 
educational function is to be performed. Events calling 
for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes re-
quire immediate, effective action. Suspension is consid-
ered to be as not only a necessary tool to maintain order 
but a valuable educational device. The prospect of im-
posing elaborate hearing requirements in every suspension 
case is viewed with great concern, and many school au-
thorities may well prefer the untrammeled power to act 
unilaterally, unhampered by rules about notice and hear-
ing. But it woulci be a strange disciplinary system in an 
educational institution if no communication was sought 
by the disciplinarian with the student in an effort to in-
form him of his defalcation and to let him tell his side of 
the story in order to make sure that an injustice is not 
done. "[F] airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-
sided determination of the facts decisive of rights . . . . 
Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self-
righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness. 
No better inst,rument has been devised for arriving at 
t ruth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss. 
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notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet 
it." Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, supra, at 170-
172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).9 ~ 
@e do not believe that school authorities must ~~ ~ 
totally free from notig and hearing requirements if their 
schools are to operate with acceptable efficiency. Stu-
dents facing temporary suspension have interests qualify-
ing for protection of the Due Process Clause, and due 
· process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 
days or less, that the student be given oral or written -ngtiQ._e.~harges ag~},!.lst in.l ~n.,d, if he enies t em, 
an explanat10n or'the evidence the authorities have and 
9 The facts involved in this case illustrate the point. Betty Crome 
was suspended for conduct which did not occur on school grounds, 
and for which mass arrests were made-hardly guarantying careful 
individualized factfinding by the police or by the school principal. 
She claims to have been involved in no misconduct. However, she 
was suspended for 10 days without ever being told what she was 
accused of doing or being given an opportunity to explain her pres-
ence among those arrested. Similarly, Dwight Lopez was suspended, 
along with many others, in connection with a disturbance in the 
lunchroom. Lopez says he was not one of those in the lunchroom 
who was involved However, he was never told the basis for the 
principal's belief that he was involved, nor was he ever given an 
opportunity to explain his presence in the lunchroom. The school 
principals who suspended Crome and Lopez may have been correct 
on the merits, but 1t is inconsistent with the Due Process Clause to 
have made the decision that misconduct had occurred without at 
some meaningful time giving Crome or Lopez an opportunity to 
persuade the principals otherwise. 
We recognize that both suspensions were imposed during a time 
of great difficulty for the school administrations involved. At least 
in Lopez' case there may have been an immediate need to send home 
everyone in the lunchroom in order to pre~erve school order and 
property; and the administrative burden of providmg 75 "hearings" 
of any kind is considerable. However, neither factor justifies a 
disciplinary suspension without at any time gathering facts relating 
to Lopez specifically, confronting him with them, and giving him an 
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an opportunity to present his side of the story. The 
c~s at least t1iese·'--ruair"ii.ent~;y ... precautions 
against unfair or mistaken .findings of misconduct and 
arbitrary exclusion from school.1° 
There need be no delay between the time "notice" is 
given and the time of the hearing. In the great majority 
of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the 
alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has 
occurred. We hold only that, in being given an oppor-
tunity to explain his version of the facts at this discus-
sion, the student first be told what he is accused of doing 
and what the basis of the accusation is. Lower courts 
which have addressed the question of the nature of the 
procedures required in short suspension cases have 
reached the same conclusion. Tate v. Board of Educa-
tion, supra, at 979; Vail v. Board of Education, supra, at 
603. Since the hearing may occur almost immediately 
following the misconduct, it follows that as a general rule 
notice and hearing should precede removal of the student 
from school. We agree with the District Court, however, 
that there are recurring situations in which prior notice 
and hearing cannot be insisted upon. Students whose 
presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property 
10 Appellants point to the fact that some process is provided under 
Oh10 law by way of judicial review. Ohio Rev. Code § 2501.06 . 
Appellants do not cite any case in which this general administrative 
review statute has been used to appeal from a disciplinary decision 
by a school official. If it be assumed that it could be so used, it is 
for two reasons insufficient to save inadequate procedures at the 
school level. First, although new proof may be offered in a § 2501.06 
proceeding, Shaker Coventry Corp. v. Shaker Heights, 176 N. E. 2d 
332, the proceeding is not de novo. In re Locke, 294 N. E. 2d 230. 
Thus the decision by the school--even if made upon inadequate pro-
cedures-is entitled to weight in the court proceeding. Second, with-
out a demonstration to the contrary, we must assume that delay wilt 
attend any § 2501.06 proceeding, that the suspension will not be 
stayed pending hearmg, and that the st1i1dent meanwhile will irrepa-
tably lose his educational benefits.. 
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or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process 
may be immediately removed from school. In such cases, 
the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should fol-
low as soon as practicable, as the District Court indicated. 
In holding as we do, we do not believe that we have 
imposed procedures on school disciplinarians which are 
inappropriate in a classroom setting. Instead we have 
imposed requirements which are, if anything, less than 
a fair-minded school principal would impose upon him-
self in order to avoid unfair suspensions. Indeed, accord-
ing to the testimony of the principal of Marion-Franklin 
High School, that school had an informal procedure, 
remarkably similar to that which we now require, appli-
cable to suspensions generally but which was not fol-
lowed in this case. Similarly, according to the most 
recent memorandum applicable to the entire CPSS, see 
n. 1, supra, school principals in the CPSS are now 
required by local rule to provide at least as much as the 
constitutional minimum which we have described. 
We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause 
to require, countrywide, that hearings in connection with 
short suspensions must afford the student the opportunity 
to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
supporting the charge or to call his own witnesses to 
verify his version of the incident. Brief disciplinary 
suspensions are almost countless. To impose in each 
such case even truncated trial type procedures might well I 
overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and, 
by diverting resources, cost more than it would save in ed-
ucational effectiveness. Moreover. further formalizing 
the suspension process and escalating its formality and 
adversary nature may 11ot only make it too costly as a 
regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its eff ective11ess 
as part of the teaching process. 
On the other hand, requiring effective notice and in-
formal hearing permitting the student to give his version 
18 
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of the events will provide a meaningful hedge against 
erroneous act10n. At least the disciplinarian will be 
alerted to the existence of disputes about facts and argu-
ments about cause and effect. He may then determine 
himself to summon the accuser, permit cross-examination 
and allow the student to present his own witnesses. In 
more difficult cases, he may permit counsel. In any 
event, his discretion will be more informed and we think 
the risk of error substantially reduced. 
Requiring that there be at least an informal give-and-
take between student and disciplinarian, preferably prior 
to the suspension, will add little to the factfinding func-
tion where the disciplinarian has himself witnessed the 
conduct forming the basis for the charge. But things 
are not always as they seem to be, and the student will at 
least have the opportunity to characterize his conduct 
and put it in what he deems the proper context. 
We should also make it clear that we have addressed 
ourselves solely to the short suspension, not exceeding 
10 days. Longer suspensions or expulsions for the re-
mainder of the school term, or permanently, may require 
more formal procedures. Nor do we put aside the possi-
bility that in unusual situations, although involving only 
a short suspension, something more than the rudimentary 
procedures will be required. 
IV 
The District Court found each of the suspensions in-
volved here to have occurred without a hearing, either 
before or after the suspension, ancitliateacn ·suspension 
was therefore invalid and the statute unconstitutional 
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The state of Ohio, by statute, provides: 
~--(~ 
"The tuperintencent of schools of a 
~ city or exempted village, the executive 
head of a local school district, or the . 
principal of a public school may .suspend a 
school for not more than ten days.' Such 
superintendent or executive head may expel 
a .:.pupil from school. Such _superintendent, 
executive head or· principal shall within twenty-
four hours, after the time of expulsion or 
suspension, notify the parent or guardian of 
the child, and the clerk ·of the board of 
education in writing of such expulsion or 
suspension including the reasons therefor. The ~ 
pupil or the parent, or guardian, or custodian 
of a pupil so expelled may appeal such action 
to the board of education at any meeting of the \,vO~ 
board and shall be permitted to be heard against ~V 
the expulsion.- At the request of the pupil, ._ -~ 
or his parent, guardian )•custodian, or attorney, 
the board may hold the liearing in executive session ~, 
but may act upon expulsion only at a public meeting 
The board may, by a majority vote of its full 1 ~ 
membership, reinstate such pupil. No pupil shall / n~. A 
be suspended or expelled from any school beyond the __.,)(JV-<) 
current ,semester." • ( ' ~
g ppe~rees wer~ 'junioF high ,and high school students r~ · 
~ ' - ,.'· 7 I scl;lools in Co}unib,us·? Ohio. · ' Each of them had been suspended 
~ . , ~- .. /U.o c;-~ wcUJ - o-
o Jr~lia,,J. -\o for ten• days or , ~!.t:hottt hav tug Ueeu T• or -
r_ V ., ~· " ~µ4 ~ '1k J«u- ,,, . ... ~ H,, 
~ (ob post ~us16il he~ • a class aclion in 
1-,~ 1'?)• ~ 0 L,Ul~~ I ~~~--~ ~ ~~ 
.)_ ,;f'\A £ed~'a1 distr'tct court . . s ,; 
. \) (\AP_<,~~ 1lv, oi.:... $,/,;t,;J, 1 
111 uJl. simitady eituat:ed5 e~I I 8 ,eli f ~ 42 u.s.c. § 1983j \:J,Y O " • . fn\.,~ ~J 
• A ~~- ~J.¾ ,(A l~c~~ ~~ ()~ 0- ~ 
. - \~~-~ 
2. 
_:!::g~ µ alia, ~ the Ohio statute was an 
unconstitutional denial of due process insofar as it permitted 
suspensions for as long as ten 
5~ 
d . hT-~ h ~ . / _ ays wit out eit er .A prior -,u...J 
1 IC &i iiiiMi=n! 
2 
or A. hearinast&ior~ after) suspension. 
A three-judge district court was convened, 28 u.s.c. § 2281, 
to consider the constitutional challenge to the state statute. 
education in Ohio was a "liberty" 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
that~ hearint-2as required 
situation" occu~ which case a 
3 ·tutional, uncon~J. statute 6.--l'(J-, i'.). -
r d from II · ns h suspensio tote 
unless an "emergency 
~n~ut?tr ~ J:i) 
AccoJairtg!y, the court declared 
and ordered a ~l "references 
4 
records. 
Appellants sought direct rev iew of the three-judge court, s _{j 
I 4/v--tJ 
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At the outset we must decide whether "educatio0 5 
II. 
in Ohio nterest entitled to ~ 
the protection of the Fourtee~~~ocess clause.
6 
~ ~~~  ~ 
The L framework for analyzi-flg ~ i-f3tte was set out in Board of 
~ Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972): 
"To have a property interest in a benefit, t.J~ 
a person clearly must have more than an abstract 
need or desire for it. He must, indeed, have 
a legitimate claim of entitlement to it •• 
M: 
~ 
Property interests, of course, are not 
created by the Constitution. Rather, they are 
created and their dimensions are defined by existing 
rules and understandings that stem £( om an 
independent source such as state law - rules or 
understandings that secure certain benefits and 
that support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits. 
In Ohio, free education jis provided by statute 
+ s aged six to twenty-one ~are 
Ohio Revised Statutes§§ 3313.48,.64. See State v. Gans 168 
Ohio 174, __ , : 151 N.E. 2d 709, 714 (1958). Indeed, 
children younger than eighteen years of age are compelled to 






~phere can be little qu~hat under Ohio law 
~ cation is the kin~ f{ e'm}em~n~ ;;e~/~ a.-
process c lause extends / 7 See Board oJLRegents v. Rot~,~; 
~.IJ,J)r-_~ - :~-~- • ~\MAI--+ • 
l J-"--~~;.....;....y v ~ Si ndermanl 408 Ju .s. 59~ (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 
533 (1972); Kelly v. Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ; Arnett v. 
Kennedy __ _ 
~ concurring). 
~~ 
U.S. ___ , __ (1974) (Powell, Jr., 
n ~ s not a)~= 
of no constitutional moment. Its~ in 
established, not only in terms of future 
earnings but also as an integral part of personal growth and 
See, e.~., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1 (1973). Accordingly, if a student is to be denied 
this property interest, the denial must comport with constitutional 
. 8 requirements. 
5. 
III 
Having ruled that educ·a~ion in Ohio is a property 
interest within the ambit of the due process clause is not the 
ned, • but rather, the •. beginning of the inquiry. Now we must 
determine what process is . due: ·11The very nature of due process 
negates any concept of inflexible procedures applicab\e to every 
imaginable situation." & Restaurant Warkers Union, 
Local 473 1 AFL-CIO v ·. McElrof, '3.67' U.S~ 886, ' 895 (1961). 
Our inquiry begins ''with1 a 'deterniinatiori0 of :the 
precise nature of the government ·function \,invoived 0 as well as the 
privat~ interest that has been affected by governmental action. " 
15!. See Arnett v. Kennedy, supra (Powell, J., concurring). 
The states' interest, broadly put, is the proper maintenance 
and functioning of its public schools. · Thus, our constitutional 
analysis is placed against a ba.ckdrop of a steady commitment 
to allow the ·states arid the school personnel maximum flexibility 
in the administration of the public schools. As we statm in 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S • . 97, 104 (1968): 
"By and large, public education in 
our Nation is comnitted to the control of 
state and local authorities . Courts do not 
and cannot intervene in the resolution of 
conflicts. which arise in the daily operation 
of school systems and which do not directly 
and sharply _implicate basic constitutional values. 
6. 
A principal or a teacher's relationship with a student 
is simply different from a wel~are administr~tor's with 
a recipient, see Kelly v. Goldberg, supra, a motor vehicle 
department's., with .a dx-iye~.,. se~ ~.!!::, v• Burson, 402 U.S. 535 
(1971), or even an employer.'_s ~ith an employee, Arnett v. 
Kennedy, supra. Besides the fact that students and teachers or 
principals have an ongoing relationship, teachers and principals 
also occupy many roles with respect to their students. One 
of those roles ' is that of disciplinarian. And while great disputes 
are waged over DBIIII the form and manner of school discipline 
9 in ge_neral, no one doubts that without discipline there 
can be no meaningful education. 
The question, then, is ,what effect on the operation 
of the schools· will result from requiring a hearing for any~ 
suspension, no matter how brief, as appellees urge. As a 
practical matter it would seem unde~iable that aany teachers 
or principals will forego reliance on brief·. suspens•ions 
rather than risk reversal at a hearing which, in tur:n, , may 
7. 
lead to loss Qf •J"e·11p~ct_ and .. ~;e·s~ige, :,and; indeed} ,.ultimately to 
. .., r • 
loss of the abilit~ to functi~n as a principal or teacher. 
Hence, one potential cost of a mandato~y hearing requirement 
is that discipline and orderliness in our schools may be 
further eroded, with the concomitant effect of less· learning 
for all. 
The state has still another reason for urging that 
hearings not ·be required for brief suspensions. Those 
principals or teachers who would risk reversal and suspend a 
student would be required to spend significant time attending 
hearings. In a brief amicus , curiae in this case filed by the 
Children's Defense Fund and the American Funds Service Committee, 
' 
we are' advised that, based on data secured by the Office of · 
Civil Rights of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
in the 1972-73 school year, approximat_ely one out ,of every twenty 
' 
public school s·tudents were suspended at least .once. If the data , 
are limited to junior high and high school students, the ratio 
increases to one in ten .students. Thus, even assuming tllat the 
imp9sition of a hearing requ~rement wi~l reduce the number of 
suspensioµs, it is clear that much time -- time sorely needed 
for education -- will be apent on hearings. 
8. 
In sum, the 'state interests in this ca~e are co~iderable, 
more weigh~y perhaps than in _any other du~ process case 
decided by this Court. Neverthel~ss, the~e interests may, to 
some extent, be overcome when a suspension requires the 
student "to suffer grevious loss." Joint Anti-Fascist .Refugee 
Committee ·-.,. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951} (Frankfu~ter, J., 
concurring}, quoted in Morrisey v. Brewer~ 408 U.S. 471, 481 
(1972). There are two circumstances in which the effect of 
a suspension would, indeed, be gretious. First, if as 
a result of the suspension a student must repeat a. semester. 
Hence, even a two, or three day suspension at the time of 
final exams would require. a hearing unless the school provides 
the student some ·way to take his exams. Second, a hearing 
would be f111<1Uired before a notation of the suspension may be 
entered on a student's "permanent record" -- !•.!·, the. 
school record that follows him through life and goes to employers, 
colleges and the military. 
Short of the above two harms, however, the harm to a 
student from a brief suspension may fairly· "be characteri,zed 
1: 
as de minimus." Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S·. 337 
9. 
342 (Harlan, J., concurring), quoted in Fuentes v. Shevin, 
407 U.S. 67, 90, n. 21 (1972)~ The mere fact that a student 
misse~ a: few days of school is insuffic_ient to trigger a 
constitutional requirement. Indeed', although we have 
concluded that education· 'in Ohio is a "prope~ty" interest 
for purposes of the due process clause, education, unlike 
other "property" interests is not· a readily definable or 
finite matter. For purposes of constitutional .analysis it is 
sufficient that a hearing be· giwan only when the property 
interes_t is infringed to the extent of requiring that a term's 
work be redone. While some may argue persuasively that a 
ten, or even a five or a three day suspension without a _hearing 
is more than schools need to satisfy then legitimate interests, 




Turning th~n' to the Ohio-~st:atute at 1issue, we find tn.;at 
it is valid 'on• ·it·s face · and, _i"acco'rdingly, we reverse the 
three judge ' court's decision.· :, Application of that statute 
in a way that requires a student to ·· redo a semester's work, 
or that results in an entry on the student's p~rmanent 
~ 
10. 
record would be unconstitutional unless a hearing were 
provided 11 • In the present case there is no claim that 
.. 12 
any student lost a semester's ~ork because of a suspension. 
There is, however, some indication in the re~ord suggesting 
that at least some suspensions were entered on "permanent" 
. three 
records. See Appendix at 219, 244, 256·. Since the/judge 
court did not make explicit. findings on this' issue,. we 
remand with instructions to. order' expungem~nt0 in tho.s~ cases, 
if any, where the suspension h~s 1:>een plac~id., op .a -s ~u9-ent' s 
permanent record. 
JK/gg 10-31-74 
No. 73-898 GOSS v. LOPEZ 
The issue in this case is whether the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that public 
school students be given a hearing when they are 
suspended for ten days or less. 
I. 
Appellees were junior high and high school 
students who were attending various public schools in 
Coltnnbus, Ohio. Each of them had been suspended during 
a school distu~bance for ten days or less pursuant to 
Section 3313.66 of the Ohio Revised Code, which provides: 
"The superintendent of schools of a city 
or exempted village, the executive head of a 
local school district, or the principal of 
a public school may suspend a pupil from school 
for not more than ten days. Such superintendent 
or executive head may expel a pupil from school. 
Such superintendent, executive head or principal 
shall within twenty-four hours after the time 
of expulsion or suspension, notify the parent 
or guardian of the child, and the clerk of the 
board of education in writing of such expulsion 
or suspension including the reasons therefor. 
The pupil or the parent, or guardian, or custodian 
of a pupil so expelled may appeal such action to 
the board of education at any meeting of the 
board and shall be permitted to be heard against 
2. 
against the expulsion. At the request of 
the pupil, or his parent, guardian, 
custodian, or attorney, the board may hold 
the hearing in executive session but may act 
upon expulsion only at a public meeting. The 
board may, by a majority vote of its full 
membership, reinstate such pupil. No pupil 
shall be suspended or expelled from any school 
beyond the current semester." 
No student was given a hearing either before or after 
1 
suspension to dispute the charges against him. 
Dissatisfied with these procedures, the students 
instituted a class action in federal district court, 
alleging a violation of their rights under 42 U.S.C. 
2 
§ 1983 . The students agreed, inter alia, that the 
Ohio statute violated their constitutional right to 
due process insofar as it permitted suspensions for as long 
as ten days without a hearing either prior to, or 
3 
shortly after, suspension. 
Since the students challenged the constitutionality 
of a state statute, a three judge court was impanelled. 
28 U. S.C. § 2281. The court first ruled that education 
in Ohio was a "liberty" protected by the due process clause 
3. 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Next, it held that a 
hearing was required prior to any suspension, unless 
an "emergency situation" exists, in which case a 
hearing must be held within 72 hours of the suspension. 
The hearing requirement was to be flexible, but 
the school was required "to provide at a minimum": 
(a) Statements in support of the charge(s) 
against the student upon which the 
hearing is conducted. 
(b) Statements by the student and others 
in defense of the charge(s) and/or 
in mitigations or explanation of his 
conduct. 
(c) The administrator is not required to 
permit the presenc e of counsel or 
follow any prescribed judicial rules 
in conducting the hearing. 
(d) The administrator should, within 24 
hours advise the student and his 
parents by letter of his decision and 
the reasons therefor. 4 
Since the Ohio statute failed to require a hearing the 
three judge court declared the statute unconstitutional,
5 
and ordered that all "references to the suspensions" 
6 
be expunged from the students' school records. 
Appellants appealed directly to this Court, and 




At the outset we must decide whether "education" 
under Ohio law is a "property" or "liberty" interest 
entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
due process clause. 
8 
Turning first to the question 
of property interests we look to the constitutional 
framework set forth in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564, 577 (1972): 
"To have a property interest in a 
benefit, a person clearly must have more than 
an abstract need or desire for it. He must, 
indeed, have a legitimate claim of entitlement 
to it. It is the purpose of the ancient 
constitution of property to protect those claims 
upon which people rely in their daily lives, 
reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. 
Xt is the purpose of the constitutional right 
to a hearing to provide an opportunity to 
~indicate those claims. 
Property interests, of course, are not 
created by the Constitution. Rather, they are 
created and their dimensions are defined by 
existing rules and understandings that stem from 
an independent source such as state law - rules 
or understandings that secure certain benefits 
and tha t support claims of entitlement to those 
benefits." 
In Ohio, free education is provided by statute for all 
youths aged six to twenty-one. Ohio Rev. Code§§ 3313.48, 
64. Indeed, children who are younger than eighteen 
5. 
years of age are compelled to attend school. Id. 
at§§ 3321.01 et~- The Ohio Supreme Court has 
stated that the purpose of these provisions is to 
insure that a child be given an opportunity "to 
realize his potential either to himself or his 
• II community ... State v. Gans, 168 Ohio 174, 
151 N.E. 2d 709, 714-15 (1958). The State court 
also noted that "a high school education is an absolute 
prerequisite to obtaining most jobs nowadays." Id. 
State law, therefore, makes clear that in Ohio 
eucation is the kind of entitlement to which the due 
9 
process clause applies. 
See Board of Regents v. Roth, supra; Perry v. 
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 
U.S. 533 (1972); Kelly v. Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); 
Arnett v. Kennedy, __ U.S. __ , __ (1974)(Powell, J., 
concurring). That one's property interest in "education," 
6. 
in contrast to most property interests, is relatively 
intangible, is of no constitutional moment. Its 
critical importance in a democratic polity~is well 
established not only in terms of future earning but 
also as an integral part of personal growth and 
development. See, ~-.B.·, Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954); San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Accordingly, 
if a student is to be denied this property interest, 
h d . 1 . h · · 1 · lO t e enia must comport wit constitutiona requirements. 
III. 
Having ruled that education in Ohio is a property 
interest within the ambit of the due process clause is 
not the end, but only the beginning of our constitutional 
inquiry. We must next determine what process is due before 
a state may suspend students for a maximum of ten days. 
7. 
We have frequently repeated that "the very nature 
of due process negates any concept of inflex ible 
procedures applicable to every imaginable situation." 
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, 
AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). 
Our analysis must begin "with a determination of 
the precise nature of the government function involved 
as well as the private interest that has been affected 
by governmental action." Id. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 
supra (Powell, J., concurring). The state's 
interest in this case, broadly viewed, is the proper 
maintenance and functioning of its public schools . 
Thus, the due process balance must be assessed against 
the backdrop of a strong national commitment to allow 
the states and their school administrators maximum 
flexibility in the operation of our country's public 
8. 
schools. As this Court stated in Epperson v. Arkansas, 
393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968): 
"By and large, public education in our 
Nation is corrnnitted to the control of state 
and local authorities. Courts do not and can-
not intervene in the resolution of conflicts 
which arise in the daily operation of school 
systems and which do not directly and sharply 
implicate basic constitutional values . " 
This special deference grows out of the fact that a 
principal's or a teacher's relationship with a student 
is simply different from a welfare administrator's 
with a recipient, see Kelly v. Goldberg, supra, a motor 
vehicle department ' s with a driver, see Bell v. Burson, 
402 U.- S. 535 (1971), or even an employer's with an 
employee, Arnett v. Kennedy, supra. Students and 
school officials have an ongoing relationship, one in 
~ _: r (!'le~ ~ 
which the 
R-t-N 
over the form and degRe of school 
I~, 
one/ doubts that without discipline there can ~a-
meaningful education. 
I 
~LJl., .,__ j.J ~ 
dr~1t:f~-we must assess. 
a hearing, as appellees urge, for 
There can be little doubt that ~ny teachers or 
principals would forego rm.rw...z,qen brief suspensions 
rather than risk reversal at a hearing, which, in 
turn, would lead to loss of respect and authority, ~ 
and, indeed, ultimately to loss of the ability to /4}Y 
nth 
function as a principal or teacher. 
unfortunately, our public schools 
At a time when, 
are torn by strffe 
~ ~ -Q;{i'U,Ut.-C 






teachers and principals by limiting the effective 
means of disciplinary tools now available. 
Still another cost to the state of imposing 
mandatory hearings is the expense - in terms of time 
as well as money - required if school officials are 
to spend considerable time at hearings. In a brief 
amicus curiae in this case filed by the Children's 
Defense Fund and the American Funds Service Committee, 
we are advised that, based on data secured by the 
Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare, in the 1972-73 school year approxi-
mately one out of every twenty public school students 
were suspended at least once. If the data are 
limited to junior high and high school students, the 
ratio increases to one in ten students. Thus, even 
assuming that the imposition of a hearing requirement 
will reduce the number of suspensions, it is Clear 
11. 
that much time - time sorely needed for education -
will be required for hearings. 
In sum, the state's interests in this case are 
exceptionally weighty. Nevertheless, the se interests 
must, to some extent, give way in circumstances where 
a suspension requires the student "to suffer grevious 
loss." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 
341 U.S. 123, 168 (195l)(Frankfurter, J., concurring), 
quoted in Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
We think there are two such circumstances. First, 
when, as a result of the suspension, a student must 
repeat a s emester. Thus, even a two, or three, day 
suspension at the time of final exams would require a 
hearing at a meaningful time unless the school provides 
the student an alternative opportunity to take his 
exams. Second, a hearing is required before a notation 
of the suspension may be entered on a student's "permanent 
record" - i.~., the school record that follows him through 
12. 
life and goes to employers, colleges and the military. 
See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). 
Short of the two circumstances, however, the 
harm to a student from a brief suspension may fairly 
"be characterized as de minimus." Sniadach v. 
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (Harlan, J., 
concurring), quoted in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 
90, n. 21 (1972). The mere fact that a student misses 
a few days of school is by i t self, insufficient to 
trigger a constitutional requirement. Indeed, although 
we have concluded that education in Ohio is a "property" 
interest for purposes of the due process clause, education, 
unlike other "property interests is not a readily 
definable or finite substance. For purposes of 
constitutional analysis it is sufficient that a hearing 
be given only when the property interest is infringed 
13. 
to the extent of requiring that a term's work be 
redone. While some may argue, perhaps even persuasively, 
that a ten, or a five, day suspension without a 
hearing is more time than schools need to satisfy 
their legitimate interests, that question of line 
drawing is for the legislature, not this Court. 
IV. 
Finally, we return to the Ohio statute at issue 
in this case. Since the Constitution does not require 
a hearing for every suspension of ten days or less, 
the statute is facially valid. Its application, 
however, in a way that requires a student to redo a 
semester's work, or that results in an entry on the 
student's permanent record would be unconstitutional 
unless a hearing were provided. 
io In the present 
case there is no claim that any student lost a 
semester's work because of a suspension. 12 There is, 
~ C 
14. 
however, some indication in the record suggesting 
that some suspensions may have been entered on 
"permanent" records. See Appendix at 219, 244, 256. 
Since the three judge court did not make explicit 
findings on this issue, we remand with instructions 
to order expungement in those cases, if any, where 
the suspension has been placed on a student's permanent 
record. 
Reversed and Remanded. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Text of 1983 . 
2. Appellees also challenged the Administrative Guide 
and t he Police Statement on Discipline of the Columbus Public Schoo 
System in effect at the time of their suspensions . These 
"regulations" add nothing to the statutory requirements. The 
Policy Statement, however, has been amended since the time 
of appellees ' suspensions. See note _________ , infra. 
3. In declaring the statute unconstitutional, the 
court ruled only on the suspension provisions, and not on 
the expulsion proceedur es, which do require a post-expulsion 
order. 
4. The court proceeded to consider appellees' further 
cla i m that the statute and regulations were unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad. This claim was rejected on the ground 
that these doctrines apply to intrusion on First Amendment 
rights and that appellees had failed to demonstrate that the 
conduct at the time of their suspensions was entitled to First 
Amendment protection . 
5. Appellants maintain that jurisdiction lies under 
28 U. S.C. § 1253, which, in relevant part, provides for direct 
appeal to this Court "from an order granting or denying, 
after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent 
injunction in any civil suit or proceeding required by any 
act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district 
court of three judges." In this case, the three judge 
court did not enjoin enforcement of the Ohio statute, 
2 • 
but only declared the statute invalid. Hence that determination 
by itself, does not confer jurisdiction on this Court. See 
Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical Center, 397 U.S. 820 (19 __ ). 
The three judge court, however, went on to order expungement 
from the students' records. This relief, while not styled 
injunctive by_ the three judge court, is in effect a 
mandatory injunction, and therefore jurismiction lies. See 
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971). 
6. If it is not, as appellants assert, then the 
state may permanently expel, let alone suspend, a student 
without any hearing. 
3. 
7. Appellant's reliance on San Antonio Independent 
School Distr ict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) is misplaced. 
In that case we held only that education was not a fundamental 
right f or the purposes of equal protection analysis. That 
determination, however, turned on the fact that education 
is not an interest guaranteed by the constitution. But 
property interests within the ambit of protection of the 
due process clause "are not created by the Constitution." 
Board of Regents v. Roth, supra. Compare Williams v. Dandridge, 
397 U.S. 471 (1971) (welfare not a fundamental interest), 
with Kelly v. Goldberg, 397 U.S. 754 (1970) (due process 
requires a hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits. 
8. Since we have ruled that education in Ohio is a 
"property" interest subject to the Fourteenth Amendment ' s due 
process clause, we need not reach the question of whe t her 
ectucation is a "liberty" interest for purposes of that 
amendment. The three judge court in this case answered that 
question in the affirmative. 
4. 
9. See, ~·.8.·, Baile_y, Disruption In Urban Public 
Secondary Schools (1970); Dobson, Dare to Discipline (1972); 
Illi ch , Deschooling Society (1971); Alschuler & Shea, The 
Discipline Game: Playing Without Losers, Learning Magazine 
(Aug ./Sept. 1974). 
10. Appellees also argue that a student suffers psychological 
harm if suspended without a hearing because the student may feel 
wronged and has not been given an opportunity to vindicate himself. 
This harm is the same, of course, whether the suspension is 
for a day or a month. And, it would seem that the harm, 
such as it is, is in not being vindicated and not in not 
receiving a hearing. Indeed, a student who feels wronged and 
who is not vindicated at a hearing will presumably suffer still 
greater harm. In any event, we find this potential psychological 
harm to be far too speculative on which to rest a constitutional 
ruling. 
11. We do not decide at this time what procedures are 
required to satisfy due process in either of these two 
circumstances. We note, however, that, pending resolution 
of this case, the Columbus School Board has adopted new 
5. 
regulations pertaining to suspensions, and providing 
significantly more procedures than has heretofore existed. 
[See Regulations] 
12. In any ev ent, the name students in this class 
action all have graduated. 
... 
7gg 
No. 73-898 GOSS v. LOPEZ 
The issue in this _case is whether :the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that 
p~blic school students be given a hearing whenever they 
are suspended for ten days or less. 
I. 
Appellees were junior high and high school 
students at various public schools in Columbus, Ohio. 
Each of them had been suspended during a school 
disturbance for ten days or less pursuant to Section 
3313.66 of the Ohio Revised Code, which provides: 
''The superintendent of schools of a city 
or exempted village, the executive head of 
a local school district, or the principal of 
a public school may suspend a pupil from 
school for not more than ten days. Such 
superintendent or executive headt;may expel 
a pupil from school. Such superintendent, 
executive head or principal shall within 
twenty-four hours after the time of 
expulsion or suspension, notify the parent 
or guardian of the child, and the clerk of 
the board of education in w&iting of such 
expulsion or suspension including the 
reasons therefor. The pupil or the parent, 
or guardian, or custodian of a pupil so 
expelled may appeal such action to the 
board of education at any me•ting of the 
board and shall be permitted to be heard 
' 
2. 
against the expulsion. At the request 
of the pupil, or his parent, guardian, 
custodian, or attorney, the board may 
hold the hearing in executive session 
but may act upon expulsion only at a 
public meeting. The board may, by a 
majority vote of its full membership, 
reinstate such pupil. No pupil shall 
be suspended or expelled from any 
school beyond the current semester." 
No student was given a hearing either before .or after 
suspension to dispute the charges against him. 1 
Dissatisfied with these procedures, the students 
instituted a class action in federal district court, 
2 
alleging a violation of their rights under 42 U.S. C. § 1983. 
The students argued, inter .!.lli, that the Ohio statute 
violated their constitutional right to due process insofar 
as it permitted suspensions for as long as ten days 
without a hearing either prior to, or shortly after, 
3 
suspension. 
A three judge court, 28 u.s.c. § 2281, was 
impaneled to hear the students' challenge. The court 
ruled first that education in Ohio was a "liberty" 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
... 
3. 
Amendment. Next, it held that a hearing was 
required prior to any suspension, unless an "emergency 
situation" exists, in which case a hearing must be 
held within 72 hours of the suspension. The 
court further stated that the procedures at the 
hearing could be flexible, but that "at a minimum" 
the Constitution requires: 
"(a) Statements in support of the 
charge(s) against the student 
(b) 
upon which the hearing is conducted. 
Statements by the student and others 
in defense of the charge(s) and/or 
in mitigations or explanation of his 
conduct. 
(c) The administrator is not required to 
permit the presence of counsel or 
follow any prescribed judicial rules 
in conducting the hearlng. 
(d) The administrator should, within 24 
hours advise the student and his 
parents by letter of his decision 
and the reasons therefor." 4 , . 
Since the Ohio statute does not require these procedures 
for suspension of ten days or less, the three judge 




ordered that all "references ~o ·the suspensions" 
6 
be expunged from the students' records. 
Appellants appealed directly to this Court, 
and we noted probable jurisdiction to review. 7 
II. 
At the outset we must decide whether "education" 
under Ohio law is a "property" or "liberty" interest 
entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process : claus.e : 1 ~ / .T~ing. first ·· to 
the question of property interests ,, we look to the 
constitutional framework set forth in Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972): -
''To have a property interest in a 
benefit, a person clearly must have more 
than an abstract need, or desire for it. 
He must, indeed, have a ·legitimate claim 
of entitlement to it. It is the purpose 
of the ancient institution of property to 
protect those claims upon which people 
rely in their daily lives, reliance that 
must not be arbitrarily undermined •••• 
Property interests, of course, are not 
created by the Constitution. Rather, they 
5. 
are created and their. dimensions are 
defined by existing rules and under~ 
standings that stem from an independent 
source such as ,state .~aw - . ~les or 
understan~ings that s~cure .c.ertain 
benefits. ·and _that support claims of. 
entitlement to those benefits." 
In Ohio, free education is provided by statute for all 
youths aged six to twenty-one. Ohio Rev. Code 
Ii 3313.48, 64. Indeed, children who are younger 
than eighteen years of age are compelled to attend 
school. _!!!. at §§ 3321.·01 _!S, seq. The Ohio Supreme 
Court has stated that the purpose of these provisions 
is to insure that a child is given an opportunity "to 
realize his potential either to himself or his 
community ••• " State v • .2!!!!,, 168 Ohio 174, ,;..___, 
151 N.E. 2d 709, 714-15 (1958). The State high court 
also noted that "a ,high school education is an absolute 
prerequisite to obtaining most jobs n~adays." Id. -
State law, therefore, makes clear that in Ohio 
education is the. kind of entitlement to which the due 
process clause applies. 
9 
see Board of Reaents v. t.qth, 
6. 
supra; Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); 
!!!!:, v. Burson, 402 U.S. 533 (1972); Kelly v. Goldberg 1 
397 u.s. 254 (1970); Arnett v. Kennedy, _u.s. __ , 
__ (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) _. Nor is it of any 
constitutional moment that education, in contrast to 
most property rights, is a relatively intangible 
interest. The critical i.11'>portance of education in this 
country ls well established not only in terms of 
future earning but also as an integral part of personal 
growth and development. See,!.•.&, Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); San.,Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
Accordingly, if a. student is to be denied this property 
interest, the denial .must comport· with constitutional 
10 requirements. 
III. 
Having ruled that education in Ohio is a 
property interest within the ambit of the due process 
7. 
clause is not the end, but only the beginning of 
our constitutional inquiry. ''The very nature of 
due process ' negates any concept of inflexible 
procedures applicable to every imaginable 'situation," 
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local .473, 
AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). Hence, 
we must determine what, if any, process is due before 
a state may suspen~ etudent,s for a maximum. of ten 
days. 
As usual, our analysis begins ''with a 
determination of the precise nature of the government 
function involved is well •as , the. private interest -.that 
(,1 
has been affected by go_ye~ental actic;m.". Cafeteria 
& Restaurant Workers Union l"Y.•· McElroy, , supra, st 395 • . 1 
See Arnett ·v. Kennedy, supra (Powell, J., concurring). 
The state's interest in this case , is the proper 
maintenance and functioning of its public schools. 
8. 
We note initially, therefore, that the due process 
balance must be assessed against the backdrop of 
a s~rong national commitment to permit the states 
and their school administrators maximum flexibility 
in the operation of our country's public schools. 
As this Court stated in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 
u.s. 97, 104 (1968): 
"By and large, public education in 
our Nation is committed to the control 
of state and local authorities. Courts 
do not and cannot intervene in the , 
resolution of conflicts which arise in 
the daily operation of school systems 
and which do not directly and sharply 
implicate basic constitutional values." 
This special deference results from the fact ,that a 
principal's or a teacher's relationship with a student 
is simply different from a welfare administrator's 
with a recipient, see Kelly v. Goldberg. supra, a 
motor vehicle departme~t•s with a driver, see!!!! v. 
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), or even an employer's with 
an employee, Arnett v. Kennedy, supra. Students 
and school officials have an ongoing relationship, 
one in which the teacher or principal must occupy 
9. 
many different roles ,- educator, advisor, friend, and 
even parent-substitute. The· teacher or principal 
is not, nor can he be, solely a bureaucrat who 
is r~sponsible for doling out same form of state 
largesse. 
To perform effectively in these diverse 
roles, the teacher or principal must maintain cont'rol 
over his classroom and be able to discipline his 
students. He relies to some degree on a set of 
punishments ranging frooi ~equiring , a;- s·tuo.ent ,.to, •~ay 
I~ -•• T'-"', ;;.,•~-- ·• •• 1,. ~ r 1, &..,.r· •.,~ 
,\; !,- J ' I ._ • •··" 
after school to permanen~ expulsion. The 1 ~ri~f 
suspension, during lfhfch;:tµn~ , t~p~~S. may, -cool, , $ilQ 
1
, ! ' .-, ,I>, r 
~ I.··/ i l .,.. ,..,_ ! -._, 
• ~ •..{; •"' •"• •; T 
orderr:-.y be _restored, is an effective arrow in 
the discipl:i.narian's quiver • . lf, as · appellees urge, 
a hearing is required for every suspension, irrespective 
of duration, this arrow will be blunted if not broken. 
10. 
Many teachers and principal's"wo'1ld· forego reliance on 
brief, suspensions ',~ather thjln risk _j:-ev:ersa~-a~t ::a :he·~ring, 
;,". ., • .;;;•~:::. 'f ,,: Ii_ ,~: I J• f' ,I 
which, in turn, would lead to loss of respect and ., 
authority, and, ~ndeed, ultimately to loss of the 
ability to function as a ·principal or teacher. 
Still another cost to the state of 
imposing mandatory hearings is the expense - ,in terms 
of time as · well as money'!'" of requiring school 
' officials to spend considerable time at hearings. 
In an amicus curiae brief fileai in this case by the 
Children's .Defense Fund and the American Funds 
Service Cwllilittee, we are .advised that, in the 
1972-73 . school year, approximately one out ·~f every 
twenty public school students were suspended at 
lea,t once. 11 If the data are limited to junior 
high and high school students, _the ratio increases 
12. 
the school record that follows him through life 
and goes to employers, colleges and the military. 
See Wisconsin v. Constantinean, 400 U.S. 433 
(1971). Both of the _cons~quences are of sufficient 
magnitude that, before either may attach, a hearing 
is required, irrespective of the duration of the 
suspension. 
Short of these two circumstances, however, 
the harm to a student from a brief suspension may 
"be characterized as de minimus." Sniadach v. -
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. · 337, 342 (Harlan, J., 
concurring), quoted in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 
67, 90, n. 21 (1972). The-mere fact that .. a , student 
misses _ a few days of school' is ... ,insufficient ·.to 
12 trigger a constitutio~l ;-e_q~irem~~t _ , . of a manda.tory 
hearing. It may be argued that to allow a ten or 
a five day suspension without a hearing is to give 
10. 
Many teachers and principals would forego reliance on 
brief suspensions rather than risk reversal at· a hearing, . ,· 
I 
which, in turn, would lead to loss of respect and 
authority, and, indeed, ultimately to loss of the ability 
' 
to function as a principal ,or teacher. At a . time ·when 
our schools are torn by disruption' and strife, this 
,. 
cost ,would be an extremely heavy one to .bear. 
Still another cost co the state of imposing 
mandatory hearings is the expense - in terms of time as 
well as money - of requiring school officials to spend 
considerable time at hearings. In an amicus ouriae brief 
filed in this case by the Children's Defense Fund and the 
American Funds Service Camnit~ee, we a~e advised that, in 
the 1972-73 school year, approx1mat·e1y one. out of every 
twenty public school students were suspended at 
11 
least once. If the data are. limited to junior 
high and high school students; the ratio ·increases 
11. 
to one in ten students; Thus, even assuming that_~ the 
imposition of a hearing requirement will reduce the 
number of ·suspension, it is .clear that a significant 
amount of ' time - time sorely needed for education -
will be required for hearings. 
In sum, the state's interests in this case 
are ex~eptionally weighty. Nevertheless,. these interests 
must, :· to some degree, yield in circumstaaces where 
a suspension requires -the student "to suffer grevious 
loss." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Commitcee v. McGrath~ 
341 U.S. 123, 168 (195l)(Frankfurter, J., concurring), 
quoted in Morrisey v. Brewer, 408-U.S. 471-, 48_1 (1972) •. 
There are' two such circumstances: first, when, · as 
a result of the suspension, a student must repeat a 
semester or school year; and second, ,when the suspension 
is entered on a student's "permanent record" - i.e., 
,. --
13. 
school authorities more time than is absolutely 
necessary to accomplish their legitimate disciplinary 
interests. That question of line ·drawing, however, 
is -for the legislature, not this Court. 
IV. 
The. balance we strike should satisfy 
much that concerns both sides to this dispute. 
Schools are allowed sufficient flexibility in their 
disciplinary approach, while students are assured 
13 
a hearing when the consequences of a suspension are 
at all serious. Application of these principles to 
the Ohio suspension statute requires reversal of the 
three judge court·•s decision declaring the statute 
unconstitutional. Since a hearing is not required 
for every suspension that is ten days ·or less; the 
statute is facially valid. If, however, it is applied 
in a way that requires -a· student to redo a semester's 
14. 
work, or that results in an entry on the student's 
permanent record, the application would be unconstitutional 
unless ·a hearing were provided. In the present case 
the2e is no claim that any student lost a semester's 
work -because of a ,uspe~sion. Ther~ is however, 
' I ~' ~ 
,f ~ ~ ":';. . p 
some suggestion in tne· record that same of t,h~se 
~ ).; • M, II- t \ " • 
.,- !. · .J : 
suspensions may have .been entered on students' 
.. 
"permanent"records. See Appendix -iit 219, 244, '256 • 
. ' 
Since the three judge court did not make explicit 
findings on this issue, we remand with instructions 
to order· expungement in those cases, if any, where 
. 
the suspension .has been placed on a student's permanent 
record. 
Reversed in part and Remanded 
FOOTNOTES 
1. The schools did provide conferences for 
some students and their parents, aimed at discussing 
future goals and placement, but not at reviewing the 
basis for the suspensions. See Appendix at 114. 
2. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 provides: 
"Every person who, under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States or 
other person within •the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation ,of any rights, , 
privile'ges; or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity~ or other proper proceeding 
for redress." 
3. Appellees also challenged the ' Administrative 
.;l.l.'l\.\ i~ 1.H:: l (:, 
Guide and the Police Statement on Discipline of the 
Columbus Public School System in effect at the time of 
their suspensions. For our purposes, these "regulations" 
add nothing to the statutory requirements. Most 
particularly, they do n~t require hearings for brief 
suspensions. The Policy Statement, however, has been 
amended in significant respects since the time of 
appellees' suspensions. See note ___ , infra. 
2 . 
4. The Court did not indicate which person 
or authority was to conduct these hearings. In 
Ohio this person presumably would have to be someone 
outside of the school since the principal is the only 
person within the school who may suspend students. 
5. In declaring the statute tmconstitutional, 
the court ruled only on the suspension provisions, and 
not on the expulsion procedures, which do· require a 
post-expulsion hearing . 
6 . The, oourt went on to consider appellees' 
additional claim to the effect that the statute and 
regulations_ were , 1:lll~Onatituti,onally vague and overbroad . 
This claim was rejected o~ the ground that vagueness 
,t ;-;,, -·'r ' 
, , only 
and overbreadth apply/to intrusions on First Amendment 
rights, and that appellees. had failed to demonstrate 
that their conduct was entitled to First Ameddment 
protection. 
3. 
7. Appellants maintain that jurisdiction 
lies under 28 u.s.c. § 1253, which, in relevant .part, 
provides for direct appeal to this Court "from an 
order granting or denying, after notice and ' hearing, an 
interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil 
. ' I ~ ~ 
I I 
. ' 1.. '( -
suit or proceeding required by any act of Congress 
I l ";::- ,., -,•. i' <I • \ 
, • J ! - I, j[ ., 
to be heard and determined by a -
1
-dist~:t~-t · 
three judges."· In this case, the three judge court 
ordered the suspension ,no~ation expunged from the 
students' records. This relief, while not styled 
injunctive by the three Judge court, is in effect a 
mandatory injunction, and therefore we have jur~sdiction 
to review. See Perez ·v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 84 n. 1, 
(1971). 
8. If, as appellants assert, it is not, 
then the state may permanently expel, let alone suspend, 
a student without any hearing. 
4. 
9. Appellant's reliance on San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973) is misplaced. In that case we held only that 
education was not .a fundamental right for the purposes 
of equal protection analysis. That determination, 
however, turned on the fact. that education is not an 
interest guaranteed by the constitution. But property 
interests within the protection of the due process 
clause "are not created by the Constitution." Board of 
Regents v. Roth, supra. Compare Williams v. Dandridge, 
397 U.S. 471 (1971) (welfare not a fundamental -interest), 
with Kelly v. ~oldberg, ~97 U.S. 754 (1970) (due process 
requires a hearing prior to termination of welfare 
benefits)J 
10. Since we have ruled that education in 
Ohio is a "property" interest :·- subject · to "the Fourteenth 
I 
Amendment's due process clause, we need not reach the 
question, answered in the affirmative by the three judge 
court, of whether education is 'also a "liberty" interest 
entitled to due .process protections. 
~ 
5. 
11:J The date on which these conclusions 
were based were robtained from a survey by the Office 
for Civil Rights of the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare. The Children's Defense Fund reviewed 
the suspension data for five states - Arkansas, Maryland, 
New Jersey, Ohio and South Carolina. 
12. Appellees also maintain that a student 
suffers psychological harm if suspended without a hearing 
because the student feels that he has been wronged 
without having been given an ,opportunity to vindicate 
himself. ,This harm, such as .it is, is in not being 
vindicated, and not in not receiving •a hearing. Indeed, 
a student who feels wronged and who does n~t prevail 
at a hearing will presumably suffer still greater harm. 
In any event, we find this potential psychological 
harm to be far too speculative on which to rest a 
constitutional ruling. 
13. We do not decide at this time wat procedures 
are required to satisfy due process when a hearing is 
. -
6. 
required_~ w, npta,' however / that, pending resolution 
of this case,_~ the Col~bus School Board has adopted 
',- new · susp~si?n· ·xegulations whi.ch provide .significantly 
more rigorous procedures than those that have 
heretofore existed. 
The naw regulations provide: 
1. Whenever an incident occurs which 
may lead to a suspension, the principal 
or assistant principal shall investigate 
the nature of the alleged offense before 
commencing susp~nsion procedures ·. Unless 
the pupil' is unavailable or unwilling to 
discuss the incident with the principal, 
this investigation shall include a ·: 
discussion with the pupil so that the 
pupil may be given an opportunity to be, 
heard with respect to the alleged .offense. 
•, . 
2. If the principal determines ·tha~ 
grounds for susp·ension. do exist, he shall 
notify the pupil .of the •~ct reason arid 
length of the suspension and further 
inform the pupil ·that the suspension means 
he must stay off school property and away 
from school-sponsored activities during the 
entire term of -the suap~nsion. 
3. · Notify the parent or guardian ·of the 
suspension, by phone if possible~ and 
explain the reason and length of suspension. 
Except in cases of disruption where 
circumstances make it vital that one or 
several pupils be removed from the school 
property immediately because of a threat · 
to the safety of other pupils, faculty 
or school property, no pupil shall be 
released from school during the school day 
without notifying the parent or guardian 






4. The parent or guardian shall be 
provided an opportunity to attend a 
conference with the principal, to 
review the reasons for the suspension. 
5. Within 24 hours after the incident 
leading to suspension, a letter shall 
be written to the parents or guardian 
which shall include the reasons for 
and term of the suspension and . that 
7. 
a conference with the principal will be 
arranged, at mutual convenience, at 
the earliest possible time. A carbon 
copy of this letter, together with 
relevant information regarding the 
~uspension, sha,1 b~ sent to Pupil 
Persc;mnel (designated agent of Clerk 
of Board of Education). 
6,. In the eyent t~t any suspension 
is subsequently found to be erroneous, 
all references to the suspension shall 
be expunged from the school records. 
7. At the conclusion of a suspension, 
it is the responsibility of the principal 
to see that the pupil is informed that 
the suspension is terminated and he is 
eliiible to return to school. 
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Appel-lOn Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
the Southern District of 
et al. Ohio. 
[January -, 1975] 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today invalidates an Ohio statute that per-
mits student suspensions from school without a hearing 
"for not more than ten days." 1 The decision unneces-
', sarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in the 
operation of our public schools that may affect adversely 
the quality of education. The Court holds for the first 
time that the federal courts, rather than educational 
officials and state legislatures, have the authority to 
determine the rules applicable to routine classroom disci-
pline of children and teenagers in the public schools. It 
justifies this unprecedented intrusion into the process of 
elementary and secondary education by identifying a 
new constitutional right: the right of a student not to 
be suspended for as much as a single day without notice 
and a due process hearing either before or promptly fol-
lowing the suspension.2 
1 The Ohio Statute, § 3313.66 of the Ohio Rev. Code, actual!~· is a 
limitation on the time-honored practice of school authorities de-
termining themselves the appropriate duration of susperu;ions. The 
statute allows the superintendent or principal of a public school to 
suspend a pupil "for not more than ten days .. . " (italics supplied); 
and requires notificat ion of the parent or guardian in writing within 
24 hours of any suspension. 
2 Section 3313.66 also provides authority for the expulsion of pupils, 
but requires a hearing thereon by the school board upon request of 
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The Court's decision rests on the premise that, under 
Ohio law. education is a property interest protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and 
therefore that any suspension requires notice and a hear-
ing.3 In my view, a student's interest in education is 
not infringed by a suspension within the limited period 
prescribed by Ohio law. Moreover, to the extent there 
may be some arguable infringement, it is too speculative, 
transitory and insubstantial to justify imposition of a 
con stitiawna-lrul.e.7 
The Court's conclusion as to exactly what "process is 
due" a suspended pupil is not the cause of my concern. 
Indeed , as shown in subsection D of Part III, infra, the 
Court's requirements are not likely to be as protective 
against unjust suspensions as those in the Ohio statute 
which has been invalidated. What does deeply concern 
me. and prompts this full dissent. is the effect of today's 
decision as a precedent. The Court has now thrust the 
judiciary into the classroom in a way that never before 
has been sanctioned. and which is likely to have conse-
quences detrimental to the role of the courts in our 
society as well as to public education. ForJ,be"e rea~ous ~ 
J; ·n J ic~ 
0Ji ' µ I 
,I . 
1 
vJ Although ,ve held in San Antonio Independent School 
r,/\ t{)Jif/ \ Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973), that education 
"f 'f ~ (/ ) is not a right protected by the Constitution, Ohio has 
/1 f in this case, which concerns onl,\· the limited discretion of school 
1 
authorities to suspend for not more than 10 da_\·s. Expulsion , usually 
! ( 1 ·-tv rrsulting at lrast in loss of a school .\·ear or semester, is an incom-
~ 
1 
~ 0 para bl,\· more serious matter than the brief suspension, traditionally 
i}JJV\J used as the principal sanction for enforcing routine discipline. The 
H 
Ohio statute recognizes the distinction between expulsion and limited 
j suspension. 
(
. ~ 3 The Court's opinion speaks of "exclusion from the educational 
process for more than a. tri,·ial period . .. ," but its opinion makes 
, ~ dm th,t even one doy's susp,osion invokes pcocednrnl doe pcocess. 
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elected by statute to provide free education for all youths 
age six to 21, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3313.48, 3313.64, with 
children under 18 years of age being compelled to attend 
--'T-....::s~chool. Id. , at § 3321.01 et seq. State law, therefore, 
--- ~s the right of free public school education to Ohio r± students in accordance with the education laws of that State. The right or entitlement to education so created 
is protected in a proper case by the Due Process Clause. 
See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); 
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134. 164 (1974) (POWELL, 
J., concurring). But neither the Constitution nor com-
mon sense supports a judicially protected right to attend 
school each and every day of the academic year. 
In identifying property interests subject to due process 
protections. the Court's past opinions make clear that 
these interests "are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules and understandings that stem 
from an independent source such as state law." Board 
of R egents v. Roth, supra, 408 U. S. , at 577 (emphasis 
supplied). The Ohio statute that creates the right to a 
"free" education also explicitly authorizes a principal to 
suspend a student for up to 10 days. Ohio Rev. Stat. 
~~ 3313.48. 3313.64. 3313.66. Thus the very legislation 
which "defines" the "dimension" of the student's entitle-
ment. while providing a right to education generally, does 
not establish this right free of normal disciplinary con-
trols. Ohio simply did not confer an unqualified right 
to education, as the Court's opinion assumes. Rather, 
the right is encompassed in the entire package of statu-
tory provisions governing education in Ohio-of which 
the power to suspend is one. An essential element of 
the right to education claimed by appellees is discipline, 
including the prescribed suspensions. As the Court itself 
concedes: "Suspension is seen not only as a necessary 
tool to maintain order but as an educational device."· 
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education created by the Ohio legislature and relied upon 
by appellees does not include a right to be in school every 
day and does include the prescribed right of school 
authorities to suspend. Thus, the Court rests a major 
constitutional holding upon a nonexistent entitlement.4 
II 
Even if it be assumed that the Ohio law conferring the 
asserted right to education did not also make it subject 
to the suspensions authorized in the same law, I would 
conclude that a deprivation of not more than 10 days' 
suspension of a public school student, imposed as a 
routine disciplinary measure, does not assume constitu-
tional dimensions. Contrary to the Court's assertion, 
our cases support rather than "refute" appellant's argu-
ment that "the Due Process Clause ... comes into play 
only when the State subjects a student to a 'severe detri-
ment or a grievous loss.'" Ante, at 10. Recently, the 
Court reiterated precisely this standard for anlayzing due 
process claims: 
"Whether a,llY. procedural protections are due 
depends on the extent to which an individual will 
be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 
123, 168 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), quoted 
J 
in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263 ( 1970) ." 
,A 4 This case is readily distinguishable from Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, 
If.here Congress provided that federal employees should not be dir? 
charged without "cause." Once Congress unconditionally chose that 
standard, the Constitution defines the procedures by which cause 
is established. See id., at 164 (POWELL, J., concurring). Here, by 
contrast, the Ohio Legislature has not provided students with a right 
to attend each day's classes except for cause. Nor could it be argued 
in Arnett that dismissal was a. part of the right to employment, 
whereas here the Court correctly recognizes that suspension is a 
part of the statutorily created right to education in Ohio. 
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Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972} 
( emphasis supplied). 
In Morrissey we applied that standard to require due· 
process procedures for parole revocation on the ground 
that revocation "inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee 
and on others." Id. , at 482. See also Board of Regents· 
v. Roth, .supra, 408 U. S., at 573 ("serious damage" to-
reputation and standing); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 
539 ( "important interests of the licensees"); Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,379 (1971) ("significant prop-
erty interest").5 
The Ohio suspension statute tolerates no absolute or-
total denial of education. It authorizes only a maximum 
suspension of eight school days, less than 5% of the 
normal 180-day school year. Absences of such limited 
d rare y a pupil's opportunity to learn 
or his scholastic perfor ance. Indeed, the record in this 
case reflects no educational injury to appellees. Each of 
them completed the semester in which the suspension 
occurred, and performed at least as well as he or she 
had in previous years. 6 Despite the Court's unsupported 
5 Indeed, the Court itself quotes from a portion of Justice Frank--
furter's concurrence in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. 
McGrath , supra, which explicitly refers to "a person in jeopardy of 
serious loss." 341 U.S., at 172, see ante, at-+.::- (emphasis supphed). 
Nor is the "de minimus" standard referred to by the Court rele-
vant in this case. That standard was first r~ cS;el. t,o by Justice ._ 
Harlan in a concurring opinion in Sniadach v. Fami y Finance Corp., 
395 U. S. 337, 342 (1969), and then quoted in a footnote to the· 
Court's opinion in Fuentes Y. Shevin, 407 U. S. 69, 90, n. 22 (1972). 
Both Sniadach and Fuentes, however, involved resolution of property 
disputes between two private parties claiming an interest in the same 
property. Neither case pertained to an interest conferred by the-
State. 
6 Appendix, at 163-171 (testimony of Norya]] Goss, Director of 
Pupil Personnel). See opinion of the three-judge court, Jurisdic--
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speculation that a suspended student could be "seriously 
damaged" (ante, at 9), there is no factual showing in 
this case of any such damage to appellees. 
The Court also relies on a perceived deprivation of 
"liberty" resulting from any suspension, arguing-again 
without factual support in the record-that a suspension 
harms a student's reputation. In view of the Court's 
decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, I ,rnuld have 
thought that this argument was plainly untenable. 
Underscoring the need for "serious damage" to reputa-
tion. the Roth Court held that a nontenured teacher who 
is not rehired by a public university could not claim to 
suffer sufficient reputationa1 injury to require constitu-
tional protections.7 Surely a brief suspension is of less 
serious consequence to a teenage student's reputation. 
The Due Process Clause is susceptible to boundless 
expansion if applied to every right or interest in property 
or liberty, created by contract or conferred by a State 
or the Federal Government. In my view there should 
be the most discriminating application of the Clause's 
vast power to formalize relationships in society, to 
foment litigation. to build bureaucracies. to inhibit ex-
perimentation. and indeed to substitute the judgment 
of as fevv as five Justices not responsible to the people for 
the democratic processes of our system of Government. 
Prior decisions of the Court, recognizing the foregoing, 
have required procedural d~ ~eess.. only when the 
asserted infringement is "grievous." or "significant" in 
some substantial sense. Today. the Court in denying 
the Ohio legislature the right to authorize a single day's 
suspension without affording the pupil due process. has 
constitutionalized the trivial. 
7 See al,:o Wisconsin v. Constineau. 400 U. S. 4:33, quoting the 
"grievous las,-" st~ndard first ~rticulntrd in Joint Anti-Fascist Com-
mittee v. iJ1 cGrath. supra. 
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III 
7 
...JI' I'"..,. :E.· this Court has explicitly recognized 
school a · ies must have broad discretionary 
authority in the ai y operation of public schools. This 
includes wide latitude with respect to maintaining disci-
pline and good order. In Epperson Y. Arkansas, 393 
U. S. 97, 104 (1968), the Court _said: 
"By and large, public education in our Nation is 
committed to the control of state and local authori-
ties. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the 
resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily opera-
tion of school systems and which do not directly and 
sharply implicate basic constitutional values." 
In Tinker v. D es Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, 
507 (1969). the Court addressed specifically the authority 
of school officials to control conduct : 
"The Court has repeatedly emphasized the need 
for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
states and of school officials, consistent with funda-
mental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools." 
In dissent on the First Amendment issue, Mr. Justice 
Harlan recognized there was no disagreement on this 
basic principle: 
"I am reluctant to believe that there is any dis-
agreement between the majority and myself on the 
proposition that school officials should be accorded 
the widest authority in maintaining discipline and 
good order in their institutions." 393 U. S. 526. .., 
The Court today turns its back on these precedents. ~; 
It could hardly be claimed witb.~-tr~e"that a 
school principal's decision to suspend a pupil for a single 
day \vould "directly and sharpl:v implicate basic consti-
tutional values." Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 104. 
i 
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Moreover, the Court ignores the experience of man-
kind, as well as the long history of our law, to the effect 
that there are differences which must be recognized in 
determining the rights and duties of adults and children. 
Examples of t~ifferenc9bound in our law: in con-
tracts, in torts, in criminal law and procedures, in crimi-
nal sanctions and rehabilitation, and in the right to vote 
and to hold office. Until today, and except in the special 
context of the First Amendment issue in Tinker, the 
rights of children and teenagers with respect to their 
education in the elementary and secondary schools have 
not been analogized to adult rights or to those accorded 
college students. Even with respect to the First Amend-
ment, the rights of children have not been regarded as 
"coextensive with those of adults." MR. JusTICE STEW-
ART, concurring in Tinker v. Des M oine.s School District, 
393 U. S., at 515 (1968). 
A 
I turn now to some of the considerations which sup-
port the former view of the Court as to the comprehen-
sive authority of the States and school officials "to pre-
scribe and control conduct in the schools." Tinker, 
supra, at 507. Unlike the divergence and even sharp 
conflict of interests usually present where due process 
rights ~~ts here implicated of the 
M through its schools and( the pupils-are es n ially 
congruent. 
The State's interest, broadly put, is the proper func-
tioning of its public school system for the benefit of all 
pupils and the public generally. Few rulings would 
interfere more extensively in the daily functioning of 
schools than the subjecting of routine discipline to the 
formalities and judicial oversight of due process. Sus-
pensions are one of the traditional means-ranging from 
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used to maintain discipline i ~tis com 
knowledge that ~~~ );j_•ng ord.er and reasonable 
corum in school b clings and classrooms is a major 
educational problem, and one which has increased sig-
nificantly in magnitude as the trend toward insubordina-
tion, disorder and disruption has accelerated in recent 
years.8 Often the teacher, in protceting the rights of 
other children to an education ( if not his or their safety), 
is compelled to rely on the power to suspend. 
he facts set forth in the margin 9 leave little room for 
doubt as to the magnitude of the disciplinary problem in 
the public schools, or as to the extent of reliance upon 
e right to suspend. They also demonstrate that if 
earings were required for a substantial percentage of 
short-term suspensions, the school authorities would have 
time to do little else. 
rally S. Baile~·, Disruption in Urban Secondary Schools(..\O\ 11)) 
which summarizes some of the recent surveys on school disruption. 
For ex. ample, a Syracuse University study found that 85% of the 
schools responding reported some t~·pe of disruption in the years 
1967-1970. 
9 An amicus brief filed by the Children's Defense Fund states that 
at least 10% of the junior and senior high school students in the 
States sampled were suspended one or more times in the 1972-1973 
school ~·ea r. The data on which this conclusion rests were obtained 
from an extensive survey prepared by the Office for Civil Rights of 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The Children's 
Defense Fund reviewed the suspension data for five States-Arkansas, 
Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and South Carolina. 
Likewise, an amicus brief submitted by several school associations 
in Ohio indicates that the number of suspensions is significant: in 
1972-1973, 4,054 students out of a school enrollment of 81,007 were· 
suspended in Cincinnati; 7,352 of 57,000 students were suspended in 
' 
• 0 ,·" suspended in Clevela 
ee also the Office of Civil Rights Survey, supra, finding that ap-
proximately 20,000 students in New York City, 12,000 in Cleveland, 
9,000 in Miami, and 9,000 in Memphis were suspended at least once· 
during the 1972-1973 school years. These figures are probably some--
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B 
The generalized interest of the State in maintaining 
an orderly school system is not incompatible with the 
individual interest of the student. Indeed. the State has 
a duty to provide schooling which includes the inculcat-
ing of an understanding in each pupil of the necessity of 
rules and obedience thereto. This understanding by the 
individual is no less important in a civilized society than 
learning to read and write. One who does not compre-
hend the meaning and necessity of discipline is handi-
capped not merely in his education but throughout his 
subsequent life. In an age ,Yhen the home and church 
bave a diminishing role in shaping the character and value 
judgments of the young. a heavier responsibility in this 
respect falls upon the schools. When an immature stu-
dent merits censure for his conduct, he is rendered a 
disservice if appropriate sanctions are not applied or if 
procedures for their application are so formalized as to 
invite such a student to challenge the teacher 10-an invi-
tation " 'hich rebellious or even merely spirited teenagers 
are likely to accept.. 
The lesson of discipline is not merely a matter of the 
student's self-interest in the shaping of his own character 
and personality; it includes an early understanding of 
the relevance to the social compact of respect for the 
rights of others. The classroom is the laboratory in 
which this lesson of life is best learned. Mr. Justice 
Black summed it up: 
"School discipline. like parental discipline, is an 
integral and important part of training our children 
to be good citizens-to be better citizens." Tinker 
v. Des Moines School D·istrict, supra, at 524 (Black, 
J., dissenting). 
10 See generally J. Dobson, Dare to Discipline (1972). 
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In assessing in constitutional terms the need to pro-
tect pupils from unfair minor discipline by school authori-
ties, the Court ignores the commonality of interest of the 
State and pupils in the public school system. Rather, 
it thinks in traditional judicial terms of an adversary 
situation. To be sure, there will be the occasional pupil 
innocent of any rule infringement who is mistakenly sus-
pended or whose infraction is too minor to justify suspen-
sion. There is no evidence that indicates a frequency of 
unjust suspensions, and common sense suggests that they 
will not be numerous in relation to the total number and 
that mistakes or injustice will usually be righted by 
informal means. 
C 
One of the more disturbing aspects of today's decision 
is its indiscriminate reliance upon the judiciary, and the ~ 
adversarv process. as the means of conflict resolution ~ ~ 
~ f the most routine problems arising in the class-
/ room. I In mandating due process proceduresj the Court 
a.lBo---misapprehends the reality of the norm'a! teacher-
pupil relationship.11 There is an ongoing relationship, 
one in which the teacher must occupy many roles-edu-
cator, adviser. friend and, at times, parent-substitute. 
It is rarely adversary in nature except with respect to the 
chronically disruptive or insubordinate pupil whom the 
teacher must be free to discipline without frustrating 
forma.lities. 12 
11 Thr role of thr teacher in our soriet>· historical!>· has been 11n 
honorPd 11nd respPrtrd one, rooted in the experience of decade;, that 
h:-is left for most of us warm memories of our teachers. especial]>· 
those of the formatiYP >·ears of prirnar>' 11nd secondary education. 
12 In this reirard , the rel11tionship between a student 1111d teacher 
is manifesth· different from tlrnt between a "·p]fare 11dministrntor 
11nd a recipient (see Goldberg v. K elly, supra), 11 motor vehicle de-
partment and II driYer( see B ell v. Burson. supra) , a debtor 1111d a 
creditor (see Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 377 (1968) ; 
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The Ohio statute, providing as it does for due notice 
both to parents and the Board, is compatible with the 
teacher-pupil relationship and informal resolution of mis-
taken disciplinary action. We have relied for genera-
tions upon the experience, good faith and dedication of 
those who staff our public schools, 13 and the nonadversary 
means of airing grievances that always have been avail-
able to pupils and their parents. One would have 
thought before today's opinion that this informal, non-
adversary method of resolving differences was more com-
patible with the interests of all concerned than resort to 
any constitutionalized procedure, however blandly it may 
be defined by the Court. 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. Grant, - U. S. 
- (1974)), a parole officer and a parolee (see Morrissey v. Brewer, 
supra), or even an employer and employee (see Arnett v. Kennedy, 
supra; Board of Regents of State College v. Roth, supra; Perry v. 
Sinderman, 408 U. S. 593 (1972)). In almost all of these non-
education settings there is-for purposes of this analysis- a "face-
less" administrator dealing with an equally "faceless" recipient of 
some form of government assistance; in a few, such as the garnish-
ment and repossession cases, there is a conflict of interest relation-
ship. Our public school system, however, is premised on the belief 
that teachers and pupils should not be "faceless" to each other. 
Nor does the educational relationship present a traditional "conflict of 
interest." Rather, the relationship typically is marked by a coinci-
e 0f interests. 
--...c::::_ -
i the Court, relying on cases such as Sniadach and Fuentes, ap-
parently views the classroom of teenagers as c:§mparable, to the 
competitive and adversary environment of the adult, commercial 
world. 
13 A traditional factor in any due process analysis is "the pro-
tection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is 
~ 
challenged .... " Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath,~ 
'163 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) . In the public school 
setting there is a high degree of such protection since a teacher has 
responsibility for, and a commitment to, his pupils that is absent in 
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D 
13 
In my view~ the constitutionalizing of routine class-
room decisions not only is unwise and represents a sig-
nificant new extension of the Due Process Clause; it also· 
was quite unnecessary in view of the safeguards pre-
scribed by the Ohio statute. This is demonstrable from 
a comparison of what the Court mandates as required by 
due process with the protective procedures held invalid. 
The Ohio suspension statute, limiting suspensions to-
not more than eight school days, requires written notice· 
to the student's parents and to the Board of Education 
within 24 hours of any suspension. The Court only 
requires oral or written notice to the pupil, with no notice 
being required to the parents or to the Board of Educa-
tion. With respect to what it calls a "hearing," the 
Court holds only that the principal must listen to the 
student's "version of the facts," either before suspension 
or thereafter-depending upon the circumstances. Such 
a truncated "hearing" is likely to be considerably less 
meaningful than the opportunities for correcting mis-
takes already available to students and parents. Indeed, 
in this case all of the students and their parents were· 
offered an opportunity to attend a conference with school 
officials. 
The Court also disregards the effect of the provision 
in the Ohio statute that the Board of Education-as well 
as the student's parents-be notified in writing of each 
suspension within 24 hours. The mere fact of this 
requirement is a deterrent against arbitrary action by the 
principal. The Board, usually elected by the people and 
sensitive to constituent relations, may be expected to 
-------::=+~-i:id~e::'.n::t~if:::y~a 1 whose record of suspensions merits 
nquiry. In an event, parents put on a written notice-
a provision absent from the Court's formulation-may 
exercise their rights as constitutents by going directly 
14 
73-898-DISSENT 
GOSS v. LOPEZ 
to the Board or a member thereof if dissatisfied with the 
principal's decision. In its rush to mandate a constitu-
tional rule, the Court appears to give no weight to the 
practical way in which suspension problems will be 
worked out normally under Ohio law.14 One wonders, 
then, what possible purpose will be served by the Court's 
new formulation that has all of the disadvantages of 
constitutionalizing the student-teacher relationship, a.nd 
yet will assure less protection against arbitrary action 
than the Ohio statute held invalid. 
IV 
No one can foresee the ultimate frontiers of the new 
"thicket" ,...-hich the Court now enters. Today's ruling 
appears to s"·eep within the protected interest in educa-
tion a multitude of discretionary decisions in the educa-
tional process. Teachers and other school authorities 
are required to make many decisions that may have 
serious consequences for the pupil. They must decide, 
for example. how to grade the student's work, whether 
a student passes or fails a course, whether he is to be 
promoted.1" whether he is required to take certain sub-
jects. whether he may be excluded from interscholastic 
athletics 10 or other extracurricular activities, whether he 
may be removed from one school and sent to another, 
whether he may be bmed long distances when available 
schools are nearby. and "·hether he should be placed in 
a "general," "vocational." or "college-preparatory" track. 
In each of these situations. and many similar ones, 
claims identical in principle to those before the Court 
14 The Court itself recognizes that the requirement~ it imposes are, 
"if an~·thing, le~s thnn a fair-minded Prhool principal ,mule! impose on 
himself in order to amid nn fn ir ~uspensions." Ante. nt 17. 
1 5 See Connelly Y. U. of Vermont , 244 F . Supp. 156 (Vt. 1956). 
rn See K elly Y. Metropolitan County B oard of Education of l\·ash-
ville, 393 F. Supp. 485 (MD Tenn. 1968) . 
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today can be asserted with equal or greater justification 
as to impairment of one's educational entitlement. Like-
wise, in many of these situations, the pupil can assert the 
same types of speculative and subjective injury given 
critical weight in this case. The District Court, relying 
upon generalized opinion evidence, concluded that a sus-
pended student may suffer psychological injury in one or 
more of the ways set forth in the margin below.11 
It hardly need be said that if a student, as a result of 
a day's suspension, suffers "a blow" to his "self esteem," 
"feels powerless," views "teachers with resentment," or 
feels "stigmatized by his teachers," identical psychologi-
cal harms will flow from many other routine and neces-
sary school decisions. The student who is given a fail-
ing grade. who is not promoted, who is excluded from 
certain extra.curricular activities, " -ho is assigned to a 
school reserved for children of less than average ability, 
or who is placed in the "vocational" rather than the 
"college preparatory" track. is unlikely to suffer any less 
psychological injury than if he were suspended for a day 
for a relatively minor infraction of discipline.1 8 
17 The ps,·chological injurie~ so percri,·ed were as follows: 
"1. The rnsprnsion is a blo,Y to the student's self-esteem. 
"2. The student feels powerless and helpless. 
"3. The student Yiews school authori ties and teachers with resent-
ment, suspicion :me! fear. 
"4. The st udent learns withdrmrnl as a mode of problem solving. 
"5. The student has little percrption of the reasons for the sus-
pension. He does not know whnt offending acts he committed. 
"6. The student is stigmntized by his teachers and school adminis-
trators as a deYiant. The~' expect the student to be a troublemaker 
in the future." (Decision of three-judge District Court, Jurisdic-
tional Statement, at 43.) 
18 There i~. no donbt , a school of modern ps~'chological or psychi-
at ric persuasion than maintains that any discipline of the young is 
detrimental. Whatewr one may think of the wisdom of this un-
prowd theor~·, it must be conceded that the reality of injury de-




If, as seems apparent, the Court will now require due 
process procedures whenever such routine school deci-
sions are challenged, the impact upon public education 
will be serious indeed. The discretion and judgment of 
federal courts across the land will be substituted for that 
of the 50-state legislatures, the 14,000 school boards 1 !} 
and the 2,000,000 20 teachers who heretofore have been 
responsible for the administration of the American public 
school system. If the Court perceives a rational and 
analytically sound distinction between the new right not 
to be suspended for as much as a single day without being 
accorded due process, and the types of decisions described 
above, it would be prudent to articulate it in today's 
oprn1on. Otherwise, the federal courts should prepare 
themselves for a boundless new role in society. 
V 
Not so long ago, state deprivations of the most sig-
nificant forms of state largesse were not thought to re-
quire due process protection on the ground that the 
deprivation was only a state provided "benefit." E. g., 
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46 (D. C. Cir.), aff'd by 
an equally divided Court, 341 U. S. 918 (1951). In re-
cent years the Court, wisely in my view, has rejected the 
reprimand by the teacher may be more traumatic to the shy, timid 
introvert than e)qrnlsion would be to the aggressive, rebellious ex-
trovert. In my view, we tend to lose our sense of perspective and 
proportion in a case of this kind. For the average, normal child-
the vast majority-suspension for a few days is simply not a detri-
ment; it is a commonplace occurrence, with some 10% of all students 
being suspended; it leaves no sca rs; affects no reputations; indeed, 
it often may be viewed by the young as a badge of some distinction 
and a welcome holiday. 
19 This estimate was supplied by the National School Board As-
sociation, Washington, D. C. 
20 See U. S. Office of Education, Elementary and Secondary Public 
School Statistics, 1972-1973. 
73-898-DISSENT 
GOSS v. LOPEZ 17 
"wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges,' " 
Board of Regents v. Roth, su,pra, 408 U. S., at 571, and 
looked instead to the significance of the state created or 
enforced right and to the substantiality of the alleged 
deprivation. Today's opinion, however, MJa.nEl~ th:; 
rea~ne:ble approach by holding in effect that government 
denial of any interest to which a person is entitled, no· 
matter what the interest or how inconsequential the in-
fringement, requires constitutional protection. As it is 
difficult to think of any less consequential "deprivation" 
than suspension of a junior high school student for a 
single day, it is equally difficult to perceive any rational 
limit to the new reach of procedural due process.2 1 
21 Some half dozen years ago, the Court extended First Amendment 
rights under limited circumstances to public school pupils. Mr. Jus-
tice Black, dissenting, viewed the decision as ushering in "an entirely 
new era in which the power to control pupils by the elected 'officials· 
of state-supported public schools ... ' is in ultimate effect trans-
ferred to the Supreme Court." Tinker, supra, at p. 515. There were 
some who thought Mr. Justice Black was unduly concerned . In fact, 
he was largely prophetic. In the few yea rs since Tinker there ha.ve 
been literally hundreds of cases by school children alleging violation 
of their constitut ional rights. This flood of litigation, between pupils· 
and teachers (of all people!) was triggered by a First Amendment 
case which I could well have joined on its facts. One can only 
imagine the rush to the courthouse, and the consequent disruption of 
public education, that will result from giving every school child the 
power to contest in court virtually any decision made by his teacher_ 
:0$0p 
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MR. JUSTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
The Court today invalidates an Ohio statute that per-
mits student suspensions from school without a hearing 
"for not more than ten days." 1 The decision unneces-
sarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in the 
operation of our public schools that may affect adversely 
the quality of education. The Court holds for the first 
time that the federal courts, rather than educational 
officials and state legislatures, have the authority to 
determine the rules applicable to routine classroom disci-
pline of children and teenagers in the public schools. It 
justifies this unprecedented intrusion into the process of 
elementary and secondary education by identifying a 
new constitutional right: the right of a student not to 
be suspended for as much as a single day without notice 
and a due process hearing either before or promptly fol-
lowing the suspension.2 
. 1 The Ohio Statute, § 3313.66 of the Ohio Rev. Code, actually is a 
limitation on the t ime-honored practice of school authorit ies de-
termining themselves the appropriate duration of suspensions. The 
statute allows the s.l).perintendent or principal of a public school to 
suspend a pupil "for not more than ten days . . . " (italics supplied); 
and requires notification of the parent or guardian in writ ing within 
24 hours of any suspension. 
,: 2 Section 3313.66 also provides authority for the expulsion of pupils, 
but requires a hearing thereon by the school board upon request of 
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The Court's decision rests on the premise that, under 
Ohio law, education is a property interest protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and 
therefore that any suspension requires notice and a hear-
ing. 3 In my view; a student's interest in education is 
not infringed by a suspension within the limited period 
prescribed by Ohio law. Moreover, to the extent that 
there may be some arguable infringement, it is too specu-
lative, transitory and insubstantial to justify imposition 
of a constitutional rule. 
I-
Although we held in San A·ntonio Independent School 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 35 (1973), that education 
is ·not a right protected· by the Constitution, Ohio has 
elected by statute to provide free education for all youths 
age six to 21, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3313.48, 3313.64, with 
children under 18 years of age being compelled to attend 
school. Id., at § 3321.01 et seq. State law, therefore, 
extends the right of free public school education to Ohio 
students in accordance with the education laws of that 
State. The right or entitlement to education so created 
is protected in a proper oase by the Due Process Clause. 
See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); 
,4rnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 164 (1974) (POWELL, 
J., concurring). In my view, this is not such a case. 
In identifying property interests subject to due process 
in this case, which concerns only the limited discretion of school 
authorities to suspend for not more than 10 days. Expulsion, usually 
resulting at least in loss of a school year or semester, is an incom-
parably more serious matter than the brief suspension, traditionally 
used as the principal sanction for enforcing routine discipline . The 
Ohio statute recognizes this distinction. 
3 The Court speaks of "exclusion from the educational process 
for more than a trivial period . . . ," but its opinion makes clear 
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protections, the Court's past opinions make clear that 
these interests "are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules and understandings that stem 
from an independent source such as state law." Board 
of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 U. S., at 577 ( emphasis 
supplied). The Ohio statute that creates the right to a 
"free" education also explicitly authorizes a principal to 
suspend a student for up t6 10 days. Ohio Rev. Stat. 
§§ 3313.48, 3313.64, 33.13.66. Thus the very legislation 
which "defines" the "d1mension'1 of the student's entitle-
ment, while providing·a right to education generally, does 
not establish this right free of discipline imposed in ac-
cord with Ohio law. Rather, the right is encompassed 
in . the entire package of statutory provisions governing 
education in Ohio-of which the power to suspend is one. 
: The Court thus disregards the basic structure of Ohio 
Hiw in posturing this case as if Ohio had conferred an 
unqualified right to education, thereby compelling the 
s~hool authorities to conform to due process procedures 
in imposing the most routine discipline.4 
4 The Court apparently reads into Ohio law by implication a 
cfualification that suspensions may be imposed only for "cause," 
thereby analogizing this case to the Civil Service laws considered 
in Arnett v. Kennedy, supra. To be sure, one may assume that 
pupils are not suspended at the whim or caprice of the school 
official, and the statute does provide for notice of the suspension 
with the "reasons therefor." But the same statute draws a sharp 
distinction between suspensions and the far more drastic sanction 
of expulsion. A hearing is required only for the latter. To follow 
the Court's analysis, one must conclude that the legislature never-
theless intended-without saying so- that suspension also is of such 
consequence that it may be imposed only for causes which can be 
justified at a hearing. The unsoundness of reading this sort of 
requirement into the statute is apparent from a comparison with 
Arnett. In that case, Congress expressly provided that nonproba-
tionary federal employees should be discharged only for "cause." 
This requirement reflected congressional recognition of the serious-
4 
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But however one may define the entitlement to educa-
tion provided by Ohio law, I would conclude that a depri-
vation of not more than 10 days' suspension from school, 
'imposed as a routine disciplinary measure, does not as-
sume constitutional dimensions. Contra.ry to the Court's 
..-assertion, our cases support rather than "refute" appel-
lant's argument that "the Due Process Clause ... comes 
· into play only when the State subjects a student to a 
' 'severe detriment or a grievous loss.' " . Ante, at 10. Re-
cently, the Court reiterated precisely this standard for 
analyzing due process claims: 
"Whether any procedural protections are due 
depends on the extent to which an individual will 
be 'condemned to suffer,.grievous loss.' Joint Anti-
Fascist R efugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 
123, 168 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) , quoted 
in Goldberg v. KeUy, 397 U. S. 254, 263 (1970) ." 
Morrissey v. Brewer, ·408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972) 
( emphasis supplied). 
- In Morrissey we applied that standard to require due 
process procedures· for parole revocation on the ground 
· that revocation "inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee 
and on others." ·· Id. , at ·482. See also Board of Regents 
· v. Roth, supra, 408 U. S., at 573 ("serious damage" to 
reputation and standing); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 
- 539 ("important interests of the licensees"); Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971) ("significant prop-
erty interest").5 
ness of discharging such employees. There simply is no analogy 
between termination of nonprobationary employment of a civil 
service employee and the suspension of a public school pupil for 
pot more than 10 days. Even if the Court is correct in implying 
some concept of justifiable cause in the Ohio procedure, it could 
hardly be stretched to the constitutional proportions found present 
in Arnett . 
5 Indeed, the Court itself quotes from a portion of Justice Frank-
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The Ohio suspension statute tolerates no absolute or 
total denial of education. It authorizes only a maximum 
suspension of eight school days, less than 5% of the 
normal 180-day school year. Absences of such limited 
duration will rarely affect a pupil's opportunity to learn 
0r his scholastic performance. Indeed, the record in this 
case reflects no educational injury to appellees. Each 
completed the semester in which the suspension oc~ 
,.curred and performed at least as well as he or she 
,had in previous years. 6 Despite the Court's unsupported 
'speculation that a suspended student could be "seriously 
damaged" ( ante, at 9), there is no factual showing 
of any such damage to appellees. 
The Court also relies on a perceived deprivation of 
"liberty" resulting from any suspension, arguing-again 
.. without factual support in the record-that a suspension 
harms a student's reputation. In view of the Court's 
... decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, I would have 
thought that this argument was plainly untenable. 
Underscoring the need for "serious damage" to reputa-
. tion, the Roth Court held that a nontenured teacher who 
is not rehired by a public university could not claim to 
,.furter's concurrence in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. 
'McGrath, supra, which explicitly refers to "a person in jeopardy of 
,serious loss." 341 U.S., at 172, see ante, at 14 (emphasis supplied). 
Nor is the "de minimus" standard referred to by the Court rele-
-vant in this case. That standard was first stated by Justice 
:Harlan in a concurring opinion in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp ., 
395 U. S. 337, 342 (1969) , and then quoted in a footnote to the 
Court's opinion in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 69, 90, n. 22 (1972) . 
Both Sniadach and Fuentes, however, involved resolution of property 
disputes between two private parties claiming an interest in the same 
. property. Neither case pertained to an interest conferred by the 
'State. 
6 Appendix, a.t 163-171 (testimony of Norvall Goss, Director of 
Pupil Personnel). See opinion of the three-judge court, Jurisdic-
-tional Statement, at 42, 44. 
6 
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suffer sufficient reputational injury to require constitu-
tional ·protections.7 Surely a brief suspension is of less 
serious consequence to the reputation of a teenage 
student. 
II 
In prior decisions, this Court has explicitly recognized 
that school authorities must have broad discretionary au-
thority in the daily operation of public schools. This 
includes wide latitude with respect to maintaining disci-
pline and good order. Addressing this point specifically, 
the Court stated in Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 
393 U. S. 503,507 (1969): , 
"The Court has repeatedly emphasized the need 
for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
states and of school officials, consistent with funda-
mental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools." 8 
Buch an approach properly recognizes the unique nature 
of public education and the correspondingly limited role 
of the judiciary in its supervision. In Epperson v. Ar• 
kansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968), the Court stated: 
"By and large, public education in our Nation is 
committed to the control of state and local authori-
ties. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the 
resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily opera-
7 See arso Wisconsin v. Constineau, 400 U. S. 433, quoting the 
•'tgrievous Ioss" standard first articulated in Joint Anti-Fascist Com-
mi"ttee v. McGrath, supra. 
8 In dissent on the First Amendment issue, Mr. Justice Harlan 
recognized the Court's basic agreement on the limited role of the 
judiciary in overseeing school disciplinary decisions : 
"I am reluctant to believe that there is any disagreement between 
the majority and myself on the proposition that school officials 
should be accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline 
and good order in their institutions." 393 U. S. 526. 
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tion of school systems and which do not directly and 
sharply implicate basic constitutional values." 
The Court today turns its back on these precedents. 
ft can hardly seriously be claimed that a school princi-
pal's· decision to suspend a pupil for a single day would 
t,\iirectly and sharply implicate basic constitutional 
values." Epperson, supra. 
Moreover, the Court ignores the experience of man-
kind, as well as the long history of QUr law, recognizing 
that there are differences which must be accommodated in 
determining the rights and duties of adults and children. 
Examples of this difference abound in our law: in con-
tracts, in torts, in criminal law and procedures, in crimi-
nal sanctions and rehabilitation, and in the right to vote 
and to hold office. Until today, and except in the special 
context of the First Amendment issue in Tinker, the 
educational rights of children and teenagers in the ele-
mentary and secondary schools have not been analogized 
to the rights of adults or to those accorded college stu-
dents. Even with respect to the First Amendment, 
the rights of children have not been regarded as 
"coextensive with those of adults." MR. JusTICE STEW-
ART, concurring in Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 
393 U. S., at 515 (1968). 
A 
I turn now to some of the considerations which sup-
port the Court's former view regarding the comprehen-
sive authority of the States and school officials "to pre-
scribe and control conduct in the schools." Tinker, 
supra, at 507. Unlike the divergence and even sharp 
conflict of interests usually present where due process 
rights are asserted, the interests here implicated-of the 
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The State's interest, broadly put, is in the proper func-
tioning of its public school system for the benefit of all 
pupils and the public generally. Few rulings would 
interfere more extensively in the daily functioning of 
schools than subj ecting routine discipline to the 
formalities and judicial oversight of due process. Sus-
. pensions are one of the traditional means-ranging from 
keeping a student after class to permanent expulsion-
us~d to maintain discipline in the schools. It is common 
- knowledge that maintaining order and reasonable de-
corum in school'"buildings and classrooms is a major 
"educational problem, and one which has increased sig-
nificantly in magnitude in recent years. 9 Often the 
· teacher, in protecting the rights of other children to an 
' education (if not his or their safety), is compelled to rely 
on' the power to suspend. 
The facts set forth in the margin 1 0 leave little room for 
,·doubt as to the magnitude of the disciplinary problem in 
9 See generally S. Bailey, Disruption in Urban Secondary Schools 
(1970) , which summarizes some of the recent surveys on school 
disruption . For example, a Syracuse University study found that 
" 85% of the schools responding reported some type of significant dis~ 
~rupt ion in the years 1967-1970. 
10 An amicus brief filed by the Children's Defense Fund states that 
at least 10% of the junior and senior high school students in the 
States sampled were suspended one or more times in the 1972-1973 
school year. The data on which this conclusion rests were obtained 
from an extensive survey prepared by the Office for Civil Rights of 
the Department of Health , Education, and Welfare. The Children's 
Defense Fund reviewed the suspension data for five States-Arkansas, 
Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and South Carolina. 
Likewise, an amicus brief submitted by several school associations 
in Ohio indicates that the number of suspensions is significant: in 
1972-1973, 4,054 students out of a school enrollment of 81,007 were 
suspended in Cincinnati ; 7,352 of 57,000 students were suspended in 
Akron, and 14,598 of 142,053 students were suspended in Cleveland. 
See also the Office of Civil Rights Survey, supra, finding that ap-
proximately 20,000 students in New York City, 12,000 in Cleveland, 
9,000 in Miami, and 9,000 in Memphis were suspended at least once 
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the public schools, or as to the extent of reliance upon 
the right to suspend. They also demonstrate that if 
hearings were required for a substantial percentage of 
short-term suspensions, school authorities would have 
time to do little else .. 
B 
The State's generalized interest in maintaining an or-
derly school system is not incompatible with the indi-
vidual interest of the student. Education in any mean-
il}gful sense includes the inculcation of an understanding; 
iri each pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience 
thereto. This understanding is no less important than 
l~arning to read and write. One who does not compre-
hend the meaning and necessity of discipline is handi-
c'apped not merely in his education but throughout his 
subsequent life. In an age when the home and church 
play a diminishing role in shaping the character and value 
j'udgments of the young, a heavier responsibility falls 
upon the schools. When an immature student merits 
censure for his conduct, he is rendered a disservice if ap-
propriate sanctions are not applied or if procedures for 
their application are so formalized as to invite a challenge 
to the teacher's authority 11-an invitation which rebelli-
ous or even merely spirited teenagers are likely to accept. 
The lesson of discipline is not merely a matter of the 
student's self-interest in the shaping of his own character 
and personality; it provides an early understanding of 
the relevance to the social compact of respect for the 
rights of others. The classroom is the laboratory in 
which this lesson of life is best learned. Mr. Justice 
Black summed it up: 
"School discipline, like parental discipline, is an 
during the 1972-1973 school years . Even these figures are probably 
somewhat conservative since some schools did not reply to the survey. 
11 See generally J. Dobson, Dare to Discipline (1972). 
IO 
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integral and important part of training our children 
to be good citizens-to be better citizens." Tinker 
v. Defj Moines School District, supra, at 524 (Black, 
J., dissenting). 
In assessing in constitutional terms the need to pro-
tect pupils from unfair minor discipline by school authori-
ties, the Court ignores the commonality of interest of the 
State and pupils in the public school system. Rather, 
it thinks in traditional judicial terms of an adversary 
situation. To be sure, there will be the occasional pupil 
innocent of any rule infringement who is mistakenly sus-
pended or whose infraction is too minor to justify suspen-
sion. But while there is no evidence that indicates a fre-
quency of unjust suspensions, common sense suggests 
that they will not be numerous in relation to the total 
number, and that mistakes or injustices will usually be 
tigh ted by informal means. 
C 
One of the more disturbing aspects of today's decision 
is its indiscriminate reliance upon the judiciary, and the 
adversary process, as the means of resolving many 
of the most routine problems arising in the class-
room. In mandating due process procedures the Court 
misapprehends the reality of the normal teacher-
pupil relationship.12 There is an ongoing relationship, 
one in which the teacher must occupy many roles-ed,u-
cator, adviser, friend and, at times, parent-substitute. 
It is rarely adversary in nature except with respect to the 
chronically disruptive or insubordinate pupil whom the 
12 The role of the t eacher in our society historically has been an 
honored and respected one, rooted in the experience of decades that 
has left for most of us warm memories of our teachers, especially 
those of the formative years of primary and secondary education. 
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teacher must be free to discipline without frustrating 
formalities. 13 
The Ohio statute, providing as it does for due notice 
both . to parents and the Boa.rd, is compatible with the 
teacher-pupil r·e1ationship and informal resolution of mis-
taken disciplinary action. We have relied for genera-
tions upoi1 the experience, good faith and dedication of 
those who staff our public schools,14 and the nonadversary 
means of airing grievances that always have been avail-
1 3 In this regard, the relationship between a student and teacher 
is manifestly different from that between a welfare administrator 
and a recipient (see Goldberg v. K elly, supra), a motor vehicle de-
partment and a driver( see Bell v. Burson, supra), a debtor and a 
creditor (see Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 377 (1968); 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. Grant, 416 U. S. 
600 (1974)), a parole officer and a parolee (see Morrissey v. Brewer, 
supra), or even an employer and employee (see Arnett v. K ennedy, 
supra; Board of R egents of State College v. Roth, supra; Perry v. 
Sinderman, 408 U. S. 593 (1972)) . In almost all of these non-
education settings there is-for purposes of this analysis-a "face-
less" administrator dealing with an equally "faceless" recipient of 
some form of government assistance; in a few, such as the garnish-
ment and repossession cases, there is a conflict of interest relation-
ship. Our public school system, however, is premised on the belief 
that teachers and pupils should not be "faceless" to each other. 
Nor does the educational relationship present a traditional "conflict of 
interest." Rather, the relationship typically is marked by a coinci-
dence of interests . 
Yet the Court, relying on cases such as Sniadach and Fuentes, ap-
parently views the classroom of teenagers as comparable, to the 
competit ive and adversary environment of the adult, commercial 
world. 
14 A traditional factor in any due process analysis is "the pro-
tection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is 
challenged . . . ." Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 
supra, at 163 (Frankfurter, J ., concurring). In the public school 
setting there is a high degree of such protection since a teacher has 
responsibility for, and a commitment to, his pupils that is absent in 
other due process contexts. 
12 
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able to pupils and their parents. One would have 
thought before today's opinion that this informal method 
of resolving differences was more compatible with the in-
terests of all concerned than resort to any constitution-
alized procedure, however blandly it may be defined by 
the Court. -
D 
In my view, the constitutionalizing of routine class-
room decisions not only represents a significant and un-
wise of the Due Process Clause; it also was quite un-
necessary in view of the safeguards prescribed by the Ohio 
statute. This is demonstrable from a comparison of what 
the Court mandates as required by due process with the 
-protective procedures held invalid. 
The Ohio statute, limiting suspensions to not more 
-than eight school days, requires written notice including 
-the "reasons therefor," to the student's parents and to 
'the Board of Education within 24 hours of any suspen-
sion. The Court only requires oral or written notice to 
-the pupil, with no notice being required to the parents 
or the Board of Education. The mere fact of the statu-
tory requirement is a deterrent against arbitrary action 
·by the principal. The Board, usµally elected by the 
people and sensitive to constituent relations, may be 
expected to identify a principal whose record of suspen-
sions merits inquiry. In any event, parents placed on 
written notice may exercise their rights as constituents 
by going directly to the Board or a member thereof if 
dissatisfied with the principal's decision. 
Nor does the Court's due process "hearing" appear to 
provide significantly more protection than that already 
available. The Court holds only that the principal must 
listen to the student's "version of the events," either 
before suspension or thereafter-depending upon the cir-
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cumstances. Ante, at 17-18. Such a truncated "hear-
ing" is likely to be considerably less meaningful than the 
opportunities for correcting mistakes already available 
to students and parents. Indeed, in this case all of the 
students and parents were offered an opportunity to 
attend a conference with school officials. 
In its rush to mandate a constitutional rule, the Court 
appears to give no weight to the practical manner in 
which suspension problems normally would be worked 
0ut under Ohio law.15 One must doubt, then, whether 
the constitutionalization of the student-teacher relation-
ship, with all of its attendant doctrinal and practical 
difficulties, will assure in any meaningful sense greater 
protection than that already afforded under Ohio law. 
III 
No one can foresee the ultimate frontiers of the 
new "thicket" the Court now enters. Today's ruling 
appears to sweep within the protected interest in educa-
tion a multitude of discretionary decisions in the educa-
tional process. Teachers and other school authorities 
are required t9 make many decisions that may have 
serious consequences for the pupil. They must decide, 
for example, how to grade the student's work, whether 
a student passes or fails a course, whether he is to be 
promoted,16 whether he is required to take certain sub-
jects, whether he may be excluded from interscholastic 
athletics 11 or other extracurricular activities, whether he 
may be removed from one school and sent to another, 
whether he may be bused long distances when available 
15 The Court itself recognizes that the requirements it imposes are, 
"if anything, less than a fa ir-minded school principal would impose on 
himself in order to avoid unfa ir suspensions." Ante, at 17. 
1 6 See Connelly v. U. of Vermont , 244 F . Supp. 156 (Vt. 1956). 
1 7 See K elly v. M etropolitan County Boa.rd of Education of Nash-
ville, 393 F. Supp. 485 (MD Tenn . 1968) . 
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schools are nearby, and whether he should be placed in 
a "general," "vocational," or "college-preparatory" track. 
In these and many similar situations claims of impair-
ment of one's educational entitlement identical in prin-
ciple to those before the Court today can be asserted 
with equal or greater justification. Likewise, in many 
of these situations, the pupil can advance the same types 
of speculative and subjective injury given critical weight 
in this case. The District Court, relying upon general-
ized opinion evidence, concluded that a suspended · stu-
dent may suffer psychological injury in one or more of, 
the ways set forth in the margin below.18 The Court 
appears to adopt this rationale. See ante, at !J 
It hardly need be said that if a student, as a result of 
a day's suspension, suffers "a blow" to his "self esteem/' 
"feels powerless," views "teachers with resentment," or 
feels "stigmatized by his teachers," identical psychologi-
cal harms will flow from many other routine and neces-
sary school decisions. The student who is given a fail-
ing grade, who is not promoted; who is excluded from 
certain extracurricular activities, who is assigned to a 
school reserved for children of less than average ability, 
br who is placed in the- "v0cational11 rather than the 
"college preparatory'; track, is unlikely to suffer any less 
·i s The psychological injuries so perceived· were as follows: 
" I. The suspension is a blow to the student's self-esteem. 
"2. The student feels powerless and helpless. 
"3. The student views school authorit ies and teachers with resent-
·ment, suspicion and fear. 
"4. The student lea r·ns withdrawal as a mode of problem solving. 
"5. The student has little perception of the reasons for the sus-
· pension . He does not know what offending acts he committed. 
"6. The student is stigmatized by his teachers and school adminis-
trators as a deviant . They expect the student t o be a troublemaker 
in the future." (Decision of three-judge District Court , Jurisdic• 
t ional Statement, at 43.) 
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psychological injury than if he were suspended for a day 
for a relatively minor infraction of discipline.19 
If, as seems apparent, the Court will now require due 
process procedures whenever such routine school deci-
sions are challenged, the impact upon public education 
will be serious indeed. The discretion and judgment of 
federal courts across the land will be substituted for that 
of the 50-state legislatures, the 14,000 school boards 20 
and the 2,000,000 21 teachers who heretofore have been 
responsible for the administration of the American public 
school system. If the Court perceives a rational and 
analytically sound distinction between the new right not 
to be suspended for as much as a single day without being 
accorded due process, and the types of decisions described 
above, it would be prudent to articulate it in today's 
opm1on. Otherwise, the federal courts should prepare 
themselves for a vast new role in society. 
19 There is, no doubt, a school of modern psychological or psychi-
atric persuasion than maintains that any discipline of the young is 
detrimental. Whatever one may think of the wisdom of this un-
proved theory, it hardly affords dependable support for a constitu-
tional, decision. Moreover, even the theory's proponents would 
concede that the magnitude of injury depends primarily upon the 
individual child or teenager. A classroom reprimand by the teacher 
may be more traumatic to the shy, timid introvert than explusion 
would be the aggressive, rebellious extrovert. In my view we, 
tend to lose our sense of perspective and proportion in a case of 
this kind. For the average, normal child-the vast majority-
suspension for a few days is simply not a, detriment; it is a com-
monplace occurrence, with some 10% of all students being suspended; 
it leaves no scars; affects no reputations; indeed, it often may be 
viewed by the young as a badge of some distinction and a welcome 
holiday. 
20 This estimate was supplied by the National School Board As-
sociation, Washington, D. C. 
21 See U. S. Office of Education, Elementary and Secondary Public 
School Statistics, 1972-1973. 
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IV 
Not so long ago, state deprivations of the most sig-
nificant forms of state largesse were not thought to re-
quire due process protection on the ground that the 
deprivation resulted only in the loss of a state provided 
"benefit." E. g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46 
(D. C. Cir.), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U. S. 
918 (1951). In recent years the Court, wisely in my 
view, has rejected the "wooden distinction between 'rights' 
and 'privileges,' " Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 
U. S., at 571, and looked instead to the significance of the 
state created or enforced right and to the substantiality 
of the alleged deprivation. Today's opinion abandons this 
reasonable approach by holding in effect that government 
denial of any interest to which a person is entitled, no 
matter what the interest or how inconsequential the in-
fringement, requires constitutional protection. As it is 
difficult to think of any less consequential "deprivation" 
than suspension of a junior high school student for a 
single day, it is equally difficult to perceive any rational 
limit to the new reach of procedural due process.22 
22 
Some half dozen years ago, the Court extended First Amendment 
rights under limited circumstances to public school pupils. Mr. Jus-
tice Black, dissenting, viewed the decision as ushering in "an entirely 
riew era in which the power to control pupils by the elected 'officials 
of state-supported public schools ... ' is · in ultimate effect trans,-
ferred to the Supreme Court." Tinker, supra, at p. 515. There were 
some who thought Mr. Justice Bla,ck was unduly concerned. But 
the prophesy of Mr. Justice Black is now being fulfilled. In the 
f~w years since Tinker there have been literally hundreds of cases 
by school children alleging violation of their constitutional rights. 
This flood of litigation, between pupils and school authorities was 
triggered by a narrowly written First Amendment case which I could 
well have joined on its facts. One can only imagine the rush to the 
courthouse, and the consequent disruption of public education, that 
will result from giving every school child the power to contest in 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today invalidates an Ohio statute that per-
mits student suspensions from school without a hearing 
"for not more than ten days." 1 The decision unneces-
sarily opens avenues for judicial 'intervention in the 
operation of our public schools that may affect adversely 
the quality of education. The Court holds for the first 
time that the federal courts, rather than educational 
officials and state legislatures, have the authority to 
determine the rules applicable to routine classroom disci-
pline of children and teenagers in the public schools. It 
jrn~tifies this unprecedented intrusion into the process of 
elementary and secondary education by identifying a 
new constitutional right: the right of a student not to 
be suspended for as much as a single day without notice 
and a due process hearing either before or promptly fol-
lowmg the suspension.2 
1 The Ohio Statute, § 3313.66 of the Ohio Rev. Code, actually is a 
limitation on the time-honored practice of school authorities de-
termining themselves the appropriate duration of suspensions. The 
statute allows the superintendent or principal of a public school to 
suspend a pupil "for not more than ten days ... " (italics supplied); 
and requires notification of the parent or guardian in writing within 
24 hours of any suspension. 
2 Sect10n 3313.66 also provides authonty for the expulsion of pupils, 
but requires a hearing thereon by the school board upon request of 
a parent or guardian. The rights of pupils expelled are not involved 
Qnu 
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The Court's decision rests on the premise that, under 
Ohio law, education is a property interest protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and 
therefore that any suspension requires notice and a hear-
ing. 3 In my view, a student's interest in education is 
not infringed by a suspension within the limited period 
prescribed by Ohio law. Moreover, to the extent that 
there may be some arguable infringement, it is too specu-
lative, transitory and insubstantial to justify imposition 
of a constitvtional rule. 
I 
Although we held in San Antonio Independent School 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) , that education 
is not a right protected by the Constitution, Ohio has 
elected by statute to provide free education for all youths 
age six to 21, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3313.48, 3313.64, with 
children under 18 years of age being compelled to attend 
school. Id., at § 3321.01 et seq. State law, therefore, 
extends the right of free public school education to Ohio 
students in accordance with the education laws of that 
State. The right or entitlement to education so created 
is protected in a proper case by the Due Process Clause. 
See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); 
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 164 (1974) (POWELL, 
J ., concurring). In my view, this is not such a case. 
In identifying property interests subject to due process 
h1 this case, which concerns only the liinited discretion of school 
authorities to suspend for not more than 10 days. Expulsion, usually 
resulting at least in loss of a school year or semester, is an incom-
parably more serious matter than the brief suspension, traditionally 
used as the principal sanction for enforcing routine discipline. The 
Oluo statute recogmzes tlns distinction. 
3 The Court speaks of "exclusion from the educational process 
for more than a trivial period ... ,'' but its opinion makes clear 
that even one day 's suspens10n invokes the const1tut10nal procedure 
tn.andated today. 
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protections, the Court's past oprn10ns make clear that 
these interests "are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules and understandings that stem 
from an independent source such as state law." Board 
of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 U. S., at 577 ( emphasis 
supplied). The Ohio statute that creates the right to a 
"free" education also explicitly authorizes a principal to 
suspend a student for up to 10 days. Ohio Rev. Stat. 
§§ 3313.48, 3313.64, 3313.66. Thus the very legislation 
which "defines" the "dimension" of the student's entitle-
ment, while providing a right to education generally, does 
not establish this right free of discipline imposed in ac-
cord with Ohio law. Rather, the right is encompassed 
in the entire package of statutory provisions governing 
education in Ohio-of which the power to suspend is one. 
The Court th us disregards the basic structure of Ohio 
law in posturing this case as if Ohio had conferred an 
unqualified right to education, thereby compelling the 
school authorities to conform to due process procedures 
in imposing the most routine discipline.4 
4 The Court apparently reads into Ohio law by implication a 
qualification that suspensions may be imposed only for "cause," 
thereby analogizing this case to the Civil Service laws considered 
in Arnett v. Kennedy, s-upra. To be sure, one may assume tha.t 
pupils are not suspended at the whun or caprice of the school 
official, and the statute does provide for notice of the suspension 
with the "reasons therefor." But the same statute draws a sharp 
d1stmction between suspensions and the far more drastic sanction 
of expulsion. A hearing is required only for the latter. To follow 
the Court's analysis, one must conclude that the legislature never-
theless intended-without saying so-that suspension also is of such 
consequence that it may be imposed only for causes which can be 
justified at a hearmg. The unsoundness of reading this sort or 
requirement into the statute is apparent from a comparison with 
Arnett In that case, Congress expressly provided that nonproba-
tionary federal employees should be discharged only for "cause.,. 
'l'lu<i requirement reflected congressional recognit10n of the serious-
' 
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But however one may define the entitlement to educa-
tion provided by Ohio law, I would conclude that a depri.:O 
vation of not more than 10 days' suspension from school, 
imposed as a routine disciplinary measure, does not as-
sume constitutional dimensjons. Contrary to the Court's 
assertion, our cases support rather than "refute" appel-
lant's argument that "the Dlle Process Clause . . . comes 
into play only when the State subjects a student to a 
'severe detriment or a grievous loss.' " Ante, at 10. Re-
ce11tly, the Court reiterated precisely this standard for 
analyzing due process claims : 
"Whet.her any procedural protections are due 
depends on the extent to which an individual will 
be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 
123, 168 (1958) (Frankfurter, J ., concurring) , quoted 
in Goldberg v. Kelly , 397 U. S. 254, 263 (1970)." 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972) 
( emphasis supplied) . 
In Morrissey we applied that standard to require due 
process procedures for parole revocation on the ground 
that revocation "inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee 
and on others. " Id., at 482. See also Board of Regents 
v. Roth, supra, 408 U. S., at 573 ("serious damage" to 
reputation and standing) ; B ell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 
539 (1971 ) ("important interests of the licensees" ); Bod-
die v. Connectiwt, 401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971) ("signifi-
cant property interest"). 5 
ness of discharging such employees There simply is no analogy 
between termination of nonprobationary employment of a civil 
service employee and the suspension of a public school pupil for-
not more than 10 days . Even 1f the Court is correct in implying 
some concept of justifiable cause in the Oh10 procedure, it could 
ha rdly be stretched to the constitutional proportions found present 
in Arnet t . 
5 Indeed, 1 he Court itself quotes from a portion of .Justice F rank-
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The Ohio suspension statute tolerates no absolute or 
total denial of education . It authorizes only a maximum 
suspension of eight school days, less than 5% of the 
normal 180-day school year. Absences of such limited 
duration will rarely affect a pupil's opportunity to learn 
or his scholastic performance. Indeed, the record in this 
case reflects no educational injury to appellees. Each 
completed the semester in which the suspension oc-
curred and performed at least as well as he or she 
had in previous years. 6 Despite the Court's unsupported 
speculation that a suspended student could be "seriously 
damaged" (ante, at 9), there is no factual showing 
of any such damage to appellees. 
The Court also relies on a perceived deprivation of 
"liberty" resulting from any suspension, arguing-again 
without factual support in the record pertaining to· 
these appellees-that a suspension harms a student's 
reputation. In :view of the Co_urt's decision in 
Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, I would have 
thought that this argument was plainly untenable. 
Underscoring the need for "serious damage" to reputa-
tion, the Roth Court held that a nontenured teacher who 
is not rehired by a public university could not claim to· 
furter's concurrence in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. 
McGrath, supra, which explicitly refers to ''a person m jeopardy of 
serious loss." 341 U.S., at 172; see ante, at 14 (emphasis supplied) . 
Nor is the "de minimus" standard referred to by the Court rele-
vant in this case. That standard was first stated by Justice-
Harlan in a concurring opinion in Sniadach v. Family Fina.nee Corp., 
395 U. S. 337, 342 (1969) , and then quoted in a footnote to the 
Court's opinion in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 69, 90, n. 22 (1972) . 
Both Sniadach and Fuentes, however, involved resolution of property 
disputes between two privatP parties claiming an interest in the same· 
property. Neither case pertained to an interest conferred by the 
State. 
6 Appendix, at 163-171 (testimony of Norvall Goss, Director of 
Pupil Personnel). See opinion of th~ thre_e-j_udge court, Junsd1c-
tJpnt1!__ St~tement~ q.t @.. 44.._ 
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suffer sufficient reputational injury to require constitu. 
tional protections.7 Surely a brief suspension is of less 
serious consequence to the reputation of a teenage 
student. 
II 
In prior decisions, this Court has explicitly recognized 
that school authorities must have broad discretionary au-
thority in the daily operat.ion of public schools. This 
includes wide latitude with respect to maintaining disci-
pline and good order. Addressing this point specifically, 
the Court stated in Tinker v. Des Moines School Di.strict, 
393 U.S. 503, 507 ( 1969): 
"The Court has repeatedly emphasized the need 
for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
states and of school officials, consistent with funda-
mental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools." 8 
Such an approach properly recognizes the unique nature 
of public education and the correspondingly limited -role 
of the judiciary in its supervision. In Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968), the Court stated: 
"By and large, public education in our Nation is 
committed to the control of state and local authori-
ties. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the 
resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily opera-
7 See also Wisconsin v. Constineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) , quoting 
the "grievou~ loss" 5tandard first articulated in Joint Anti-Fascist 
Comimttee v. McGrath, supra. 
8 In dissent on the First Amendment issue, Mr. Justice Harlan 
recognized the Court's basic agreement on the limited role of the 
judiciary m overseemg school disciplinary decisions: 
"I am reluctant to believe that there 1:; any disagreement between 
the majority and myself on the proposition that school officials 
should be accorded the widest authority in maintaming discipline 
and good order m their institutions." Id ., at 526. 
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ti.on of school sy~tems and. which «l'o, noJt directly an«I 
sharply im.plica:te basic coosti1tuti@nal values." 
The Ca:urt today turns its back on these precedents. 
It cm hardly seriously be claimed that a school princi-
pal's. decision to suspend a pupil for a single day would 
"directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional 
values." Epperson, supra. 
Moreover, the Court ignores the experience of man-
kind, as well as the long history of our law, recognizing 
that there are differences which must be accommodated in 
determining the rights and duties of children as com-
pared with those of adults. Examples of this distinction 
abound in our law: in contracts, in torts, in criminal 
law and procedure, in criminal sanctions and rehabilita-
tion, and in the right to vote and to hold office. Until 
today, and except in the special context of the First 
Amendment issue in Tinker, the educational rights of 
children and teenagers in the elementary and secondary 
schools have not been analogized to the rights of adults 
or to those accorded college students. Even with respect 
to the First Amendment, the rights of children have not 
been regarded as "coextensive with those of adults." 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring in Tinker, supra, at 515 .. 
A 
I turn now to some of the considerations which sup-
port the Court's former view regarding the comprehen-
sive authority of the States and school officials "to pre-
~cribe and control conduct in the schools." Tinker, 
supra, at 507. Unlike the divergent and even sharp, 
conflict of interests usually present where due process 
rights are asserted, the interests here implicated-of the, 
State through its schools and of the pupils-are essen-
tially congruen1i ... 
8 
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The State's interest, broadly put, is in the proper func-
tioning of its public school system for the benefit of all 
pupils and the public generally. Few rulings would 
interfere more extensively in the daily functioning of 
schools than subjecting routine discipline to the 
formalities and judicial oversight of due process. Sus-
pensions are one of the traditional means-ranging from 
keeping a student after class to permanent expulsion-
used to maintain discipline in the schools. It is common 
knowledge that maintaining order and reasonable de-
corum in school buildings and classrooms is a major 
educational problem, and one which has increased sig-
nificantly in magnitude in recent years. 9 Often the 
teacher, in protecting the rights of other children to an 
education (if not his or their safety), is compelled to rely 
on the power to suspend. 
The facts set forth in the margin 10 leave little room for 
doubt as to the magnitude of the disciplinary problem in 
9 See generally S. Bailey, Dis,ruption in Urban Secondary Schools 
(1970), which summarizes some of the recent surveys on school 
disruption. A Syracuse University study; for example, found that 
85% of the schools responding reported some type of significant dis-
n1ption in the years 1967-1970. 
10 An amicus brief filed by the Children's Defense Fund states that 
at lea.st 10% of the junior and senior high school students in the 
States sampled were suspended one or more times in •the 1972-1973 
chool year. The data on which this conclusion rests were obtained 
from an extensive survey prepared by the Office for Civil Rights of 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The Children's 
Defense Fund reviewed the suspension data for five States-Arkansas, 
l\Iaryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and South Carolina. 
Likewise, an amicus brief submitted by several school associations 
in Ohio indicates that the number of suspensions is significant: in 
1972-1973, 4,054 students out of a school enrollment of 81,007 were 
suspended m Cincinnati; 7,352 of 57,000 students were suspended in 
Akron, and 14,598 of 142,053 students were suspended in Cleveland. 
See also the Office of Civil Rights Survey, supra, finding that ap-· 
proximately 20,000 students in New York City, 12,000 in Cleveland, 
9 ,000 in Miami, and 9,000 in Memphis were suspended at least once· 
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the public schools, or as to the extent of reliance upon 
the right to suspend. They also demonstrate that if 
hearings were required for a substantial percentage of 
short-term suspensions, school authorities would have 
time to do little else, 
B 
The State's generalized interest in maintaining an or-
derly school system is not incompatible with the indi-
vidual interest of the student. Education in any mean-
ingful sense includes the inculcation of an understanding 
in each pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience 
thereto. This understanding is no less important than 
learning to read and write. One who does not compre-
hend the meaning and necessity of discipline is handi-
capped not merely in his education but throughout his 
subsequent life. In an age when the home and church 
play a diminishing role in shaping the character and value 
judgments of the young, a heavier responsibility falls 
upon the schools. ·when an immature student merits 
censure for his conduct, he is rendered a disservice if ap-
propriate sanctions are not applied or if procedures for 
their application are so formalized as to invite a challenge 
to the teacher's authority 11-an invitation which rebelli-
ous or even merely spirited teenagers are likely to accept. 
The lesson of discipline is not merely a matter of the 
student's self-interest in the shaping of his own character 
and personality; it provides an early understanding of 
the relevance to the social compact of respect for the 
rights of others. The classroom is the laboratory in 
which this lesson of life is best learned. Mr. Justice 
Black summed it up . 
"School discipline, like parental discipline, is an 
during the 1972-1973 school year. Even these figures are probabl:t 
somewhat conservative since some schools did not reply to the survey, 
11 See generally J . Dobson, Dare to Discipline (1972). 
10 
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integral and important part of training our children 
to be good citizens-to be better citizens." Tinker, 
supra, at 524 (dissenting opinion) . 
In assessing in constitutional terms the need to pro-
tect pupils from unfair minor discipline by school authori-
ties, the Court ignores the commonality of interest of the 
State and pupils in the public school system. Rather, 
it thinks in traditional judicial terms of an adversary 
situation. To be sure, there will be the occasional pupil 
innocent of any rule infringement who is mistakenly sus-
pended or whose infraction is too minor to justify suspen-
sion. But while there is no evidence indicating the fre-
quency of unjust suspensions, common sense suggests 
that they will not be numerous in relation to the total 
number, and that mistakes or injustices will usually be 
righted by informal means. 
C 
One of the more disturbing aspects of today's decision 
is its indiscriminate reliance upon the judiciary, and the 
adversary process, as the means of resolving many 
of the most routine problems arising in the class-
room. In mandating due process procedures the Court 
misapprehends the reality of the normal teacher-
pupil relationship.12 There is an ongoing relationship, 
one in which the teacher must occupy many roles-edu-
cator, adviser, friend and, at times, parent-substitute. 
It is rarely adversary in nature except with respect to the 
chronically disruptive or insubordinate pupil whom the 
teacher must be free to discipline without frustrating· 
formalities.18 
12 The role of the teacher in our society historically has been an· 
honored and respected one, rooted in the experience of decades that 
has left for most of us warm memories of our teachers, especially 
those of the formative years of primary and secondary education. 
13 Iu this regard, th.e relationship between a student and teacher-
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The Ohio statute, providing as it does for due notice 
both to parents and the Board, is compatible with the 
teacher-pupil relationship and the informal resolution of 
mistaken disciplinary action. We have relied for genera-
tions upon the experience, good faith and dedication of 
those who staff our public schools,14 and the nonadversary 
means of airing grievances that always have been avail-
able to pupils and their parents. One would have 
thought before today's opinion that this informal method 
of resolving differences was more compatible with the in-
terests of all concerned than resort to any constitution-
is manifestly different from that between a welfare administrator 
and a recipient (see Goldberg v. Kelly, supra), a mater vehicle de-
partment and a driver( see Bell v. Burson, supra), a debtor and a 
creditor (see Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra; Fuentes v. 
Shevin, supra; Mitchell , . Gran. t, 416 U. S 600 (1974)), a parole +a~ 
officer and a parolee (see Morrissey v. Brewer, supra), or even an('..e_ 
employee (see Arnett v. Kennedy, supra; Board of Regents of State 
College v. Roth, supra; Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)). 
In many of these noneducation settings there is-for purposes of 
this analysis-a "faceless" administrator dealing with an equally 
"faceless" recipient of some form of government benefit or license; 
in others, such as the garnishment and repossession cases, there is a 
conflict of interest relationship. Our public school system, however, 
is premised on the belief that teachers and pupils should not be 
"faceless" to each other. Nor does the educational relationship 
present a typical ·'conflict of interest." Rather, the relationship 
traditionally is marked by a coincidence of interests. 
Yet the Court, relying on cases such as Sniadach and Fuentes, ap-
parently views the classroom of teenagers as comparable to the 
competitive and adversar) environment of the adult, commercial 
world . 
14 A traditional factor in any due process analysis is "the pro-
tection unplicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is 
challenged .... " Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 
supra, at 163 (Frankfurter, J ., concurring) . In the public school 
setting there is a high degree of such protection since a teacher has 
responsibility for, and a commitment to, his pupils that is absent in 




GOSS v . LOPEZ 
alized procedure, however blandly it may be defined by 
the Court. 
D 
In my view, the constitutionalizing of routine class-
room decisions not only rrpresents a significant and un-
wise extension of the Due Process Clause; it also was 
quite unnecessary in view of the safeguards prescribed 
by the Ohio statute. This is demonstrable from a com-
parison of what the Court mandates as required by due 
process \vith the protective procedures it finds constitu-
tionally insufficient. 
The Ohio statute, limiting suspensions to not more 
than eight school days, requires written notice including 
the "reasons therefor" to the student's parents and to 
the Board of Education within 24 hours of any suspen-
sion. The Court only requires oral or written notice to 
the pupil, with no notice being required to the parents 
or the Board of Education. The mere fact of the statu-
tory requirement is a deterrent against arbitrary action 
by the principal. The Board, usually elected by the 
people and sensitive to constituent relations, may be 
expected to identify a principal whose record of suspen-
sions merits inquiry. In any event, parents placed on 
written notice may exercise their rights as constituents 
by going directly to the Board or a member thereof if 
dissatisfied with the principal's decision. 
Nor does the Court's due process "hearing" appear to 
provide significantly more protection than that already 
available. The Court holds only that the principal must 
listen to the student's "version of the events," either 
before suspension or thereafter-depending upon the cir-
cumstances. Ante, at 17-18. Such a truncated "hear-
ing" is likely to be considerably less meaningful than the 
opportunities for correcting mistakes already available 
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to students and parents. Indeed, in this case all of the 
students and parents were offered an opportunity to 
attend a conference with school officials. 
In its rush to mandate a constitutional rule, the Court 
appears to give no weight to the practical manner in 
which suspension problems normally would be worked 
out under Ohio law.15 One must doubt, then, whether 
the constitutiona1ization of the student-teacher relation-
ship, with all of its attendant doctrinal and practical 
difficulties, will assure in any meaningful sense greater 
protection than that already afforded under Ohio law. 
III . 
No one can foresee the ultimate frontiers of the 
new "thicket" the Court now enters. Today's ruling 
appears to sweep within the protected interest in educa-
tion a multitude of discretionary decisions in the educa-
tional process. Teachers and other school authorities 
are required to make many decisions that may have 
serious consequences for the pupil. They must decide, 
for example. how to grade the student's work, whether 
a student passes or fails a course,11' whether he is to be 
promoted, whether he is required to take certain sub-
jects, whether he may be excluded from interscholastic 
athletics 17 or other extracurricular activities, whether he 
may be removed from one school and sent to another, 
whether he may be bused long distances when available 
schools are nearby, and whether he should be placed in 
a "general" "vocational." or "college-preparatory" track. 
1 ~ Tlw Court it::wlf recognize•,, that the reqmrements it. imposes are, 
'' if anything, le1,,; than a fair-minded school principal would impose on 
him~elf in order to nvoid unfair sns1w11sions." Ante, at 17. 
1" Sc•e Connelly , . C of Vermont, ~44 F . Supp. 156 (Vt. 1956). 
17 St·e Kelly v M etropohtan County Boa.rd of Education of Nash~ 
vtllr.:, 393 F. Supp. 485 (MD Te1m. 1968) 
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In these and many similar situations claims of impair-
ment of one's educational entitlement identical in prin-
ciple to those before the Court today can be asserted 
with equal or greater justification. Likewise, in many 
of these situations, the pupil can advance the same types 
of speculative and subjective injury given critical weight 
in this case. The District Court, relying upon general-
ized opinion evidence, concluded that a suspended stu-
dent may suffer psychological injury in one or more of 
the ways set forth in the margin below.18 The Court 
appears to adopt this rationale. See ante, at 9. 
It hardly need be said that if a student, as a result of 
a day's suspension, suffers "a blow" to his "self esteem," 
"feels powerless," views "teachers with resentment," or 
feels "stigmatized by his teachers," identical psychologi-
cal harms will flow from many other routine and neces-
sary school decisions. The student who is given a fail-
ing grade, who is not promoted, who is excluded from 
certain extracurricular activities, who is assigned to a 
school reserved for children of less than average ability, 
or who is placed in the "vocational" rather than the · 
"college preparatory" track, is unlikely to suffer any less 
psychological injury than if he were suspended for a day 
for a relatively minor infraction of discipline.10 
18 The psychological injuries so perceived were as follows: 
"l. The suspension is a blow to the student's self-esteem. 
"2. The titudent feels powerless and helpless. 
"3. The student views school authorities and teachers with resent-
ment, suspicion and fear 
"4 The student learn::; withdrawal as a mode of problem solving. 
''5. The student ha~ little perception of the reasons for the sus-
pens10n. He does not know what offending acts he committed. 
''6. The student is ,;tigmatized by his teachers and school adminis-
tratorti as a deviant. They expect the student to be a troublemaker 
in the future." (Dec1s1on of three-judge District Court, Jurisdic-
tional Statement, at 43.) 
rn There is, no doubt, a school of modern psychological or psychi-
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If, as seems apparent, the Court will now require due 
process procedures whenever such routine school deci-
sions are challenged, the impact upon public education 
will be serious indeed. The discretion and judgment of 
federal courts across the land often will be substituted for 
that of the 50-state legislatures, the 14,000 school boards 20 
and the 2,000,000 21 teachers who heretofore have been 
responsible for the administration of the American public 
school system. If the, Court perceives a rational and 
analytically sound distinction between the new right not 
to be suspended for as much as a single day without being 
accorded due process, and the types of decisions described 
above, it would be prudent to articulate it in today's 
opm1on. Otherwise, the federal courts should prepare 
themselves for a vast new role in society. 
IV 
Not so long ago, state deprivations of the most sig-
nificant forms of state largesse were not thought to re-
atnc persuasion than mamtains that any discipline of the young is 
detrimental. Whatever one may thmk of the wisdom of this un-
proved theory, it hardly affords dependable support for a constitUr 
tional decision. Moreover, even the theory's proponents would 
concede that the magnitude of mjury depends primarily upon the 
individual child or teenager. A classroom reprimand by the teacher 
may be more traumatic to the shy, timid mtrovert than explusion 
would be the aggressive, rebellious extrovert. In my view we 
tend to lose our sense of perspective and proport10n in a case of 
this kind. For the average, normal child-the vast majority-
suspension for a few days is simply not a detriment; it is a com-
monplace occurrence, with some 10% of all students being suspended, 
it lea.ves no scars, affects no reputations; indeed, 1t often may be 
viewed by the young as a badge of some d1Stinct1on and a welcome 
holiday. 
20 This estimate was supplied by the National School Board As-
sociation, Washington, D. C. 
21 See U. S. Office of Education, Elementary and Secondary Publie 
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quire due process protection on the ground that the 
deprivation resulted only in the loss of a state provided 
"benefit." E. g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46 
(D. C. Cir.) , aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 
918 (1951). In recent years the Court, wisely in my 
view, has rejected the "wooden distinction between 'rights' 
and 'privileges,' " Board of Regents v. Roth, SU'f)ra, 408 
U. S., at 571, and looked instead to the significance of the 
state created or enforced right and to the substantiality 
of the alleged deprivation. Today's opinion appears to 
abandon this reasonable approach by holding in effect 
that government denial of any interest to which a person 
is entitled, no matter what the interest or how inconse-
quential the infringement, requires constitutional protec-
tion. As it is difficult to think of any less consequential 
"deprivation" than suspension of a junior high school 
student for a single day, it is equally difficult to perceive 
any rational limit to the new reach of procedural due 
process.22 
22 Some half dozen years ago, the Court extended First Amendment 
rights under limited circumstances to public school pupils. Mr. Jus-
tice Black, dissenting, viewed the decision as ushering in "an entirely 
new era in which the power to control pupils by the elected 'officials 
of state-supported public schools . . .' is in ultimate effect t rans-
ferred to the Supreme Court." Tinker, supra, at 515. There were 
some who thought Mr. Justice Black was unduly concerned. But 
the prophesy of Mr. Justice Black is now being fulfilled. In the 
few years since Tinker there have been literally hundreds of cases 
b,v school children allegmg violat10n of their constitutional rights . 
This flood of litigation, between pupils and school authorities was 
triggered by a narrowly written First Amendment case which I could 
well have joined on its facto;. One can only speculate as to the 
extent to which public education will be disrupted by giving every 
school child the power to contest in court any decision made by his 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today invalidates an Ohio statute that per-
mits student suspensions from school without a hearing 
"for not more than ten days." 1 The decision unneces-
sarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in the 
operation of our public schools that may affect adversely 
the quality of education. The Court holds for the first 
time that the federal courts, rather than educational 
officials and state legislatures, have the authority to 
determine the rules applicable to routine classroom disci-
pline of children and teenagers in the public schools. It 
justifies this unprecedented intrusion into the process of 
elementary and secondary education by identifying a 
new constitutional right: the right of a student not to 
be. suspended for as much as a single day without notice 
and a due process hearing either before or promptly fol-
lowing the suspension.2 
1 The Ohio Statute, § 3313.66 of the Ohio Rev. Code, actually is a 
limitation on the time-honored practice of school authorities de-
termining themselves the appropriat~ duration of suspensions. The 
statute allows the superintendent or principal of a public school to 
suspend a pupil "for not more than ten Jays ... " (italics supplied); 
and requires notification of the parent or guardian in writing within 
24 hours of any suspension. 
2 Section 3313.66 also provides authority for the expulsion of pupils, 
but requires a hearing thereon by the school board upon request of 
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The Court's decision rest.s on the premise that, under 
Ohio law, education is a property interest protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and 
therefore that any suspension requires notice and a hear-
ing. 3 In :rny view, a student's interest in education is 
not infringed by a suspension withip the limited period 
prescribed by Ohio law. M8reov.er, to the e~tent that 
there may be some arguable infringement, it is too specu-
lative, transitory and insubstantial to j4stify imposition 
of a constitutional rule. 
I 
Although we held in San Antonio Independent School 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 35 (1973), that education 
is not a right protected by the Constitution, · Ohio hM 
elected by statute to provide free education for all youths 
age six to 21, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3313.48, 3313.64, with 
children under 18 years of age being compelled to attend 
school. Id., at § 3321.01 et seq. · State law, therefore, 
extends the right of free public school education to Ohio 
students in accordance with the education laws of that 
State. The right or entitlement to education so created 
is protected in a proper case by the Due Process Clause. 
See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972); 
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 164 (1974) (POWELL, 
J ., concurring). In my view, this is not such a case. 
In identifying property interests subject to due process 
in this case, which concerns only the _limited discretion of school 
authorities to suspend for not more than 10 days. Expulsion, usually 
resulting at least in loss of a school year or semester, is an incom• 
parably more serious matter than the brief suspension, t raditionally 
used as the principal sanction for enforcing routine discipline. The 
Ohio statute recognizes this distinction. 
8 The Court speaks of "exclusion from the educational process 
for more than a t rivial period . . . ," ante, at 10, but its opinion makes 
clear that even one day's suspension invokes the constitutional pr~ce,. 
<lure mandated today. 
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protections, the Court's past opinions make clear that 
these interests "are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules and understandings that stem 
from an independent source such as state law." Board 
of Regents v. ' Roth, supra, 408 U. S., at 577 (emphasis 
supplied) . The Ohio statute that creates the right to a 
"free" education also explicitly authorizes a principal to 
suspend a student for up to 10 days. Ohio Rev. Stat. 
§§ 3313.48, 3313.64, 3313.66. Thcis the very legislation 
which "defines" the "dimension" of the student's entitle-
ment, while providing a right to education generally, does 
not establish this right free of discipline imposed in ac-
cord with Ohio law. Rather, the ·right is encompassed 
in the entire package of statutory provisions governing 
education in Ohio-of which the power to suspend is one. 
The Court thus disregards the basic structure of Ohio 
law in posturing this case as if Ohio had conferred an 
unqualified right to education, thereby compelling the 
school autp.orities to conform to due- process procedures 
in imposing the most routine discipline:' 
4 The Court apparently reads into Ohio law by implication a 
qualification that suspensions may be imposed only for "cause," 
thereby analogizing this case to the Civil Service laws considered 
in Arnett v. Kennedy, supra. To be sure, one may assume that 
pupils are not suspended at the whim or caprice of the school 
official, and the statute doe.s provide for notice of the suspension 
with the "reasons therefor." But the same statute draws a sharp 
distinction between suspension and the far more drastic sanction 
of expulsion. A hearing is required only for the latter. To follow 
the Court's analysis, one must conclude that the !?gislatnre ne,·er-
theless intended-without saying so-that suspension also is of such 
consequence that it may be imposed only for cause.s which can be 
justifiec:' at a hearing. The unsoundness of reading this sort of 
requirement into the statute is apparent from a comparison with 
Arnett. In that case, Congress expressly provided that nonproba-
tionary federal employees should be discharged only for "cause." 
This requh-ement reflected congressional !l'ecognition of the serious-
4 
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But however one may define the entitlement to educa-
tion provided by Ohio law, I would conclude that a depri-
vation of not more than 10 days' suspension from school, 
imposed as a routine disciplinary measure, does not as-
sume constitutional dimensions. Contrary to the Court's 
assertion, our cases support rather than "refute" appel-
lant's argument that "the Due Process Clause ... comes 
into play only when the State subjects a student to a. 
'severe detriment or a grievous loss.' " Ante, at 10. Re-
cently, the Court reiterated precisely this standard for 
analyzing due process claims: 
"Whether any procedural protections are due 
depends on the extent to which an individual will 
be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGr(Lth, 341 -U. S. 
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), quoted 
in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263 (1970)." 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972) 
(emphasis supplied) . 
In Morrissey we applied that standard to require due 
process procedures for parole revocation on the ground 
that revocation "inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the parolee 
and of ten on others." Id., at 482. See also Board of 
Regents v. Roth, SU'f)'fa, 498 U.S., at 573 ("seriously dam-
age" reputation &nd standing); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 
535, 539 (1971) ("important interests of the licensees"); 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971) ("sig-
nificant property interest"),5 
ness of discharging such employees. There simply is no analogy 
between termination of nonprobationary employment of a civil 
service employee and the suspension of a public school pupil fO!" 
not more than 10 days. Even if the Court is correct in implying 
some concept of justifiable cause in the Ohio procedure, it could 
hardly be stretched to the constitutional proportions found present 
in Arnett. 
.11 Indeed, the Court itself quotes from a portion of Justice Frank-
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The Ohio suspension statute allows no serious or sig-
nificant infringement of education. It authorizes only a 
maximum suspension of eight school days, less than 5% of 
the normal 180-day school year. Absences of such limited 
duration will rarely affect a pupil's opportunity to learn 
or his scholastic performance. Indeed, the record in this 
case reflects no educational injury to appellees. Each 
completed the semester in which the suspension oc-
curred and performed at least as well as he or she 
had in previous years.0 Despite the Court's unsupported 
speculation that a suspended student could be "seriously 
damaged" (ante, at 9), there is no factual showing 
of any such damage to appellees. 
The Court also relies on a perceived deprivation of 
"liberty" resulting from any su&pension, arguing-again 
without factual support in the record pertaining to 
these appellees-that a suspension harms a student's 
reputation. In view of the Court's decision in 
Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, I would have 
thought that this argument was plainly untenable. 
Underscoring the need for "serious damage" to reputa-
tion, the Roth Court held that a nontenured teacher who 
is not rehired by a public ,university could not claim to 
furtP.r's concurrence in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. 
McGrath, supra, which explicitly refers to "a person in jeopardy of 
serious loss." 341 U.S., at 172; see ante, at 14 (emphasis supplied). 
Nor is the "de minim us" standard referred to by the Court rele-
vant in this case. That standard was first stated by Justice 
Harlan in a concurring opinion in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 
395 U. S. 337, 342 ( 1969), and then quoted in a footnote to the 
Court's opinion in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 69, 90, n. 21 (1972) . 
Both Sniadach and Fuentes, however, involved resolution of property 
disputes between two private parties claiming an interest in the same 
property. Neither case pertained to an interest conferred by the 
State. 
6 Appendix, at 163-171 (testimony of Norval Goss, Director of 
Pupil Personnel) . See opinion of the three-judge court, Jurisdic• 
tional Statement, at 42, 44. 
® 
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suffer sufficient reputational injury to require constitu-
tional protections.7 Surely a brief suspension is of less 
serious consequence to the reputation of a teenage 
student. 
II 
In prior decisions, this Court has explicitly recognized 
that school authorities must have broad discretionary au-
thority in the daily operat.ion of public schools. This 
includes wide latitude with respect to maintaining disci-
pline and good order. Addressing this point specifically, 
the Court stated in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 
393 U.S. 503,507 (1969) : 
"[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need 
for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
States and of school officials, consistent with funda-
mental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools." 8 
Such an approach properly recognizes the unique nature 
of public education and the correspondingly limited role 
of the judiciary in its supervision. In Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968) , the Court stated : 
"By and large, public education in our Nation is 
committed to the control of state and local authori-
ties. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the 
resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily opera-
7 See also Wisconsin v. Constineau, 400 U.S. 433,437 (1971) , quot-
, ing the "grievous loss" standard first articulated in Joint Anti~Fascist 
Committee v. McGrath, supra. 
8 In dissent on the First Amendment issue, Mr. Justice Harlan 
recognized the Court 's basic agreement on the limited role of the 
judiciary in overseeing school disciplinary decisions : 
"I am reluctant to believe that there i:;, any disagreement between 
the majority and myself on the proposition that school officials 
should be accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline 
<1nd good order in their institutions." Id ., at 526. 
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tion of school systems and which do not directly and 
sharply implicate basic constitutional values." 
The Court today turns its back on these precedents. 
It can hardly seriously be claimed that a school princi-
pal's decision to suspend a pupil for a single day would 
"directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional 
values." Epperson, supra. 
Moreover, the Court ignores the experience of man-
kind, as well as the long history of our law, recognizing 
that there are differences which must be accommodated in 
determining the rights and duties of children as com-
pared with those of adults. Examples of this distinction 
abound in our law: in contracts, in torts, in criminal 
law and procedure, in criminal sanctions and rehabilita-
tion, and in the right to vote and to hold office. Until 
today, and except in the special context of the First 
Amendment issue in Tinker, the educational rights of 
children and teenagers in the elementary and secondary 
schools have not been analogized to the rights of adults 
or to those accorded college students. Even with respect 
to the First Amendment, the rights of children have not 
been regarded as "coextensive with those of adults." 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring in Tinker, supra, at 515. 
A 
I turn now to some of the considerations which sup-
port the Court's former view regarding the comprehen-
sive authority of the States and school officials "to pre-
scribe and control conduct in the schools." Tinker, 
supra, at 507. Unlike the divergent and even sharp 
conflict of interests usually present where due process 
rights are asserted, the interests here implicated-of the 
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The State's interest, broadly put, is in the proper func-
tioning of its public school system for the benefit of all 
pupils and the public generally. Few rulings would 
interfere more extensively in the daily functioning of 
schools than subjecting routine discipline to the 
formalities and judicial oversight of due process. Sus-
pensions are one of the traditional means-ranging from 
keeping a student after class to permanent expulsion-
used to maintain discipline in the schools. It is common 
knowledge that maintaining order and reasonable de-
corum in school buildings and classrooms is a major 
educational problem, and one which has increased sig-
nificantly in magnitude in recent years.9 Often the 
teacher, in protecting the rights of other children to an 
education (if not his or their safety), is compelled to rely 
on the power to suspend. · 
The facts set forth in the margin 10 lea.ve little room for 
doubt as to the magnitude of the disciplinary problem in 
9 See generally S. Bailey, Disruption in Urban Secondary Schools 
(1970), which summarizes some of the recent surveys on school 
disruption. A Syracuse University study, for example, found that 
85% of the schools responding reported some type of significant dis• 
ruption in the years 1967-1970. 
10 An amicus brief filed by the Children's Defense Fund states that 
at lea.st 10% of the junior and senior high school students in the 
States sampled were suspended one or more times in 'the 1972-1973. 
school year. The data on which this conclusion rests were obtained 
from an extensive survey prepared by the Office for Civil Rights of 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The Children's 
Defense Fund reviewed the suspension data for five States--Arkansas, 
Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and South Carolina. 
Likewise, an amicu, brief submitted by several school associations 
in Ohio indicates that the number of suspensions is significant: in 
1972-1973, 4,054 students out of a school enrollment of 81,007 were 
suspended in Cincinnati; 7,352 of 57,000 students were suspended in 
Akron; and 14,598 of 142,053 students were suspended in Cleveland. 
See also the Office of Civil Rights Survey, supra, finding that ap-
proximately 20,000 students in New York City, 12,000 in Cleveland, 
9..000 in Miami, and 91000 in Memphis were suspended at least once 
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the public schools, or as to the extent of reliance upon 
the right to suspend. They also demonstrate that if 
hearings were required for a substantial percentage of 
short-term suspensions, school authorities would have 
time to do little else. 
B 
The State's generalized interest in maintaining an 
orderly school system is not incompatible with the indi-
vidual interest of the student. Education in any mean-
ingful sense includes the inculcation of an understanding 
in each pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience 
thereto. This understanding is no less important than 
learning to read and write. One who does not compre-
hend the meaning and necessity of discipline is handi-
capped not merely in his education but throughout his 
subsequent life. In an age when the home and church 
play a diminishing role in shaping the character and value 
judgments of the young, a heavier responsibility falls 
upon the schools. ·when an immature student merits 
censure for his conduct, he is rendered a disservice if ap-
propriate sanctions a.re not applied or if procedures for 
their application are so formalized as to invite a challenge 
to the teacher's authority 11-an invitation which rebelli-
ous or even merely spirited teenagers are likely to accept. 
The lesson of discipline is not merely a matter of the 
student's self-interest in the shaping of his own character 
and personality; it provides an early understanding of 
the relevance to the social compact of respect for the 
rights of others. The classroom is the laboratory in 
which this lesson of life is best learned. Mr. Justice 
Black summed it up : 
"School discipline, like parental discipline, is an 
during the 1972-1973 school year. Even these figures ate probably 
somewhat conservative since some schools did not reply to the survey. 
usee generally J. Dobson, Dare to Discipline (1972) . 
10 
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integral and important part of training our children 
to be good citizens-to be better citizens." Tinker, 
supra, at 524 (dissenting opinion). 
In assessing in constitutional terms the need to pro-
tect pupils from unfair minor discipline by school authori-
ties, the Court ignores the commonality of interest of the 
State and pupils in the public school system. Rather, 
it thinks in traditional judicial terms of an adversary 
situation. To be sure, there will be the occasional pupil 
innocent of any rule infringement who is mistakenly sus-
pended or whose infraction is too minor to justify suspen~ 
sion. But, while there is no evidence indicating the fre-
quency of unjust suspensions, common sense suggests 
that they will not be numerous in relation to the total 
number, and that mistakes or injustices will usually be 
righted by informal means. 
C 
One of the more disturbing aspects of today's decision 
is its indiscriminate reliance upon the judiciary, and the 
adversary process, as the means of resolving many 
of the most routine problems arising in the class-
room. In mandating due process procedures the Court 
misapprehends the reality of the normal teacher-
pupil relationship. There is an ongoing relationship, 
one in which the teacher must occupy many roles-edu-
cator, adviser, friend and, at times, parent-substitute.i2 
It is rarely adversary in nature except with respect to the 
chronically disruptive or insubordinate pupil whom the 
teacher must be free to discipline without frustrating 
formalities.13 
12 The role of the teacher in our society historically has been an 
honored and respected one, rooted in the experience of decades that 
has left for most of us warm memories of o'l,lr teachers, especially 
those of the formative years of primary and secondary education. 
18 In this regard, the relationship between a student and teacher 
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The Ohio statute, providing as it does for due notice 
both to parents and the Board, is compatible with the 
teacher-pupil relationship and the informal resolution of 
mis~aken disciplinary action. We have relied for genera-
tions upon the experieµce, good faith and dedication of 
those who staff our public schools,l4 and the nonadversary 
means of airing grievances that always have been avail-
able to pupils and their parents. One would have 
thought before today's opinion that this informal method 
of resolving differences was more compatible with the in-
terests of all concerned than resort to any constitution-
is manifestly different from that between a welfare administrator 
and a recipient (see Goldberg v. Kelly, supra), a motor vehicle de-
partment and a driver( see Bell v. Burson, supra), a debtor and a 
creditor (se!J S~iadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra; Fuentes v. 
Shevin, supra; 'Mitchell v. Grant, 416 U. S. 600 (1974)), a parole 
officer and a parolee (see Morrissey v. Brewer, supra), or even an 
empolyer aµd an employee _(see A~nett v. 
1
Kennedy,. su~rai{~ 
~ ~)). In many of these noneducation settings there is-
for purposes of this analysis-a "faceless" administrator dealing with 
an equally "faceless" recipient of some form of government benefit or 
license ; in others, such as the garnishment and repossession cases, there 
is a conflict of interest relationship. Our public school system, how-
ever, is premised on the belief that teachers and pupils should not be 
"faceless" to each other. Nor does the educational relationship 
present a typical "conflict of interest." Rather, the relationship 
traditionally is marked by a coincidence of interests. 
Yet the Court, relying on cases such as Sniadach and Fuentes, ap-
parently views the classroom of teenagers as comparable to the 
oompetitive and adversary environment of the adult, commercial 
world. 
14 A tradit ional factor in any due process analysis is "the pro-
tection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is 
challenged .• . . " Joint Anti-F(I,Bcist Committee v. McGrath, 
supra, at 163 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) . In the public school 
setting there is a high degree of such protection since a teacher has 
responsibility for, and a commitment to, his pupils that is absent in 
other due process contexts.. 
·, 
' 111,. ., 
12 
73-898-D!SSENT 
GOSS v . LOPEZ 
alized procedure, however blandly it may be defined by 
the Court, 
D 
In my view, the constitutionalizing of routine class-
room decisions not only represents a significant and un-
wise extension of the Due Process Clause; it also was 
quite unnecessary in view of the safeguards prescribed 
by the Ohio statute. This is demonstrable from a com-
parison of what the Court mandates as required by due 
process with the protective procedures it finds constitu-
tionally insufficient. 
The Ohio statute, limiting suspensions to not more 
than eight school days, requires written notice including 
the "reasons therefor" to the student's pa.rents and to 
the Board of Education within 24 hours of any suspen-
sion. The Court only requires oral or written notice to 
the pupil, with no notice being required to the parents 
or the Board of Education. The mere fact of the statu-
tory requirement is a deterrent against arbitrary action 
by the principal. The Board, usually elected by the· 
people and sensitive to constituent relations, may be 
expected to identify a principal whose record of suspen-
sions merits inquiry. In any event, parents pla.ced on 
written notice may exercise their rights as constituents 
by going directly to the Board or a member thereof if 
dissatisfied with the principal's decision. 
Nor does the Court's due process "hearihg" appear to 
provide significantly more protection than that already 
available. The Court holds only that the principal must 
listen to the student's "version of the events,1' either· 
before suspension or thereafter-depending upon the cir-
cumstances. Ante, at 17-18. Such a truncated "hear-
ing" is likely to be considerably less meaningful than the· 
Qpportunities for correcting; mistakes already available 
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to students and parents. Indeed, in this case all of the 
students and parents were offered an opportunity to 
attend a conference with school officials. 
In its rush to mandate a constitutional rule, the Court 
appears to give no weight to the practical manner in 
which suspension problems normally would be worked 
out under Ohio law.1 5 One must doubt, then, whether 
the constitutionalization of the student-teacher relation-
ship, with all of its attendant doctrinal and practical 
difficulties, will assure in any meaningful sense greater 
protection than that already afforded under Ohio law. 
III 
No one can foresee the ultimate frontiers of the 
new "thicket" the Court now enters. Today's ruling 
appears to sweep within the protecteq interest in educa-
tion a multitude of discretionary decisions in the educa-
tional process. Teachers and other school authorities 
are required to make many decisions that may have 
serious consequences for the pupil. They must decide, 
for example, how to grade the student's work, whether 
a student passes or fails a course,16 whether he is to be 
promoted, whether he is required to take certain sub-
jects, whether he may be excluded from interscholastic 
athletics 11 or other extracurricular activities, whether he 
may be removed from one school and sent to another, 
whether he may be bused long distances when available 
schools are nearby, and whether he should pe placed in 
a "general," "vocational," or "college-preparatory" track. 
15 The Court itself recognizes that the requirements it imposes are, 
•'if anythmg, le~s than a fair-minded school principal would impose on 
!iimself in order to nv01d unfair suspensions." Ante, at 17. 
16 See Connelly v. U. of Vermont, 244 F. Supp. 156 (Vt. 1956) . 
17 See Kelly v. Metropolitan County Board of Education of Nash,. 
ville, 393 F. Supp. 485 (MD Tenn. 1968). 
14 
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In these and many similar situations claims of impair• 
ment of one's educational entitlement identical in prin• 
ciple to those before the Court today can be asserted 
with equal or greater justification. Likewise, in many 
of these situations, the pupil can advance the same types 
of speculative and subjective injury given critical weight 
in this case. The District Court, relying upon general-
ized opinion evidence, concluded that a suspended stu-
dent may suffer psychological injury in one or more of 
the ways set forth in the margin below.18 The Court 
appears to adopt this rationale. See ante, at 9. 
It hardly need be said that if a student, as a result of 
a day's suspension, suffers "a blow" to his "self esteem," 
"feels powerless," views "teachers with resentment," or 
feels "stigmatized by his teachers," identical psychologi-
cal harms will flow from many other routine and neces-
sary school decisions. The student who is given a fail-
ing grade, who is not promoted, who is excluded from 
certain extracurricular activities, who is assigned to a 
school reserved for children of less than average ability, 
or who is placed in the "vocational" rather than the 
"college preparatory" track, is unlikely to suffer any less 
psychological injury than if he were suspended for a day 
for a relatively minor infraction.19 
1 8 The psychological injuries so perceived were as follows : 
"1. The suspension is a blow to the student's self-esteem. 
"2. The student feels powerless and helpless. 
"3. The student views school authorities and teachers with resent-
ment, suspicion and fear. 
" 4. The student learns withdrawals as a mode of problem solving. 
"5. The student has little perception of the reasons for the sus-
pension. He does not know what offending acts he committed. 
"6. The student is stigmatized by his teachers and school adminis-
trators as a deviant. They expect the student to be a troublemaker 
in the future.'' (Decision of three-judge District Court, Jurisdic-
tional Statement, at 43.) 
19 There is, no doubt, a school {)f modern psychologic.al or psychi-
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If, as seems apparent, the Court will now require due 
process procedures whenever such routine school deci-
sions are challenged, the impact upon public education 
will qe serious indeed. The discretion anq judgment of 
federal courts across the land often will be substituted for 
that of the 50-state legislatures, the 14,000 school boards 20 
and the 2,000,000 21 teachers who heretofore have been 
responsible for the administration of the American public 
school system. If the Court perceives a rational and 
analytically sound distinction between the discretionary 
decision by school authorities to suspend a pupil for a 
brief period, and the types of discretionary school deci-
sions described above, it would be prudent to articulate 
it in today's opinion. Otherwise, the federal courts 
should prepare themselves for a vast new role in society. 
IV 
Not so long ago, state deprivations of the most sig-
nificant forms of state largesse were not thought to re-
atric persuasion than maintains that any discipline of the young is 
detrimental. Whatever one may think of the wisdom of this un-
proved theory, it hardly affords dependable support for a con.stitu-
tional, decision. Moreover, even the theory's proponents would 
concede that the magnitude of injury depends primarily upon the 
individual child or teenager. A classroom reprimand by the teacher 
may be more traumatic to the shy, timid introvert than explusion 
would be the aggressive, rebellious extrovert. In my view we 
tend to lose our sense of perspective and proportion in a case of 
this kind. For the average, normal child-the vast majority-
suspension for a few days is simply not a detriment; it is a com-
monplace occurrence, with some 10% of all students being suspended; 
it leaves no scars; affects no reputations; indeed, it often may be 
viewed by the young as a badge of some distinction and a welcome 
holiday. 
20 This estimate was supplied by the National School Board As-
sociation, Washington, D. C. 
:11 See U. S. Office of Education, Elementary and Secondary Public 
School Statistics, 1972-1973. 
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quire due process protection on the ground that the 
deprivation resulted only in the loss of a state provided 
"benefit." E. (J., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46 
(CADC), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U. S. 
918 (1951) . In recent years the Court, wisely in my 
view, has rejected the "wooden distinction between 'rights' 
and 'privileges,'" Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 
U. S., at 571, and looked instead to the significance of the 
state created or enforced right and to the substantiality 
of the alleged deprivation. Today's opinion appears to 
abandon this reasonable approach by holding in effect 
that government infringement of any interest to which a 
person is entitled, no matter what the interest or how 
inconsequential the infringement, requires constitutional 
protection. As it is difficult to think of any less conse-
quential infringement than suspension of a junior high 
school student for a single day, it is equally difficult to 
perceive any principled limit to the new reach of proce-
dural due process.22 
22 Some half dozen years ago, the Court extended First Amendment 
rights under limited circumstances to public school pupils. Mr. Jus-
tice Black, dissenting, viewed the decision as ushering in "an entirely 
new era in which the power to control pupils by the elected 'officials 
of state-supported public schools ... ' is in ultimate effect trans-
ferred to the Supreme Court." Tinker, supra, at 515. There were-
some who thought Mr. Justice Black was unduly concerned. But 
the prophesy of Mr. Justice Black is now being fulfilled. In the· 
few years since Tinker there have been literally hundreds of cases· 
by school children alleging violation of their constitutional rights. 
This flood of litigation, between pupils and school authoritiesj'wa'S· ✓ 
triggered by a narrowly written First Amendment case which I coulcf 
well have joined on its facts. One can only speculate as to the· 
extent to which public education will J.ie disrupted by giving every 
school child the power to contest in court any decision made by his 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today invalidates an Ohio statute that per-
mits student suspensions from school without a hearing 
"for not more than ten days." 1 The decision unneces-
sarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in the 
operation of our public schools that may affect adversely 
the quality of education. The Court holds for the first 
time that the federal courts, rather than educational 
officials and state legislatures, have the authority to 
determine the rules applicable to routine classroom disci-
pline of children and teenagers in the public schools. It 
justifies this unprecedented intrusion into the process of 
elementary and secondary education by identifying a 
new constitutional right: the right of a student not to 
be suspended for as much as a single day without notice 
and a due process hearing either before or promptly fol-
lowing the suspension,2 
1 The Ohio Statute, § 3.313.66 of the Ohio Rev. Code, actually is a 
limitation on the time-honored practice of school authorities de-
termining themselves the appropriate duration of suspensions. The 
statute allows the superintendent or principal of a public school to 
suspend a pupil "for not more than ten days ... " (italics supplied); 
and requires notification of the parent or guardian in writing within 
24 hours of any suspension. 
2 Section 3313.66 also provides authority for the expulsion of pupils, 
but requires a hearing thereon by the school board upon request of 
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The Court's decision rests on the premise that, uhder 
Ohio law, education is a property interest protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and 
therefore that any suspension requires notice and a hear-
ing. 3 In my view, a student's interest in education is 
not infringed by a suspension within the limited period 
prescribed by Ohio law. Moreov:er, to the extent that 
there may be some arguable infri1igement, it is too specu-
lative, transitory and insubstantial to justify imposition 
of a constitutional rule. 
I 
Although we held in San Antonio Independent School 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973), that education 
is not a right protected by the Constitution,· Ohio has· 
elected by statute to provide free education for all youths 
age six to 21, Ohio Rev. Code §§ '3313.48, 3313.64, with 
children under 18 years of age being compelled to attend 
school. Id., at § 3321.01 et 3eq. • State law, therefore, 
extends the right of free public school education to Ohio 
students in accordance with the education laws of that 
State. The right or entitlement to education so created 
is protected in a proper case by the Due Process Clause. 
See, e.g., Board of Regents v.-Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); 
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 164 (1974) (PowELL, 
J., concurring). In my view, this is not such a case. 
In identifying property interests subject to due process 
in this case, which concerns only the limited discretion of school 
authorities to suspend for not more than 10 days. Expulsion, usually 
resulting at least in loss of a school year or semester, is an incom• 
parably more serious matter than the brief suspension, traditionally 
used as the principal sanction for enforcing routine discipline. The 
Ohio statute recognizes this distinction. 
3 The Court speaks of "exclusion from the educational process 
for more than a trivial period ... ," ante, at 10, but its opinion makes 
clear that even one day's suspension invokes the constitutional _proce-
dure mandated today. 
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protections, t}i.e Court's past opinions make clear that 
these interests "are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules and understandings that stem 
from an independent source such as state law." Board 
of Regents v.· Roth, supra, 408 U. S., at 577 ( emphasis 
supplied) . The Ohio statute that creates the right to a 
"free" education also explicitly authorizes a principal to 
suspend a student for up to 10 days. Ohio Rev. Stat. 
§§ 3313.48, 3313.64, 3313.66. Thus the very legislation 
which "defines" the "dimension" of the student's entitle-
ment, while providing a right to education generally, does 
not establish this right free of discipline imposed in ac-
cord with Ohio law. Rather, the ·right is encompassed 
in the entire package of statutory provisions governing 
education in Ohio-of which the power to suspend is one. 
The Court thus disregards the basic structure of Ohio 
law in posturing this ca..,~ as if Ohio had conferred an 
unqualified right to education, t,hereby compelling the 
school authorities to conform to due- process procedures 
in imposing the most routine discipline.4 
4 The Court apparently reads into Ohio law by implication a 
qualification that suspensions may be imposed only for " cause," 
thereby analogizing this case to the Civil Service laws considered 
in Arnett v. Kennedy, supra. To be sure, one may assume that 
pupils are not suspznded at the whim or capric"l of the school 
official, and the statute does provide for notice of the suspension 
with the "reasons therefor." But the same statute draws a sharµ 
distinction between suspension and the far more drastic sanction 
of expulsion. A hearing is required only for the latter. To follow 
the Court's analysis, one must conclude that the lrgislature never-
theless intended-without saying so-that suspension also is of such 
consequence that it may be imposed only for causes which can be 
justifiev at a hearing. The unsoundness of reading this sort of 
requirement into the statute is apparent from a comparison with 
Arnett. In that case, Congress expressly provided that nonproba-
tionary federal employees should be discharged only for "cause." 
'!his requirement reflected congressional !l"ecognition of the serious-
4 
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But however one may define the entitlement to educa-
tion provided by Ohio law, I would conclude that a depri-
vation of not more than 10 days' suspension from school, 
imposed as a routine disciplinary measure, does not as-
sume constitutional dimensions. Contrary to the Court's 
assertion, our cases support rather than "refute" appel-
lant's argument that "the Due Process Clause ... comes 
into play only when the State subjects a. student to a 
'severe detriment or a grievous loss.' " Ante, a.t 10. Re~ 
cently, the Court reiterated precisely this standard for 
analyzing due process claims: 
"Whether any procedural protections are due 
depends on the extent to which an individual will 
be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J ., concurring) , quoted 
in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263 (1970)." 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 ( 1972) 
(emphasis supplied) . 
In Morrissey we applied that standard to require due 
process procedures for parole revocation on the ground 
that revocation "inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the parolee 
and often on others." Id., at 482. See also Board of 
Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S., at 573 ("seriously dam-
age" reputation and standing); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 
535, 539 (1971) ("important interests of the licensees"); 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971) ("sig-
nificant property interest"). 5 
ness of discharging such employees. There simply is no analogy 
between termination of nonprobationary employment of a civil 
service employee and the suspemion oi a public school pupil foi-
not more than 10 days. Even if the Court is correct in implying 
some concept of justifiable cause in the Ohio procedure, it could 
hardly be stretched to the constitutional proportions found present 
in Arnett. 
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The Ohio suspension statute allows no serious or sig-
nificant infringement of education. It authorizes only a 
maximum suspension of eight school days, less than 5% of 
the normal 180-day school year. Absences of such limited 
duration will rarely affect a pupil's opportunity to learn 
or his scholastic performance. Indeed, the record in this 
case reflects no educational injury to appellees. Each 
completed the semester in which the suspension oc-
curred and performed at least as well as he or she 
had in previous years. 0 Despite the Court's unsupported 
speculation that a suspended student could be "seriously 
damaged" (ante, at 9), there is no factual showing 
of any such damage to appellees. 
The Court also relies on a perceived deprivation of 
"liberty" resulting from any sui:spension, arguing-again 
without factual support in the record pertaining to 
these appellees-that a suspension harms a student's 
reputation. In view of the Court's decision in 
Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, I would have 
thought that this argument was plainly untenable. 
Underscoring the need for "serious damage" to reputa-
tion, the Roth Court held that a nontenured teacher who 
is not rehired by a public university could not claim to 
furtn's concurrence in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. 
McGrath, supra, which explicitly refers to "a person in jeopardy of 
serious loss." 341 U.S., at 172; see ante, at 14 (emphasis supplied) . 
Nor is the "de minim~ " standard referred to by the Court rele-
vant in this case. That standard was first stated by Justice 
Ifarlan in a concurring opinion in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 
395 U. S. 337, 342 ( 1969), and then quoted in a footnote to the 
Court's opinion in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 69, 90, n. 21 (1972) . 
Both Sniadach and Fuentes, however, involved resolution of property 
disputes between two private parties claiming an interest in the same 
property. Neither case pertained to an interest conferred by the 
State. 
6 Appendix, at 163-171 (testimony of Norval Goss, Director of 
Pupil Personnel) . See opinion of the three-judge court, Jurisdic-
tional Statement, at 42, 44. 
® 
73-898-DISSENT 
GOSS v. LOPEZ 
suffer sufficient reputational injury to require constitue 
tional protections.7 Surely a brief suspension is of less 
serious consequence to the reputation of a teenage 
student. 
II 
In prior decisions, this Court has explicitly recognized 
that school authorities must have broad discretionary au-
thority in the daily operat.ion of public schools. This 
includes wide latitude with respect to maintaining disci-
pline and good order. Addressing this point specifically, 
the Court stated in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 
393 u. s. 503, 507 (1969) : 
"[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need 
for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
States and of school officials, consistent with funda-
mental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools." 8 
Such an approach properly recognizes the unique nature 
of public education and the correspondingly limited role 
of the judiciary in its supervision. In Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968), the Court stated : 
"By and large, public education in our Nation is 
committed to the control of state and local authori-
ties. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the 
resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily opera-
7 See also Wisconsin v. Constineau, 400 U.S. 433,437 (1971), quot-
ing the "grievous loss" standard first articulated in Joint Anti~Fa,scist 
Committee v. McGrath, supra. 
8 In dissent on the First Amendment issue, Mr. Justice Harlan 
recognized the Court's basic agreement on the limited role of the 
judiciary in overseeing school disciplinary decisions: 
"I am reluctant to believe that there i1> any disagreement between 
the majority and myself on the proposition that school officials 
should be accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline 
.and good order in their institutions." Id., at 526. 
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tion of school systems and which do not directly and 
sharply implicate basic constitutional values." 
The Court today turns its back on these precedents. 
It can hardly seriously be claimed that a school princi-
pal' s decision to suspend a pupil for a single day would 
"directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional 
values." Epperson, supra. 
Moreover, the Court ignores the experience of man-
kind, as well as the long history of our law, recognizing 
that there are differences which must be accommodated in 
determining the rights and duties of children as com-
pared with those of adults. Examples of this distinction 
abound in our law: in contracts, in torts, in criminal 
law and procedure, in criminal sanctions and rehabilita-
tion, and in the right to vote and to hold office. Until 
today, and except in the special context of the First 
Amendment issue in Tinker, the educational rights of 
children and teenagers in the elementiiry and secondary 
schools have not been analogized to the rights of adults 
or to those accorded college students. Even with respect 
to the First Amendment, the rights of children have not 
been regarded as "coextensive with those of adults." 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring in Tinker, supra, at 515. 
A 
I turn now to some of the considerations which sup-
port the Court's former view regarding the comprehen-
sive authority of the States and school officials "to pre-
scribe and control conduct in the schools." Tinker, 
supra, at 507. Unlike the divergent and even sharp 
conflict of interests usually present where due process 
rights are asserted, the interests here implicated-of the 
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The State's interest, broadly put, is in the proper func-
tioning of its public school system for the benefit of all 
pupils and the public generally. Few rulings would 
interfere more extensively in the daily functioning of 
schools than subjecting routine discipline to the 
formalities and judicial oversight of due process. Sus-
pensions are one of the traditional means-ranging from 
keeping a student after class to permanent expulsion-
used to maintain discipline in the schools. It is common 
knowledge that maintaining order and reasonable de-
corum in school buildings and classrooms is a major 
educational problem, and one which has increased sig-
nificantly in magnitude in recent years.9 Often the 
teacher, in protecting the rights of other children to an 
education (if not his or their safety), is compelled to rely 
on the power to suspend. 
The facts set forth in the margin 10 leave little room for 
doubt as to the magnitude of the disciplinary problem in 
9 See generally S. Bailey, Disruption in Urban Secondary Schools 
(1970), which summarizes some of the recent surveys on school 
disruption. A Syracuse Univeri,ity i,tudy, for example, found that 
85% of the schools responding reported some type of significant dis• 
ruption in the years 1967-1970. 
10 An amicus brief filed by the Children's Defense Fund states that 
at least 10% of the junior and senior high school students in the 
States sampled were suspended one or more times in ·the 1972-1973 
school year. The data on which this conclusion rests were obtained 
from an extensive survey prepared by the Office for Civil Rights of 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The Children's 
Defense Fund reviewed the suspension data for five States-Arkansas, 
Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and South Carolina. 
Likewise, an amicm brief submitted by several school associations 
in Ohio indicates that the number of suspensions is significant: in 
1972-1973, 4,054 students out of a school enrollment of 81,007 were 
suspended in Cincinnati; 7,352 of 57,000 students were suspended in 
Akron; and 14,598 of 142,053 students were suspended in Cleveland. 
See also the Office of Civil Rights Survey, supra, finding that ap-
proximately 20,000 students in New York City, 12,000 in Cleveland, 
~.ooo in Mia.mi, and 9,000 in Memphis were suspended at least once 
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the public schools, or as to the extent of reliance upon 
the right to suspend. They also demonstrate that if 
hearings were required for a substantial percentage of 
short-term suspensions, school authorities would have 
time to do little else. 
B 
The State's generalized interest in maintaining an 
orderly school system is not incompatible with the indi-
vidual interest of the student. Educa.tion in any mean-
ingful sense includes the inculcation of an understanding 
in each pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience 
thereto. This understanding is no less important than 
learning to read and write. One who does not compre-
hend the meaning and necessity of discipline is handi-
capped not merely in his education but throughout his 
subsequent life. In an age when the home and church 
play a diminishing role in shaping the character and value 
judgments of the young, a heavier responsibility falls 
upon the schools. When an immature student merits 
censure for his conduct, he is rendered a disservice if ap-
propriate sanctions are not applied or if procedures for 
their application are so formalized as to invite a challenge 
to the teacher's authority 11-an invitation which rebelli-
ous or even merely spirited teenagers are likely to accept. 
The lesson of discipline is not merely a matter of the 
student's self-interest in the shaping of his own character 
and personality; it provides an early understanding of 
the relevance to the social compact of respect for the 
rights of others. The classroom is the laboratory in 
which this lesson of life is best learned. Mr. Justice 
Black summed it up : 
"School discipline, like parental discipline, is an 
during the 1972-1973 school year. Even these figures are probably 
somewhat conservative since some schools did not reply to the survey. 
nsee generally J. Dobson, Dare to Discipline (1972). 
10 
73-898-DISSENT 
GOSS v. LOPEZ 
integral and important part of training our children 
to be good citizens-to be better citizens." Tinker, 
supra, at 524 (dissenting opinion) . 
In assessing in constitutional terms the need to pro-
tect pupils from unfair minor discipline by school authori-
ties, the Court ignores the commonality of interest of the 
State and pupils in the public school system. Rather, 
it thinks in traditional judicial terms of an adversary 
situation. To be sure, there will be the ocrasional pupil 
innocent of any rule infringement who is mistakenly sus-
pended or whose infraction is too minor to justify suspen~ 
sion. But, while there is no evidence indicating the fre-
quency of unjust suspensions, commop sense suggests 
that they will not be numerous in relation to the total 
number, and that mistakes or injustices will usually be 
righted by informal means. 
C 
One of the more disturbing aspects of today's decision 
is its indiscriminate reliance upon the judiciary, and the 
adversary process, as the means of resolving many 
of the most routine problems arising in the class-
room. In mandating due process procedures the Court 
misapprehends the reality of the normal teacher-
pupil relationship. There is an ongoing relationship, 
one in which the teacher must occupy many roles-edu-
cator, adviser, friend and, at times, parent-substitute.u 
It is rarely adversary in nature except with respect to the 
chronically disruptive or insubordinate pupil whom the 
teacher must be free to discipline without frustrating 
formali ties.18 
12 The role of the teacher in our society historically has been an 
honored and respected one, rooted in the experience of decades that 
has left for most of us warm memories of our teachers, especially 
those of the formative years of primary and secondary education. 
13 In this regard, the relationship between a student and teacher 
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The Ohio statute, providing as it does for due notice 
both to parents and the Board, is compatible with the 
teacher-pupil relationship and the informal resolution of 
mistaken disciplinary action. We have relied. for genera-
tions upon the experience, good faith and dedication of 
those who staff our public schools,1"' and the nonadversary 
means of airing grievances that always have been avail-
able to pupils and their parents. One would have 
thought before today's opinion that this informal method 
of resolving differences was more compatible with the in-
terests of all concerned than resort to any constitution-
is manifestly different from that between a welfare administrator 
and a recipient (see Goldberg v. Kelly, supra), a motor vehicle de-
partment and a driver( see Bell v. Burson, supra), a debtor and a 
creditor (see S~iadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra; Fuentes v. 
Shevin, supra; 'Mitchell v. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974)), a parole 
officer and a parolee (see Morrissey v. Brewer, supra), or even an 
empolyer aµd ap employee (see Arnett v. Kennedy, supra; Board of 
Regents of State College v. Roth, supra; Pe_rry v. Sinderman, 408 
U. S. 593 (1972)) . In many of these noneducation settings there is-
for purposes of this analysis-a "faceless" administrator dealing with 
an equally "faceless" recipient of some form of government benefit or 
license; in others, such as the garnishment and repossession cases, there 
is a conflict of interest relationship. Our public school system, how-
ever, is premised on the belief that teachers and pupils should not be 
"faceless" to each other. Nor does the educational relationship 
present a typical "conflict of interest." Rather, the relationship 
traditionally is marked by a coincidence of interests. 
Yet the Court, relying on cases such as Sniadach and Fuentes, ap-
parently views the classroom of teenagers as comparable to the 
oompetitive and adversary environment of the adult, commercial 
world. 
H A traditional factor in any due process analysis is "the pro-
tection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is 
challenged ... . " Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 
supra, at 163 (Frankfurter, J ., concurring) . In the public school 
setting there is a high degree of such protection since a teacher has 
responsibility for, and a commitment to, his pupils that is absent in 
other due process contexts. 
12 
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alized procedure, however blandly it may be defined by 
the Court. 
D 
In my view, the constitutionalizing of routine class-
room decisions not only represents a significant and un-
wise extension of the Due Process Clause; it also was 
quite unnecessary in view of the safeguards prescribed 
by the Ohio statute. This is demonstrable from a com-
parison of what the Court mandates as required by due 
process with the protective procedures it finds constitu~ 
tionally insufficient. 
The Ohio statute, limiting suspensions to not more 
than eight school days, requires written notice including 
the "reasons therefor" to the student's parents and to 
the Board of Education within 24 hours of any suspen-
sion. The Court only requires oral or written notice to 
the pupil, with no notice being required to the parents 
or the Board of Education. The mere fact of the statu-
tory requirement is a deterrent against arbitrary action 
by the principal. The Board, usually elected by the· 
people and sensitive to constituent relations, may be 
expected to identify a principal whose record of suspen-
sions merits inquiry. In any event, parents placed on 
written notice may exercise their rights as constituents 
by going directly to the Board or a member thereof if 
dissatisfied with the principal's decision. 
Nor does the Court's due process "hearihg" appear tO' 
provide significantly more protection than that already 
available. The Court holds only that the principal must 
listen to the student's "version of the events," either· 
before suspension or thereafter-depending upon the cir--
cumstances. Ante, at 17- 18. Such a truncated "hear-
ing" is likely to be considerably less meaningful than the· 
Qpportunities for correcting; mistakes already availabl~ 
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to students and parents. Indeed, in this case all of the 
students and parents were offered an opportunity to 
attend a conference with school officials. 
In its rush to mandate a constitutional rule, the Court 
appears to give no weight to the practical manner in 
which suspension problems normally would be worked 
out under Ohio law.1 5 One must doubt, then, whether 
the constitutionalization of the student-teacher relation-
ship, with all of its attendant doctrinal and practical 
difficulties, will assure in any meaningful sense greater 
protection than that already afforded under Ohio law. 
III 
No one can foresee the ultimate frontiers of the 
new "thicket" the Court now enters. Today's ruling 
appears to sweep within the protecteq interest in educa-
tion a multitude of discretionary decisions in the educa-
tional process. Teachers and other school authorities 
are required to make many decisions that may have 
serious consequences for the pupil. They must decide, 
for example, how to grade the student's work, whether 
a student. passes or fails a course/~ whether he is to be 
promoted, whether he is required to take certain sub-
jects, whether he may be excluded from interscholastic 
athletics 11 or other extracurricular activities, whether he 
may be removed from one school and sent to another, 
whether he may be bused long distances when available 
schools are nearby, and whether he should pe placed in 
a "general," "vocational," or "college-preparatory" track. 
15 The Court itself recognizes that the requirements it imposes are, 
"if anythmg, less than a fair-minded school principal would impose on 
!iimself m order to av01d unfair suspensions." Ante, at 17. 
16 See Connelly v U. of Vermont, 244 F. Supp. 156 (Vt . 1956) . 
1 7 See Kelly v. Metropolitan County Boa.rd of Education of Nash,. 
ville, 393 F. Supp. 485 (MD Tenn. 1968) . 
14 
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In these and many similar situations claims of impair• 
ment of one's educational entitlement identical in prin• 
ciple to those before the Court today can be asserted 
with equal or greater justification. Likewise, in many 
of these situations, the pupil can advance the same types 
of speculative and subjective injury given critical weight 
in this case. The District Court, relying upon general-
ized opinion evidence, concluded that a suspended stu-
dent · may suffer psychological injury in one or more of 
the ways set forth in the margin below.18 The Court 
appears to adopt this rationale. See ante, at 9. 
It hardly need be said that if a student, as a result of 
a day's suspension, suffers "a blow" to his "self esteem," 
"feels powerless," views "teachers with resentment," or 
feels "stigmatized by his teachers," identical psychologi-
cal harms will flow from many other routine and neces-
sary school decisions. The student who is given a fail-
ing grade, who is not promoted, who is excluded from 
certain extracurricular activities, who is assigned to a 
school reserved for children of less than average ability, 
or who is placed in the "vocational" rather than the 
"college preparatory" track, is unlikely to suffer any less 
psychological injury than if he were suspended for a day 
for a relatively minor infraction.19 
18 The psychological injuries so perceived were as follows: 
"1. The suspension is a blow to the student's self-esteem. 
"2. The student feels powerless and helpless. 
"3. The student views school authorities and teachers with resent-
ment, suspicion and fear. 
" 4. The student learns withdrawals as a mode of problem solving. 
"5. The student has little perception of the reasons for the sus-
pension. He does not know what offending acts he committed. 
"6. The student is stigmatized by his teachers and school adminis-
trators as a deviant. They expect the student to be a troublemaker 
in the future.'' (Decision of three-judge District Court, Jurisdic-
tional Statement, at 43.) 
i 9 There is, no doubt, a schoo1 of modern psychological or psychi-
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If, as seems apparent, the Court will now require due 
process procedures whenever such routine school deci-
sions are challenged, the impact upon public education 
will 'be serious indeed. The discretion anq judgment of 
federal courts acro:::s the land often will be substituted for 
that of the 50-state legislatures, the 14,000 school boards 20 
and the 2,000,000 21 teachers who heretofore have been 
responsible for the administration of the American public 
1 
school system. If the Court perceives a rational and 
analytically sound distinction between the discretionary 
decision by school authorities to suspend a pupil for a 
brief period, and the types of discretionary school deci-
sions described above, it would be prudent to articulate 
it in today's opinion. Otherwise, the federal courts 
should prepare themselves for a vast new role in society. 
IV 
Not so long ago, state deprivations of the most sig-
nificant forms of state largesse were not thought to re-
atric persuasion than maintains that any discipline of the young is 
detrimental. Whatever one may think of the wisdom of this un-
proved theory, it hardly affords dependable support for a constitu-
tional decision. Moreover, even the theory's proponents would 
concede that the magnitude of injury depends primarily upon the 
individual child or teenager. A classroom reprimand by the teacher 
may be more traumatic to the shy, timid introvert than explus1on 
would be the aggressive, rebellious extrovert. In my view we 
tend to lose our sense of perspective and proportion in a case of 
this kind. For the average, normal child-the vast majority-
suspension for a few days is simply not a detriment; it is a com-
monplace occurrence, with some 10% of all students being suspended; 
it leaves no scars; affects no reputations; indeed, it often may be 
viewed by the young as a badge of some distinction and a welcome 
holiday. 
20 This estimate was supplied by the National School Board As-
:Sociation, Washington, D. C. 
21 See U. S. Office of Education, Elementary and Secondary Public 
School Statistics, 1972-1973. 
16. 
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quire due process protection on the ground that the 
deprivation resulted only in the loss of a state provided 
"benefit." E. g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46 
(CADC), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U. S. 
918 (1951). In recent years the Court, wisely in my 
view, has rejected the "wooden distinction between 'rights' 
and 'privileges,' " Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 
U. S., at 571, and looked instead to the significance of the 
state created or enforced right and to the substantiality 
of the alleged deprivation. Today's opinion appears to 
abandon this reasonable approach by holding in effect 
that government infringement of any interest to which a 
person is entitled, no matter what the interest or how 
inconsequential the infringement, requires constitutional 
protection. As it is difficult to think of any less conse-
quential infringement than suspension of a junior high 
school student for a single day, it is equally difficult to 
perceive any principled limit to the new reach of proce-
dural due process.22 
22 Some half dozen years ago, the Court extended First Amendment 
rights under limited circumstances to public school pupils. Mr. Jus-
tice Black, dissenting, viewed the decision as ushering in "an entirely 
new era in which thP- power to control pupils by the elected 'officials 
of state-supported public schools . . .' is in ultimate effect trans-
ferred to the Supreme Court." Tinker, supra, at 515. There were· 
some who thought Mr. Justice Black was unduly concerned. But 
the prophesy of Mr. Justice Black is now being fulfilled. In the· 
few years since Tinker there have been literally hundreds of cases 
by school children alleging violation of their constitutional rights. 
This flood of litigation, between pupils · and school authorities, wa-s· 
triggered by a narrowly written First Amendment case which I could' 
well have joined on its facts. One can only speculate as to the· 
extent to which public education will l-ie disrupted by giving every 
school child the power to contest. in court any decision made by his 
teacher which arguably infringes the s.tate conferred right to, 
education .. 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JuSTICE, 
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST 
join, dissenting. 
The Court today invalidates an Ohio statute that per-
mits student suspensicns from school without a hearing 
"for not more than ten days." 1 The decision unneces-
sarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in the 
operation of our public schools that may affect adversely 
the quality of education. The Court holds for the first 
time that the federal courts, rather than educational 
officials and state legislatures, have the authority to 
determine the rules applicable to routine classroom disci .. 
pline of children and teenagers in the public schools. It 
justifies this unprecedented intrusion into the process of 
elementary and secondary education by identifying a 
new constitutional right: the right of a student not to 
be suspended for as much as a single day without notice 
and a due process hearing either before or promptly fol-
lowing the suspension. 2 
1 The Ohio Statute, § 3313.66 of the Ohio Rev. Code, actually is a 
limitation on the time-honored practice of school authorities de-
termining themselves the appropriate duration of suspensions. The 
statute allows the superintendent or principal of a public school to 
suspend a pupil "for not more than ten days ... " (italics supplied) ; 
and requires notification of the parent or guardian in writing within 
24 hours of any suspension. 
2 Section 3313.66 also provides authority for the expulsion of pupils, 
but requires a hearing thereon by the-school board upon reg\lest ,of 
2 
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The Courf s decision rests on the premise that, under 
Ohio law, education is a property interest protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and 
therefore that any suspension requires notice and a hear-
ing.3 In my view, a student's interest in education is 
not infringed by a suspension within the limited period 
prescribed by Ohio law. Moreover, to the extent that 
there may be some arguable infringement, it is too specu-
lative, transitory and insubstantial to justify imposition 
of a constitutional rule, 
I 
Although we held in San Antonio Independent School 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 35 ( 1973), that education 
is not a right protected by the Constitution, Ohio has 
elected by statute to provide free education for all youths 
age six to 21, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3313.48, 3313.64, with 
children under 18 years of age being compelled to attend 
school. Id., at § 3321.01 et seq. State law, therefore, 
extends the right of free public school education to Ohio 
students in accordance with the education laws of that 
State. The right or entitlement to education so created 
is protected in a proper case by the Due Process Clause. 
See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); 
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974) (POWELL, 
J., concurring). In my view, this is not such a case. 
In identifying property interests subject to due process 
a parent or guardian. The rights of pupils expelled are not involved 
in this case, which concerns only the limited discretion of school 
authorities to suspend for not more than 10 days. Expulsion, usually 
resulting at least in loss of a school year or semester, is an incom-
parably more serious matter than the brief suspension, traditionally 
used as the principal sanction for enforcing routine discipline. The· 
Ohio statute recognizes this distinction. 
8 The Court speaks of "exclusion from the educational process 
for more than a trivial period ... ," ante, at 10, but its opinion makes 
clear that even one day's suspension mvokes_ the constitutional proce.-
<du.re mandated tQday. 
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protections, the Court's past opm1ons make clear that 
these interests "are created and their dimensions 'are 
defined by existing rules and understandings that stem 
ftom an independent source such as state law." Board 
of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 U. S., at 577 ( emphasis 
supplied). The Ohio statute that creates the right to a 
"free" education also explicitly authorizes a principal to 
suspend a student for up to 10 days. Ohio Rev. Stat. 
§§ 3313.48, 3313.64, 3313.66. Thus the very legislation 
which "defines" the "dimension" of the student's entitle-
ment, while providing a right to education generally, does 
not establish this right free of discipline imposed in ac-
cord with Ohio law. Rather, the right is encompassed 
in the entire package of statutory provisions governing 
education in Ohio-of which the power to suspend is one. 
The Court thus disregards the basic structure of Ohio 
law in posturing this case as if Ohio had conferred an 
unqualified right to education, thereby compelling the 
school authorities to conform to due process procedures 
in imposing the most routine discipline.4 
4 The Court apparently reads into Ohio law by implication a 
qualification that suspensions may be imposed only for "cause," 
thereby analogizing this case to the Civil Service laws considered 
in Arnett v. Kennedy, supra. To be sure, one may assume that 
pupil" are not suspended at the whim or caprice of the school 
official, and the statute does provide for notice of the suspension 
with the "reasons therefor." But the same statute draws a sharp 
distinction between suspension and the far more drastic sanction 
of e:,qmlsion. A hearing is required only for the iatter. To follow 
the Court's analysis, one must conclude that the legislature never-
theless intended-without saying ser-that suspension also is of such 
,consequence that it may be imposed only for causes which can be 
justified at a hearing. The unsoundness of reading this sort of 
requirement into the statute is apparent from a comparison with 
Arnett. In that case, Congress expressly provided that nonproba-
tionary federal employees should be discharged only for "cause." 
'!'his requirement reflected congressional recognition of the serioUSr 
4 
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But however one may define the entitlement to educa-
tion provided by Ohio law, I would conclude that a depri-
vation of not more than 10 days' suspension from school, 
imposed as a routine disciplinary measure, does not as-
sume constitutional dimensions. Contrary to the Court's 
assertion, our cases support rather than "refute" appel-
lant's argument that "the Due Process Clause ... comes 
into play only when the State subjects a student to a 
'severe detriment or a grievous loss.'" Ante, at 10. Re-
cently, the Court reiterated precisely this standard for 
analyzing due process claims: 
"Whether any procedural protections are due 
depends on the extent to which an individual will 
be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), quoted 
in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263 (1970).'' 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 ( 1972) 
( emphasis supplied). 
In Morrissey we applied that standard to require due 
process procedures for parole revocation on the ground 
that revocation "inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the parolee 
and often on others.'' Id., at 482. See also Board of 
Re(Jents v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S., at 573 ("seriously dam-
age" reputation and standing); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 
535, 539 (1971) ("important interests of the licensees"); 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971) ("sig-
nificant property interest").5 
uess of discharging such employees. There simply is no analogy 
between termination of nonprobationary employment of a civil 
service employee and the suspension of a public school pupil for 
not more than 10 days. Even if the Court is correct in implying 
some concept of justifiable cause in the Ohio procedure, it could 
hardly be stretched to the constitutional proportions found present, 
in Arnett. 
4 Indeed, the Court itself quotes from a portion of Justice Frank• 
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The Ohio suspension statute . allows no serious or sig-
nificant infringement of education. It authorizes only a 
maximum suspension of eight school days, less than 5% of 
the normal 180-day school year. Absences of such limited 
duration will rarely affect a pupil's opportunity to learn 
or his scholastic performance. Indeed, the record in this 
case reflects no educational injury to appellees. Each 
completed the semester in which the suspension oc-
curred and performed at least as well as he or she 
had in previous years.0 Despite the Court's unsupported 
speculation that a suspended student could be "seriously 
damaged" (ante, at 9), there is no factual showing 
of any such damage to appellees. 
The Court also relies on a perceived deprivation of 
"liberty" resulting from any suspension, arguing-again 
without factual support in the record pertaining to 
these appellees-that a suspension harms a student's 
reputation. In view of the Court's decision in 
Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, I would have 
thought that this argument was plainly untenable. 
Underscoring the need for "serious damage" to reputa-
tion, the Roth Court held that a nontenured teacher who 
is not rehired by a public university could not claim to 
furtu's concurrence in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. 
McGrath, supra, which explicitly refers to "a person in jeopardy of 
serious loss." 341 U. S., at 172; see ante, at 14 (emphasis supplied) . 
Nor is the "de minimis" standard referred to by the Court rele-
vant in this case. That standard was first stated by Justice 
Harlan in a concurring opinion in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 
395 U. S. 337, 342 ( 1969) , and then quoted in a footnote to the 
Court's opinion in Fuentes v Shevin, 407 U. S. 69, 90, n. 21 (1972) . 
Both Sniadach and Fuentes, however, involved resolution of property 
disputes between two private parties claiming an interest in the same 
property. Neither case pertained to an interest conferred by the 
State. 
6 Appendix, at 163- 171 (testimony of Norval Goss, Director of 
Pupil Personnel) . See opinion of the three-judge court, Jurisdic-
tional Statement, at 42, 44. 
e 
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suffer sufficient reputational injury to require constitu-
tional protections. 7 Surely a brief suspension is of less 
serious consequence to the reputation of a teenage 
student. 
II 
In prior decisions, this Court has explicitly recognized 
that school authorities must have broad discretionary au-
thority in the daily operat.ion of public schools. This 
includes wide latitude with respect to maintaining disci-
pline and good order. Addressing this point spe<)ifically, 
the Court stated in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 
393 u. s. 503,507 (1969): 
"[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need 
for affirming the comprehensive authority of the 
States and of school officials, consistent with funda-
mental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools." 8 
Such an approach properly recognizes the unique nature 
of public education and the correspondingly limited role 
of the judiciary in its supervision. In Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968), the Court stated: 
"By and large, public education in our Nation is 
committed to the control of state and local authori-
ties. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the 
resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily opera-
7 See also Wisconsin v. Constineau, 400 U.S. 433,437 (1971), quot-
ing the "grievous loss" standard first articulated in Joint Anti~Fascist 
Committee v. McGrath, supra. 
8 In dissent on the First Amendment issue, Mr. Justice Harlan 
recognized the Court's basic agreement on the limited role of the 
judiciary in overseeing school disciplinary decisions: 
"I am reluctant to believe that there 1s any disagreement between 
the majority and myself on the proposition that school officials 
.should be accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline 
and good order in their institutions." Id., at 526. 
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tion of school systems and which do not directly and 
sharply implicate basic constitutional values." 
The Court today turns its back on these precedents. 
It can hardly seriously be claimed that a school princi-
pal's d~cision to suspend a pupil for a single day would 
"directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional 
values." Epperson, supra. 
Moreover, the Court ignores the experience of. man-
kind, as well as the long history of our law, recognizing 
that there are differences which must be accommodated in 
determining the rights and duties of children as com-
pared with those of adults. Examples of this distinction 
abound in our law: in contracts, in torts, in criminal 
law and procedure, in criminal sanctions and rehabilita-
tion, and in the right to vote and to hold office. Until 
today, and except in the special context of the First 
Amendment issue in Tinker, the educational rights of 
children and teenagers in the elementary and secondary 
schools have not been analogized to the rights of adults 
or to those accorded college students. Even with respect 
to the First Amendment, the rights of children have not 
been regarded as "coextensive with those of adults." 
MR. JusTICE STEWART, concurring in Tinker, supra, at 515. 
A 
I turn now to some of the considerations which sup-
port the Court's former view regarding the comprehen-
sive authority of the States and school officials "to pre-
scribe and control conduct in the schools." Tinker, 
supra, at 507. Unlike the divergent and even sharp 
conflict of interests usually present where due process 
rights are asserted, the interests here implicated-of the 
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The State's interest, broadly put, is in the proper func .. 
tioning of its public school system for the benefit of all 
pupils and the public generally. Few rulings would 
interfere more extensively in the daily functioning of 
schools than subjecting routine discipline to the 
formalities and judicial oversight of due process. Sus-
pensions are one of the traditional means--ranging from 
keeping a student after class to permanent expulsion-
used to maintain discipline in the schools. It is common 
knowledge that maintaining order and reasonable de-
corum in school buildings and classrooms is a major 
educational problem, and one which has increased sig-
nificantly in magnitude in recent years.0 Often the 
teacher, in protecting the rights of other children to an 
education (if not his or their safety), is compelled to rely 
on the power to suspend. 
The facts set forth in the margin 10 leave little room for 
doubt as to the magnitude of the disciplinary problem in 
9 See generally S. Bailey, Disruption in Urban Secondary Schools 
(1970), which summarizes some of the recent surveys on school 
disruption. A Syracuse Univen,ity study, for example, found that 
85% of the schools responding reported some type of significant dis-
ruption in the years 1967-1970. 
10 An amicus brief filed by the Children's Defense Fund states that 
at least 10% of the junior and senior high school students in the 
States sampled were suspended one or more times in the 1972-1973 
school year. The data on which this conclusion rests were obtained 
from an extensive survey prepared by the Office for Civil Rights of 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The Children's 
Defense Fund reviewed the suspension data for five States-Arkansas, 
Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and South Carolina. 
Likewise, an amicus brief submitted by several school associations 
in Ohio indicates that the number of suspensions is significant: in 
1972-1973, 4,054 students out of a school enrollment of 81,007 were 
suspended in Cincinnati; 7,352 of 57,000 students were suspended in 
Akron; and 14,598 of 142,053 students were suspended in Cleveland 
See also the Office of Civil Rights Survey, supra, finding t·hat ap .. 
proximately 20,000 students in New York City, 12,000 in Cleveland, 
'.lP0O in Miami, and 9,000 in Memphis were suspen<:1€d at least once 
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the public schools, or as to the extent of reliance upon 
the right to suspend. They also demonstrate that if 
hearings were required for a substantial percentage of 
short-term suspensions, school authorities would have 
time to do little else, 
B 
The State's generalized interest in maintaining an 
orderly school system is not incompatible with the indi-
vidual interest of the student. Education in any mean-
ingful sense includes the inculcation of an understanding 
in each pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience 
theret.o. This understanding is no less important than 
learning to read and write. One who does not compre-
hend the meaning and necessity of discipline is handi-
capped not merely in his education but throughout his 
subsequent life. In an age when the home and church 
play a diminishing role in shaping the character and value 
judgments of the young, a heavier responsibility falls 
upon the schools. When an immature student merits 
censure for his conduct, he is rendered a disservice if ap-
propriate sanctions are not applied or if procedures for 
their application are so formalized as to invite a challenge 
to the teacher's authority 11-an invitation which rebelli-
ol!s or even merely spirited teenagers are likely to accept. 
The lesson of discipline is not merely a matter of the 
student's self-interest in the shaping of his own character 
and personality; it provides an early understanding of 
the relevance to the social compact of respect for the 
rights of others. The clarssroom is the laboratory in 
which this lesson of life is best learned. Mr. Justice 
Black summed it up: 
"School discipline, like parental discipline, is an 
during the 1972- 1973 school year. Even these figures are probably 
somewhat conservative since some schools did not reply to the survey. 
11 See generally J . Dobson, Dare to Discipline (1972), 
10 
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integral and important part of training our children 
to be good citizens-to be better citizens." Tinker, 
supra, at 524 (dissenting opinion). 
In assessing in constitutional terms the need to pro-
tect pupils from unfair minor discipline by school authori-
ties, the Court ignores the commonality of interest of the 
State and pupils in the public school system. Rather, 
it thinks in traditional judicial terms of an adversary 
situation. To be sure, there will be the occasional pupil 
innocent of any rule infringement who is mistakenly sus-
pended or whose infraction is too minor to justify suspen-
sion. But, while there is no evidence indicating the fre-
quency of unjust suspensions, common sense suggests 
that they will not be numerous in relation to the total 
number, and that mistakes or injustices will usually be 
righted by informal means. 
C 
One of the more disturbing aspects of today's decision 
is its indiscriminate reliance upon the judiciary, and the 
adversary process, as the means of resolving many 
of the most routine problems arising in the class. 
room. In mandating due process procedures the Court 
misapprehends the reality of the normal teacher• 
pupil relationship. There is an ongoing relationship, 
one in which the teacher must occupy many roles-edu. 
cator, adviser, friend and, at times, parent-substitute.12 
It is rarely adversary in nature except with respect to the 
chronically disruptive or insubordinate pupil whom the 
teacher must be free to discipline without frustrating 
formali ties.18 
12 The role of the teacher in our society historically has been an 
honored and respected one, rooted in the experience of decades that 
has left for most of us warm memories of our teachers, especially 
those of the formative years of primary and secondary education. 
18 In this regard, the relationship between a student and teacher 
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The Ohio statute, providing as it does for due notice 
both to parents and the Board, is compatible with the 
teacher-pupil relationship and the informal resolution of 
mistaken disciplinary action. We have relied for genera-
tions upon the experience, good faith and dedication of 
those who staff our public schools, 14 and the nonadversary 
means of airing grievances that always have been avail-
able to pupils and their parents. One would have 
thought before today's opinion that this informal method 
of resolving differences was more compatible with the in-
terests of all concerned than resort to any constitution-
is manifestly different from that between a welfare administrator 
and a recipient (see Goldberg v. Kelly, supra), a motor vehicle de-
partment and a driver( see Bell v. Burson, supra), a debtor and a 
creditor (see Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra; Fuentes v. 
Shevin, supra; Mitchell v. Grant, 416 U. S. 600 (1974)), a parole 
officer and a parolee ( see Morrissey v. Brewer, supra), or even an 
empolyer and an employee (see Arnett v. Kennedy, supra; Board of 
Regents of State College v. Roth, supra; Pe.rry v. Sinderman, 408 
U. S. 593 (1972)) . In many of these noneducation settings there is-
for purposes of this analysis-a "faceless" administrator dealing with 
an equally "faceless" recipient of some form of government benefit or 
license; in others, such as the garnishment and repossession cases, there 
is a conflict of interest relationship. Our public school system, how-
ever, is premised on the belief that teachers and pupils should not be 
"faceless" to each other. Nor does the educational relationship 
present a typical "conflict of interest." R11.ther, the relationship 
traditionally is marked by a coincidence of interests. 
Yet the Court, relying on cases such as Sniadach and Fuentes, ap-
parently views the classroom of teenagers as comparable to the 
competitive and adversary environment of the adult, commercial 
~~- -
14 A traditional factor in any due process analysis is "the pro-
tection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is 
challenged ... . " Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 
supra, at 163 (Frankfurter, J ., concurring). In the public school 
setting there is a high degree of such protection since a teacher has 
responsibility for, and a commitment to, his pupils that is absent in 
other due process contexts. 
12 
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alized procedure, however blandly it may be defined by 
the Court. 
D 
In my view, the constitutionalizing of routine class .. 
-room decisions not only represents a significant and un-
wise extension of the Due Process Clause; it also was 
quite unnecessary in view of the safeguards prescribed 
by the Ohio statute. This is demonstrable from a com-
parison of what the Court mandates as required by due 
process with the protective procedures it finds constitu• 
tionally insufficient. 
The Ohio statute, limiting suspensions to not more 
than eight school days, requires written notice including 
the "reasons therefor" to the student's parents and to 
the Board of Educa.tion within 24 hours of any suspen-
sion. The Court only requires oral or written notice to 
the pupil, with no notice being required to the parents 
or the Board of Education. The mere fact of the statu-
tory requirement is a deterrent against arbitrary action 
by the principal. The Board, usually elected by the 
people and sensitive to constituent relations, may be 
expected to identify a principal whose record of suspen-
sions merits inquiry. In any event, parents placed on 
written notice may exercise their rights as constituents 
by going directly to the Board or a member thereof if 
dissatisfied with the principal's decision. 
Nor does the Court's due process "hearing" appear to 
provide significantly more protection than that already 
available. The Court holds only that the principal must 
listen to the student's "version of the events," either 
before suspension or thereafter-de?ending upon the cirw 
cumstances. Ante, at 17-18. Such a truncated "hear-
ing" is likely to be considerably less meaningful than the 
opportunities for correcting mistakes already available 
' 
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to students and parents. Indeed, in this case all of the 
students and parents were offered an opportunity to 
attend a conference with school officials. 
In its rush to mandate a constitutional rule, the Court 
appears to give no weight to the practical manner in 
which suspension problems normally would be worked 
out under Ohio law.'5 One must doubt, then, whether 
the constitutionalization of the student-teacher relation-
ship, with all of its attendant doctrinal and practical 
difficulties, will assure in any meaningful sense greater 
protection than that already afforded under Ohio law. 
III 
No one can foresee the ultimate frontiers of the 
new "thicket" the Court now enters. Today's ruling 
appears to sweep within the protected interest in educa-
tion a multitude of discretionary decisions in the educa-
tional process. Teachers and other school authorities 
are required to make many decisions that may have 
serious consequences for the pupil. They must decide, 
for example, how to grade the student's work, whether 
a student passes or fails a course,16 whether he is to be 
promoted, whether he is required to take certain sub-
jects, whether he may be excluded from interscholastic 
athletics 17 or other extracurricular activities, whether he 
may be removed from one school and sent to another, 
whether he may be bused long distances when available 
schools are nearby, and whether he should be placed in 
a "general," "vocational," or "college-preparatory" track. 
15 The Court itself recognizes that the requirements it imposes are, 
"if anything, less than a fair-minded school principal would impose on 
l1imself in order to avoid unfair suspensions." Ante, at 17. 
16 See Connelly v. U. of Vermont, 244 F. Supp. 156 (Vt. 1956) . 
17 See Kelly v. Metropolitan County Board of Education of N(JjJh~ 
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In these and many similar situations claims of impair~ 
ment of one's educational entitlement identical in prin-
ciple to those before the Court today can be asserted 
with equal or greater justification. Likewise, in many 
of these situations, the pupil can advance the same types 
of speculative and subjective injury given critical weight 
in this case. The District Court, relying upon general-
ized opinion evidence, concluded that a suspended stu-
dent may suffer psychological injury in one or more of 
the ways set forth in the margin below.18 The Court 
appears to adopt this rationale. See ante, at 9. 
It hardly need be said that if a student, as a result of 
a day's suspension, suffers "a blow" to his "self esteem," 
"feels powerless," views "teachers with resentment," oi-
feels "stigmatized by his teachers," identical psychologi-
cal harms will flow from many other routine and neces-
sary school decisions. The student who is given a fail-
ing grade, who is not promoted, who is excluded from 
certain extracurricular activities, who is assigned to a 
school reserved for children of less than average ability, 
or who is placed in the "vocational" rather than the 
"college preparatory" track, is unlikely to suffer any less 
psychological injury than if he were suspended for a day 
for a relatively minor infraction.19 
18 The psychological injuries so perceived were as follows: 
"l. The suspension is a blow to the student's self-esteem. 
"2. The student feels powerless and helpless. 
"3. The student views school authorities and teachers with resent-
ment, suspicion and fear. 
"4 The student 1earnf'I withdrawals as a mode of problem solving. 
"5. The student has little perception of the reasons for the sus-
·pension. He does not kI1ow what offendmg acts he committed. 
"6. Tne student is stigmatized by his teachers and school adminis-
trators as a deviant. They expect the student to be a troublemaker 
in the future ." (Decision of three-judge District Court, Jurisdic-
,tional Statement, at 43.) 
~There- is, no doubt, a school of ·modern :Psychological or psychi~ 
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If, as seems apparent, the Court will now require due 
process procedures whenever such routine school deci-
sions are challenged, the impact upon public education 
will be serious indeed. The discretion and judgment of 
federal courts acrol!s the land often will be substituted for 
that of the 50-state legislatures, the 14,000 school boards 20 
and the 2,000,000 21 teachers who heretofore have been 
responsible for the administration of the American public 
school system. If the Court perceives a rational and 
analytically sound distinction between the discretionary 
decision by school authorities to suspend a pupil for a 
brief period, and the types of discretionary school deci-
sions described above, it would be prudent to articulate 
it in today's opinioP. Otherwise, the federal courts 
should prepare themselves for a vast new role in society. 
IV 
Not so long ago, state deprivations of the most sig-
nificant forms of state largesse were not thought to re-
atric persuasion than maintains that any discipline of the young is 
detrimental. Whatever one may think of the wisdom of this un-
proved theory, it hardly affords dependable support for a constitu-
tional decision. Moreover, even the theory's proponents would 
concede that the magnitude of injury depends primarily upon the 
individual child or teenager. A classroom reprimand by the teacher 
may be more traumatic to the shy, timid introvert than explusion 
would be the aggressive, rebellious extrovert. In my view we 
tend to lose our sense of perspective and proportion in a case of 
this kind. For the average, normal child-the vast majority-
suspension for a. few days is simply not a detrimf'nt; it is a com-
monplace occurrence, with some 10% of all students being suspended; 
it leaves no scars; affects no reputations; indeed, it often may be 
viewed by the young as a badge of some distinction and a welcome 
holiday. 
20 This estimate was supplied by the National School Board As-
sociation, Washington, D. C. 
21 See U. S. Office of Education, Elementary and Secondary Public 
School Statistics, 1972-1973. 
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quire due process protection on the ground that the 
deprivation resulted only in the loss of a state provided 
"benefit." E. g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46 
(CADC), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U. S. 
918 (1951). In recent years the Court, wisely in my 
view, has rejected the "wooden distinction between 'rights' 
and 'privileges,'" Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 
U. S., at 571, and looked instead to the significance of the 
state created or enforced right and to the substantiality 
of the alleged deprivation. Today's opinion appears to 
abandon this reasonable approach by holding in effect 
that government infringement of any interest to which a 
person is entitled, no matter what the interest or how 
inconsequential the infringement, requires constitutional 
protection. As it is difficult to think of any less conse-
quential infringement than suspension of a junior high 
school student for a single day, it is equally difficult to 
perceive any principled limit to the new reach of proce-
dural due process.2!1 
22 Some half dozen years ago, the Court extended First Amendment 
rights under limited circumstances to public school pupils. Mr. Jus-
tice Black, dissenting, viewed the decision as ushering in "an entirely 
new era in which th~ power to control pupils by the elected 'officials 
of state-supported public schools . . .' is in ultimate effect trans--
ferred to the Supreme Court.'' Tinker, supra, at 515. There were 
some who thought Mr. Justice Black was unduly concerned. But 
the prophesy of Mr. Justice Black is now being fulfilled. In the 
few years since Tinker there have been literally hundreds of cases 
by school children alleging violation of their constitutional rights. 
This flood of litigation, between pupils and school authorities, was 
triggered by a narrowly written First Amendment case which I could 
well have joined on its facts. One can only speculate as to the 
extent to which public education will be disrupted by giving every 
school child the power to contest. in court any decision made by his 
teacher which arguably infring_es the s.tate conferred right to 
tducation. 
